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       Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation is a critical assessment of “biopoetics”: 
a new literary theory that attempts to import ideas from 
evolutionary science to the study of literature. Borrowing 
from the field of evolutionary psychology, the 
biopoeticists argue that some literary forms and themes are 
particularly valuable because they result from our innate 
and evolved cognitive structure; they also attempt to 
create a normative aesthetic from the idea that evolution 
is progressive. In its first half, this study examines the 
claims of evolutionary psychology and their application by 
the biopoeticists; in the second half, it examines the idea 
that evolution is progressive, and considers the 
implications this may have for literary theory. In its 
conclusion, this work argues that biopoetics, conceived 
from a dissatisfaction with other contemporary literary 
theories--and in particular with such theories’ 
politicization of literature--is more dubious in its 
assumptions and reasoning, and more programmatically 
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        Introduction   
 
 
A new methodology is gaining ground in literary studies--one 
that challenges the politicization of literature and the 
denigration of beauty that the dominant interpretive schools 
have been preaching for years. This methodology aims at 
finding the truth about literary works through an 
understanding of science, and developing an aesthetics that 
recognizes that beauty transcends politics. 
 Specifically, this new methodology calls for an 
integration of literary studies with an understanding of 
evolutionary science--particularly with the implications of 
that science for human nature (humans have a pre-social 
nature) and for an aesthetics that recognizes human nature. 
Such a methodology also recognizes that contrary to a 
fashionable pessimism, life, and the universe as a whole, is 
inexorably evolving towards higher forms--and encourages an 
aesthetics that celebrates as well as emulates such 
evolutionary progress. 
 This methodology is proposed by the leaders of a 
growing movement called “biopoetics.” Given its name by 
Brett Cooke, the co-editor of an anthology of work within 
this new paradigm, this movement consists of humanities 
scholars working within what they call the “evolutionary 
model”--a model that principally calls for making 
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connections between the developing field of evolutionary 
psychology (previously known as human sociobiology) and the 
study of literature, but that also, for some of these 
scholars, calls for a recognition of the supposedly 
progressive nature of evolution. In the pages that follow, I 
hope to provide a thorough explanation and critique of the 
biopoeticists’ paradigm and of the scientific assumptions 
behind it. 
 The biopoetics movement is small, but growing. 
Humanities study in the academy, always troubled by the 
necessity of proving its relevance, is particularly 
vulnerable in lean times. In the current atmosphere in the 
United States of shrinking budgets and departments, more 
than ever there is a pressure to make work in the humanities 
appear more systematic and scientific. Biopoetics (a 
movement whose members are almost exclusively based in the 
US) proposes that the systematic study of literature can 
lead to objective knowledge--about texts and about human 
nature. Surely such a view of the role of literary study 
would be attractive to parents paying tuition and state 
legislatures voting on funding. 
 Moreover, as evolutionary-psychological explanations 
become more popular in the broader culture (explaining 
everything from why men rape to why women earn less than 
men) and as an increasingly economically stratified society 
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calls for more sophisticated ideologies to legitimate the 
depredations of global capitalism, the opportunities for 
growth of a critical theory and aesthetic that assumes that 
gender differences are innate and preaches that “progress” 
is the good, the true and the beautiful are tremendous. 
The attempt to root aesthetics in human nature is 
hardly a new one, but the modern movement to explain 
presumably innate human behavioral tendencies as adaptive 
responses to conditions in the ancestral environment can be 
traced to the publication of E.O. Wilson's Sociobiology in 
1975, which applied new theories from evolutionary biology--
particularly the notion of “inclusive fitness”--to the study 
of animal (including human) behavior. To understand the work 
of the biopoeticists, we must understand the science upon 
which it is based. 
Human sociobiology (which was roundly criticized for 
its political implications) has re-emerged in recent years 
as “evolutionary psychology.” It is this field that the 
biopoeticists embrace. The claims of evolutionary psychology 
have been popularized in recent years by books with titles 
like The Moral Animal and The Mating Mind. Although such 
books claim to synthesize and popularize solid empirical 
research, their approach is generally this: identify some 
apparently universal human tendency, then speculate as to 
what adaptive advantage such a trait might have held in the 
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ancestral environment. The classic example of this is the 
fact that in virtually every culture, men are more 
promiscuous than women. The evolutionary-psychological 
explanation: the strategies for men and women to get the 
most children into the next generation are radically 
different. The best way for a man to guarantee many 
offspring is to impregnate many women, while the best policy 
for a woman, whose eggs (and possible time devoted to 
pregnancy) are limited, is to find a mate to stick around 
and help raise her offspring. Therefore we are all the 
descendants of promiscuous men and nesting women, and share 
their tendencies. 
The critiques of evolutionary psychology are many, but 
in the following pages I will focus on two: evolutionary 
psychology (like the larger field of what Stephen Jay Gould 
calls "Darwinian fundamentalism") assumes that every 
inherited trait is adaptive, and it is too quick to identify 
as innate human tendencies which can be more parsimoniously 
explained as cultural products.  
We must come to terms with such criticisms if we are to 
evaluate the attempts of the biopoeticists to apply 
evolutionary psychology to the study of literature. Such 
attempts range from the speculations that innate tendencies 
like male promiscuity and incest avoidance can be used to 
gauge the "universality" of a work of literature's themes to 
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more grounded research (actually closer to cognitive science 
than to evolutionary psychology) into the consequences for 
artistic form of the limitations of human memory and pattern 
recognition. 
The success or failure of most of these attempts 
depends to a great degree on the persuasiveness of the 
evolutionary-psychological model, so I will spend a great 
deal of time addressing specific critiques of evolutionary 
psychology. Since much of the work of evolutionary 
psychologists is avowedly speculative and cutting-edge (part 
of Richard Lewontin’s critique is that evolutionary 
psychology is so speculative as to not be science at all), I 
will examine the definition of science, as well as consider 
arguments as to whether highly speculative "science" with 
possibly pernicious consequences should be practiced at all. 
The criticisms of evolutionary psychology put its 
status as a science into serious question. It has not, 
however, been completely discredited, and it could in fact 
grow into a more mature science. So we must consider this: 
independent of the cogency of evolutionary-psychological 
arguments, what are the consequences for criticism and 
theory of the idea of evolved and innate human behavioral 
tendencies? The biopoeticists seem to think that quite a lot 
turns on this idea; I will argue that rather little does, 
unless one embraces the idea (rejected by mainstream 
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evolutionary psychology) that "innate" means "good." 
Biopoetics ultimately represents an attempt, rooted in 
highly speculative science and elaborated in a desperate and 
often vague way, to rescue aesthetics from politics. If 
there is no innate sense of beauty, say the biopoeticists, 
then beauty (and art) is whatever people say it is. Art 
becomes ideology, as the biopoeticists' enemies--Marxists, 
feminists, and the like--claim. 
In addition to the idea that evolutionary psychology 
can provide some insight into the nature of literature and 
the value of individual works, some of the most prominent 
biopoeticists attempt to derive an aesthetics from their 
belief that evolution is progressive. 
Despite Darwin's caveats, many persist in reading 
"fittest" in “survival of the fittest” to mean something 
like "absolute fitness"--that is, that organisms aren't just 
"fit" in the sense of adapted to their environment, but show 
some general increase in complexity or quality. (This 
despite the fact that algae are the modal organism on the 
planet.) The notion of evolution as progress, as a ladder 
with man (so far) at the top has been used to underwrite a 
number of political programs--among them the smarter 
versions, such as Herbert Spencer's, of Social Darwinism--
and it is seeing a resurgence as an ideological 
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justification for the libertarianism of the new 
technological overclass. 
The biopoeticists subscribe to this notion of progress, 
and explain such progress through appeals to controversial 
findings from the field of complexity studies. From such 
findings they assert not only that life and the cosmos are 
evolving into “higher” forms, but that it should be so, and 
that we should actively encourage or accelerate this 
evolution. They also attempt to directly construct a theory 
of beauty from complexity studies. 
Frederick Turner, a prominent theorist of the 
biopoetics movement (and co-editor of the Biopoetics 
anthology), has written a book-length epic poem, Genesis, 
about the terraforming (“making Earth-like”) of Mars. In 
this work Turner presents an ethos of progress that he has 
partially presented in nonfiction works: it is man's 
obligation, as the most complex life form on earth, to 
encourage the universe's tendency toward higher forms. One 
important way of doing this is by bringing life to lifeless 
planets like Mars. And the most effective way of doing this 
is through unbridled capitalism. 
As with evolutionary psychology, the ethic of evolution 
as progress operates, through a dubious scientific claim and 
an even more dubious application of that claim, to forestall 
political debate. It will not, however, be my primary goal 
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in the following pages to evaluate the political 
implications of the biopoeticist paradigm--although those 
consequences will probably strike most readers as 
pernicious. 
Why, then, is this still-inchoate movement deserving of 
such attention? Although membership in this movement is 
still small, as I indicated earlier, this approach to 
literature is poised to become very influential, both within 
the academy and in popular culture. Lingua Franca has 
published a cover story on evolutionary-psychological 
approaches to the arts, and Reason magazine, the foremost US 
journal of libertarian politics--and favorite reading, after 
Wired magazine, of techno-elites everywhere--seems to have 
adopted biopoetics as the official aesthetic theory of smart 
libertarians. 
Yet, as we shall see, many of the basic assumptions of 
this approach are highly questionable, and the reasoning is 
often shoddy. Because biopoetics is an emerging paradigm, we 
might expect it to be somewhat internally incoherent, or for 
there to be disagreements about empirical evidence 
supporting its claims; more than this, though, biopoetics is 
false to its own stated mandate: characterizing contemporary 
theory as scientifically illiterate and poorly reasoned, the 
biopoeticists embrace claims that most scientists (even 
those whose theories they enlist to support their arguments) 
 
 
                                                            
                                                            
                               9 
                                                          
reject, and their reasoning is poor by almost any academic 
standard--but particularly feeble when compared to the rigor 
of, for example, the work of Jacques Derrida, the 
biopoeticists’ frequent target of condemnation. 
Moreover, decrying the politicization of literature and 
criticism by contemporary theory, the biopoeticists 
ultimately argue for an aesthetics and critical theory that 
is based more crudely on a political vision than the least 
sophisticated feminist or Marxist criticism. 
The rapidly growing field of biopoetics cries out for 
criticism, then, not only because of its political 
implications--and its status as a reflection of the dominant 
ideology of the late-capitalist US--but because it is, to 
put it simply, bad theorizing. Its claims to have discovered 
the truth about literature are ludicrous; its criticism and 
theorizing can be “interesting,” but interesting in the way 
that a literary theory based on Aristotelian physics might 
be, or the literary theory of Hippolyte Taine is. (In fact, 
one biopoeticist, Joseph Carroll, highly praises Taine’s 
work as a precursor to biopoetics, particularly his use of 
“race”--the innate differences between peoples in body and 
temperament--as an explanatory factor in his discussion of 
literature. Most evolutionary biologists and psychologists, 
on the other hand, believe that the category of race is a 
useless explanatory concept.) 
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If all that one desires of one’s critical theory is 
that it be interesting, rather than truth-seeking--and 
assuming one finds this sort of “scientific” criticism 
interesting--one might find biopoetics to be a fine critical 
theory. For me, its questionable fundamental assumptions and 
logical incoherence make biopoeticist work a failure even as 
interesting fiction--I cannot suspend my disbelief. 
Ultimately, this is why I believe biopoetics is 
deserving of criticism. I prefer that my critical theory 
both instruct and delight; biopoetics does neither. That 
this sort of thing might become popular--that one might have 
to reckon with this nonsense in writing, in class, or in 
conversation--is a real possibility, one that I do not view 
with pleasure. 
Therefore the following: an attempt to take biopoetics 
and its scientific assumptions seriously, an attempt to 
salvage what is useful from its critical framework, an 
attempt to challenge biopoetics on its own ground, dealing 
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Part I: Evolutionary Psychology and Literary Theory 
 
      
       The Model 
 
Darwin’s most important insight was suggested by Thomas 
Malthus’s observation that the human population will always 
grow at a faster rate than available resources: differential 
reproduction. Animals will differ in the number of their 
offspring that will survive into the next generation. Since 
animals differ, however subtly, in a variety of ways (size, 
hairiness, color), hereditary traits that enhance an 
animal’s ability to survive to reproductive age and to 
reproduce will tend to be preserved, while other traits will 
not. This process, in which some members of a species 
survive and reproduce, preserving their hereditary traits, 
while others do not, Darwin called  “natural selection” or 
(in a phrase borrowed from Herbert Spencer) “survival of the 
fittest.” 
 This famous phrase is somewhat misleading, because 
although it suggests movement towards some sort of “absolute” 
fitness--that is, progress--Darwin always meant fitness 
within an ecological niche. The phrase is actually a 
tautology; fitness in fact for Darwin meant survival into the 
next generation; the phrase could be translated as “survival 
of that which survives” or “fitness of the fittest.”  
However, despite the confusion it generates, the term 
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persists, perhaps because it is so evocative of the constant 
struggle that Darwin saw in nature. 
 Natural selection (to employ the more precise phrase), 
operates thus: if a particular trait is advantageous--let us 
say hairiness in cold climes--eventually those whose 
ancestors were particularly hairy will come to completely 
dominate. If the cold-climate whatevers are reproductively 
isolated from the original population of whatevers, 
eventually they will differ genetically so much from the 
original population so much that they become their own 
species (that is, they can only reproduce with one another). 
 Evolutionary psychologists (and before them 
sociobiologists) apply this Darwinian logic to behavior. 
 The methodology works this way: some trait is observed 
to be virtually universal, and then an explanation for this 
behavior being genetically advantageous in the Environment 
of Evolutionary Adaptation (also known as the “ancestral 
environment”) is proposed. Simple enough, and not unlike the 
methodology used by evolutionary biologists (but, we shall 
see, fatally flawed). 
 The founding observations of evolutionary psychology 
were made by geneticist A.J. Bateman, and were elaborated on 
by biologists George Williams and Robert Trivers. Bateman’s 
observation, made in 1948 (from studying fruit-flies) was 
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that while females had the same number of offspring 
regardless of how many males they mated with, males had more 
offspring the more females they mated with. Such an 
arrangement, Bateman observed, would encourage “an 
undiscriminating eagerness in the males, and a 
discriminating passivity in the females” (Qtd. in 
Segerstrale 56).  
 George Williams, in his 1966 work Adaptation and 
Natural Selection: A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary 
Thought, restated the subject of differing male and female 
genetic interests as differing “sacrifices” necessary for 
reproduction. The male’s “essential role may end with 
copulation, which involves a negligible expenditure of 
energy and materials on his part, and only a momentary lapse 
of attention from matters of direct concern to his safety 
and well-being” (183). Males benefit (that is, they get 
their genes into the next generation most successfully) by 
having “an aggressive and immediate willingness to mate with 
as many females as may be available” (184). 
 For females, however, “copulation may mean a commitment 
to a prolonged burden, in both the mechanical and 
physiological sense, and its many attendant stresses and 
dangers” (184). It is therefore in the interests of her 
genes to reproduce only in particularly good circumstances--
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and one of those circumstances is a particularly fit 
inseminating male. These differing needs and strategies lead 
to courtship: males attempt to present themselves as highly 
fit whether they are or not--and females show discrimination 
(184). 
 Robin Trivers, with his 1972 paper “Parental Investment 
and Sexual Selection,” replaced Williams’s language of 
“sacrifice” with one of “investment.” “Sperm is cheap; eggs 
are expensive” would soon come to be the mantra of 
sociobiologists everywhere, the assumption being that 
virtually all observable differences in behavior between 
males and females are rooted in reproductive “strategies” 
resulting from this biological difference.  
 It was these observations, and their consequences, that 
E.O. Wilson popularized in his books Sociobiology (1975) and 
On Human Nature (1978). These works, although proposing few 
new ideas, were an extraordinarily thorough synthesis that 
influenced research in a number of fields, as well as 
provoking a formidable backlash. Wilson's primary 
contribution in this work was to apply ideas from 
evolutionary biology--particularly the notions of  "kin 
selection" and "inclusive fitness" (the notion that the 
gene, rather than the individual or the group, is the 
primary unit of selection, and that, therefore, traits 
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unfavorable to the individual can persist into the next 
generation if the survival of close relatives is enhanced--
in the world of behavior we call such traits "altruistic") 
to animal behavior. While Wilson's speculations about the 
evolution of altruistic behavior among ants were well 
considered and persuasive to many (Wilson was, and still is, 
a renowned naturalist and entomologist), his final chapter, 
on human behavior, was not quite so readily accepted. 
 “Kin selection” and “inclusive fitness” are terms 
introduced by biologist William Hamilton in the early 1960s, 
and they are at the center of the new “selfish gene” model 
embraced by Wilson and Richard Dawkins (in his famous 
popularization, The Selfish Gene). What Hamilton proposed 
was that the most important unit of selection for natural 
selection to operate on was the gene, rather than the 
individual organism (as Darwin argued) or on the group or 
species as a whole (as some people were beginning to argue 
before the notion of gene selection was introduced, but 
which was never well explained as a mechanism). Hamilton’s 
elegant theory, introduced to explain “selfless” or 
altruistic behavior among some animals, was that if certain 
behaviors contributed to the well-being and reproductive 
success of one’s kin (that is, those who share a great deal 
of one’s genes), then it is sometimes beneficial to the 
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organism to engage in behaviors that might seem “selfless” 
but in fact serve to get one’s genes into the next 
generation. 
 Biologist J.B.S. Haldane is said to have lampooned this 
kind of logic by remarking that he would never give his life 
for his brother, but would give it for “two brothers or 
eight cousins” (Segerstrale 63), but it does seem to explain 
some sorts of animal behavior--in particular, the behavior 
of ants and bees, the selflessness of which was a question 
that Darwin himself was unable to solve. Hamilton’s theory 
predicts that the higher the degree of relatedness between 
organisms, the more selfless behavior will be observed. Ants 
and bees do all sorts of things that are completely selfless 
from the organism’s viewpoint. 
 Despite devastating critiques by scientists such 
Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin and philosophers such 
as Philip Kitcher, as well as general disapproval from the 
left of the political consequences of sociobiological 
speculation about innate human tendencies, human 
sociobiological research continued, to emerge in recent 
years as "evolutionary psychology."  
     The scientific and political critiques were often 
intertwined, but (as we shall see in the next section) not 
always: Wilson was accused of racism despite the fact that he 
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approvingly cited data and conclusions from Lewontin 
indicating that "race" was not a useful explanatory concept 
in biology. Wilson was less often accused of sexism, despite 
the fact that his strongest conclusions touched on innate 
gender differences in behavior. 
 In a nice bit of sleight-of-hand, the evolutionary 
psychologists distinguish themselves from the sociobiologists 
by claiming that while the sociobiologists identified innate 
tendencies and said they were therefore good, evolutionary 
psychology allows that traits that might have been adaptive 
in the ancestral environment may no longer be useful. While 
some figures in sociobiology might have made the former 
claim, such was surely not the claim of Wilson and the other 
principal figures in sociobiology. The evolutionary 
psychologists have focused on an at most marginal tenet of 
sociobiology as its major flaw, making their own field, which 
is identical to human sociobiology in nearly every respect, 
seem corrected. 
 This debate aside, what are the implications of the 
ideas of inclusive fitness and evolved psychological 
“traits” as applied to human beings, in either sociobiology 
or evolutionary psychology?  As we shall see, many 
evolutionary-psychological explanations are origin stories 
explaining well-documented phenomena from cognitive science-
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-such as why humans are better at remembering faces than 
remembering names. The more revolutionary work of 
evolutionary psychology is in its arguments about the 
innateness and evolutionary origin of more complicated 
behaviors. One of the first, and now one of the most 
central, “findings” of evolutionary psychology was in the 
area of sex and gender. 
  As Wright sums up the argument in The Moral Animal, if 
we merely accept that natural selection implies a fitness 
benefit from relative choosiness in women, that such 
choosiness is virtually culturally universal, and that 
cultural theories cannot explain these differences as 
parsimoniously, we must accept that gender differences (at 
least in regard to mating behavior) are at least partially 
innate (46-48). 
 This theory, probably the most uncontroversial (within the 
field; it’s certainly politically explosive) and most touted of 
evolutionary psychology’s “findings,” obviously has profound 
social implications, some of them quite disturbing. For example, 
in their 2000 book A Natural History of Rape: The Bases of Sexual 
Coercion, evolutionary psychologists Craig Palmer and Randy 
Thornhill argue that the phenomenon of rape is a direct 
consequence of these differential reproductive strategies: men 
may be predisposed to rape because if they are facing complete 
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reproductive failure, or simply because of their predisposition 
to want to have intercourse with as wide a variety of women as 
possible. 
  
 Because of men’s predisposition to rape, Palmer and 
Thornhill argue, they should be educated about this natural 
rape drive, the better to suppress it. Such an education, 
they suggest, might be a requirement for a young man’s 
receiving his driver’s license (179). The program would 
include instruction in the evolutionary causes of men’s 
arousal at the mere image of a woman, as well as 
explanations of why men might be led to demand sex even when 
women don’t want it, and frequently misinterpret gestures or 
clothing as sexual overtures (179). 
 Of course, this program would emphasize that despite 
the fact that men have an evolved tendency to rape, this 
natural impulse is no excuse for rape, and that if they 
comprehend and resist these impulses, they may be able to 
avoid committing rape (179). 
 Women too, should receive an education that addresses, 
in addition to how apparent youth is the most significant 
risk factor for rape, how health, symmetry, and hormone 
markers such as waist size, in addition to clothing and 
makeup that enhance apparent fertility, all contribute to 
the risk of rape. Not that women should be urged to look ill 
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and infertile--they must simply be aware of the risks 
involved in not looking this way (182). 
Such arguments are easily lampooned, but Thornhill and 
Palmer’s “diagnosis” of rape is exemplary of evolutionary-
psychological methodology. Although there was a brief media 
firestorm over the book when it was first published, most of 
the criticism of the book revolved around its distasteful 
political implications, not around its science. 
 In fact, some of the foremost proponents of 
evolutionary psychology lined up to praise the book: Steven 
Pinker, perhaps the best-known and most-respected of the 
academic popularizers said in his blurb for the book jacket, 
“This is a courageous, intelligent, and eye-opening book 
with a noble goal--to understand and eliminate a loathsome 
crime. Armed with logic and copious data, A Natural History 
of Rape will force many intellectuals to decide which they 
value more: established dogma and ideology, or the welfare 
of real women in the real world.” John Tooby and Leda 
Cosmides, editors of The Adapted Mind, one of the founding 
documents of evolutionary psychology, also defended 
Thornhill and Palmer’s science, in a letter to The New 
Republic. 
Thornhill himself was already an eminent authority in 
evolutionary psychology, the co-author of a well-known 
study--“Human Facial Attractiveness and Sexual Selection: 
 
 
                                                            
                                                            
                               21 
                                                          
The Role of Symmetry and Averageness” (1994)--arguing that 
we have evolved to find facial symmetry attractive because 
in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness it was 
adaptive to do so. He argues that there is a transcultural 
standard of beauty based on this preference. This idea has 
been popularized in such books as Nancy Etcoff’s Survival of 
the Prettiest: The Science of Beauty (2000). 
 Critics on Jenny Jones and in the pages of Time and 
Newsweek (both of which have run cover stories on 
evolutionary-psychological “proof” of innate psychological 
differences between men and women), by implicitly accepting 
the evolutionary psychology paradigm, allowed Thornhill and 
Palmer to take the scientific high ground, their position 
essentially being, “We don’t like this any more than you do, 
but these are the facts. Given those facts, here’s what we 
think should be done.” 
 To halfhearted challenges like, “If rape is about 
reproduction, then why are so many men, children, and women 
obviously past reproductive age so frequently the victims of 
rape?” Thornhill and Palmer could respond, from the ever-
shifting ground of adaptive explanation, that the mental 
module was about forced sex, not about discrimination among 
candidates for rape on the basis of suitability. 
 The debate over The Natural History of rape presented 
an excellent opportunity for a public discussion of the 
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methodology of evolutionary psychology, the insights of 
which have enlivened the discourse of both cocktail party 
bores and (as we shall see) literary critics. Such a 
discussion failed to emerge. 
 This episode is instructive not because it tars the 
entire enterprise of evolutionary psychology, but because it 
illustrates how far the evolutionary-psychological model has 
colonized the popular consciousness--the arguments about the 
science were fought almost exclusively in orthodox 
evolutionary-psychological terms--and also how quickly 
evolutionary-psychological explanations, even if true, can 
be used to make very questionable assertions about the role 
of mental “organs” in a world full of more proximate causes 
of emotions and behaviors. 
The incident is also noteworthy because the assertions 
made by Thornhill and Palmer were so uncontroversial within 
the field. If one wished to emphasize the loathsome uses to 
which evolutionary psychology can be put, one would do 
better to emphasize the work of Kevin Macdonald, professor 
of evolutionary psychology at California State University at 
Long Beach and witness for the defense at the trial in 
Britain of Holocaust Revisionist David Irving. Macdonald’s 
thesis about the Jews, set forth in a trio of works--A 
People That Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism as a Group 
Evolutionary Strategy; Separation and Discontents: Toward an 
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Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism; and The Culture of 
Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in 
Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements--is 
that Judaism is basically a group evolutionary strategy to 
maximize intelligence. Macdonald, while not a holocaust 
denier himself, sees anti-Semitism, and even Nazism, as the 
inevitable response to this eugenics program (Shulevitz 1). 
Far from a fringe figure, Macdonald was, at the time of the 
trial, a prominent member of the Human Behavior and 
Evolution Society (the professional society to which most of 
the most prominent evolutionary psychologists in the United 
States belong), serving as archivist, secretary, editor of 
the newsletter, and member of the executive board (Shulevitz 
2). 
 Despite the increasing appearance of such easy targets, 
it will not be primarily my project in the following pages 
to evaluate directly the political or social consequences of 
the arguments of evolutionary psychology. For reasons that I 
hope will become clear in the following section, I believe 
that challenging “scientific” findings because of their 
political consequences is not only “wrong” in the sense of 
“mistaken by contemporary canons of science,” but is 
ultimately a rhetorically weak strategy. 
 It will, rather, be my project in the following pages 
to evaluate the epistemological status of the evolutionary-
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psychological enterprise, and to consider, regardless of the 
disagreements among scientists about the goals and 
accomplishments of that enterprise, the consequences of this 
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                 The Critique 
 
Although evolutionary-psychological speculation may 
sound plausible, critics of sociobiology and evolutionary 
psychology maintain that this is the essence of their 
critique: evolutionary psychological explanations are 
plausible, but not particularly scientific. The critiques of 
evolutionary psychology are many, but perhaps the most 
elegant and complete critique was made by philosopher Philip 
Kitcher, in his 1985 book Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology 
and the Quest for Human Nature. 
 Kitcher begins his critique with two fundamental 
distinctions: between “broad” and “narrow” sociobiology and 
between narrow sociobiology and “pop” sociobiology. Broad 
sociobiology, in Kitcher’s view, is the study of the 
biological basis of social behavior--encompassing such 
issues as the mechanisms, development, genetics, and 
function of social behavior--a program to which few 
reasonable people would object (114-115). 
Narrow sociobiology, on the other hand, focuses 
exclusively on evolutionary questions: how did the behavior 
evolve, and why does it persist? How, in particular, do 
traits such as altruism, which would seem to reduce 
individual fitness, evolve? (115) 
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It is the insistence of evolutionary theory on assuming 
adaptive explanations for every aspect of an organism--and 
the importation of this methodology to sociobiology, in 
which all behaviors are assumed to be adaptive (which leads 
to the creation of pseudo-problems such as the “problem” of 
altruism)--to which evolutionary biologists like Stephen Jay 
Gould most object. Kitcher, however, has a more specific 
target: “pop” sociobiology. 
 Pop sociobiology, as Kitcher defines it, is the 
application of ideas about the evolution of animal behavior 
to the construction of theories--often quite sweeping--about 
human behavior and politics; such theories are most 
frequently addressed to a popular audience rather than to 
the scientific community. 
 But pop sociobiology, in Kitcher’s view, is practiced 
not only by journalistic popularizers, but also by 
scientists like E.O. Wilson, who may make real and 
compelling discoveries yet also advance grandiose and poorly 
grounded claims. 
 Although many writers have made cogent critiques of 
sociobiology (most notably Stephen Jay Gould and Richard 
Lewontin), Kitcher describes, perhaps more clearly than 
anyone, the logical structure of sociobiological argument. 
 Pop sociobiology, argues Kitcher, relies on a chain of 
invalid inference that he calls "Wilson's ladder." Wilson’s 
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ladder has four "rungs": first, it assumes that all members 
of a certain group would maximize their fitness in their 
typical environments by exhibiting a specific behavior; 
second, when we find a certain behavior in virtually all 
members of a certain group, we can conclude that this 
behavior became prevalent and remains so through natural 
selection (specifically by increasing fitness); third, since 
selection acts upon genetic differences, we can conclude 
that there are genetic differences between the current group 
and their ancestors who failed to reproduce; fourth, it will 
be difficult to modify the behavior by altering the social 
environment, because the behavior is either impossible to 
eliminate or impossible to eliminate without giving up other 
important goals (127). 
 Most of the critiques of sociobiology can be understood 
as attacks on one or more of these rungs--so the ladder 
provides a fine framework for organizing these critiques. 
 For Stephen Jay Gould, the leap from the first rung to 
the second is the crucial flaw of sociobiology--it is an 
unabashed endorsement of what is known as the 
"adaptationist" program, which Gould argues has a logical 
flaw at its center: the confusion of historical origin and 
current utility.  
 Much of Gould's career has been an attack on the 
adaptationist program--which he has recently dubbed 
 
 
                                                            
                                                            
                               28 
                                                          
"Darwinian fundamentalism" (“Fundamentalism”). One of 
Gould's most famous discussions of the topic, and one in 
which he and his co-author Richard Lewontin introduced a 
rather arcane term into common usage, is contained in an 
address that he delivered to the Royal Society in 1978. "The 
Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A 
Critique of the Adaptationist Programme." The arguments made 
here are central to a serious critique of sociobiology and 
evolutionary psychology. The adaptationist program is still 
the dogma of many evolutionary thinkers, and it is 
superficially quite convincing; it would therefore be 
appropriate to discuss in some detail the still somewhat 
controversial critique of this program.  
 In the “spandrels” paper, Gould and Lewontin object to 
the adaptationist program because of its faith that natural 
selection always optimizes. The adaptationist program works 
by breaking down the organism into unitary “traits” and 
imagining an adaptive story for each one. Even traits 
thought to be non-optimal are assumed to be the result of 
trade-offs with other optimized traits. Gould and Lewontin 
believe that the evolution of organisms can be more 
scientifically explained by considering organisms as 
integrated wholes, and by considering constraints placed on 
natural selection by lineages, developmental pathways, and 
general architecture. They fault the adaptationist program 
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for failing to consider the distinction between origin and 
current utility; for refusing to consider alternatives to 
adaptive stories; for accepting adaptive stories on the 
basis of mere plausibility; for failure to consider other 
causes of evolutionary change, such as random fixation of 
alleles, production of non-adaptive structures by 
developmental correlation with selected features; for not 
separating adaptation and selection; for not considering the 
possibility of multiple adaptive peaks; and for not 
considering current utility as an epiphenomenon of non-
adaptive structures. 
 It is sociobiology's failure to consider alternatives 
to adaptive explanations to which Gould and Lewontin object; 
to give a simple example: suppose Wilson is right, and there 
are significant and nearly universal differences between 
male and female human behavior (of course there is great 
reason to suppose the measurable differences are far less 
than he supposes). Let us additionally suppose that such 
differences are proven to be completely hereditary. Gould 
could still object that the existence of such traits does 
not automatically imply adaptation: they could be a relic of 
our hominid ancestors, who were much more sexually dimorphic 
(as measurable by size) than we. 
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 Gould and Lewontin in fact propose several alternatives 
to immediate adaptation for the explanation of form, 
function, and behavior. 
 There is, for example, the possibility of change 
occurring absent any adaptation or selection at all. This 
can occur due to genetic drift or population bottlenecks. 
Genetic drift occurs like this: say we have five green and 
five red lizards. Five of them are killed by accidents--a 
tree falling, a flood, whatever. If all of the green ones 
happen to be killed, the only ones left would be red, 
meaning a change in the gene pool. Evolution has occurred, 
despite the fact that there is no advantage in having red 
skin and there was no selection. All of the deaths are 
random. If this occurred in the rain forest, it would have 
occurred even if there were natural selection for green skin 
because of its utility for hiding from predators. 
 A population bottleneck (a special case of genetic 
drift) occurs when there is a reduction in the size of the 
population--and therefore in the gene pool of the 
population--and then a return to the original population 
size. 
 Particular parts of organism may also evolve despite an 
absence of adaptation or selection because they are 
correlated with selection of some other trait. For example, 
considering our red and green lizards again, let us suppose 
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that the gene which gives our lizards green skin also gives 
them immunity from a certain virus. If the virus is 
introduced into their environment, the red lizards might all 
die, while the green ones are unaffected. There would only 
be green lizards left, but not because they are green. They 
would remain because being green is associated with another 
trait that does confer selective advantage. 
 Another way in which a trait might evolve is that it 
might vary in a direct way with another trait (this is 
called allometry). Let us say body size and metabolism are 
related allometrically. In our lizards’ environment, there 
is a selective advantage to being large. The lizards become 
larger over several generations; their metabolic rate 
increases, too, although there was no selection for an 
increased metabolic rate. 
 Sometimes, there can be a decoupling of adaptation and 
selection. Lewontin gives an example of one form of this--
selection without adaptation--in another essay: a mutation 
that doubles the fecundity of individuals will sweep through 
a population. If there is no increase in available 
resources, members of the population will lay more eggs (for 
example), but the excess births will die off because of 
resource limitations. The individuals are no better adapted 
than before--in fact, if a predator prays on immature 
members of the population, population size may actually 
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decrease. Yet selection will always favor those individuals 
with higher birth rates (7). 
 Adaptation can also occur in the absence of selection. 
Imagine for a moment that our lizards’ skin color is 
determined not by genetics, but by diet. If we put our 
differently colored lizards (from different environments) in 
a rain forest, there will be heavier predation on the red 
lizards. But the diet here turns all the lizards green. As 
the red lizards eat the new diet, they turn green. We are 
left with an entirely green population. The green lizards 
are adapted to the green environment, but not because of 
selective forces. 
 Finally, sometimes adaptation and selection occur, but 
the adaptation is a secondary use of available parts. Gould 
and Lewontin explain this idea in their discussion the 
Tyrannosaurus’s forelegs. Although the Tyrannosaur no doubt 
used them for something, it would be foolish to seek an 
immediate adaptive explanation for them, argue Gould and 
Lewontin, when they are the reduced product of functional 
limbs in the Tyrannosaur’s ancestors. The size of the 
Tyrannosaur’s limbs is likely to be the result of a fixed 
allometric relationship between increases in head and limb 
size. As there are well-known rules for relationships 
between parts of animals at different sizes (both within and 
among species), Gould and Lewontin claim that such 
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explanations are much more testable than adaptive 
explanations. 
 As these proposed alternatives to optimization through 
selection and adaptation suggest, Gould's argument with the 
Darwinian Fundamentalists can be summed up rather easily: 
they are not historical enough. In concentrating on 
adaptedness, they ignore historical contingency and the 
constraints that such contingency puts on the supply of 
variation on which natural selection can work. 
 This emphasis on historical contingency can be seen in 
what is probably Gould's most famous and most profound 
contribution to paleontology and evolutionary biology: the 
theory of "punctuated equilibrium." Introduced in a paper 
written with Niles Eldredge in 1977, this theory was 
proposed to explain a puzzle in paleontology: the dearth of 
intermediate forms in the fossil record. What the record 
seems to show, instead of the gradual transformation of 
species that the dominant interpretation of the theory of 
natural selection would suggest, most species appearing 
suddenly and changing little in form during their existence. 
 What Gould and Eldredge argued was that this dearth was 
not an artifact of the incomplete fossil record, but that it 
reflected reality: species do emerge in a geological 
instant, remain basically stable throughout their lifetimes, 
and then disappear. But how can there be such long-term 
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stability in the face of selective pressure? And if such 
stability is the norm, how does speciation occur at all? 
 Species remain static for long periods of time for two 
primary reasons. First, absent very intense selective 
pressure, even the most adaptive trait will be swamped by 
genetic drift.   
 Second, even when there are phenotypic changes in 
lineages from one generation to the next, such changes 
typically do not accumulate. They "wobble" around a 
phenotypic mean. Jonathan Weiner describes this process in 
his book The Beak of the Finch:  
   
In wet years, there is selection for slender beaks 
that enable finches to eat small soft seeds. In 
dry years, there is selection for more robust 
beaks. These are suited for cracking the larger 
harder seeds available in droughts. Wet years are 
interleaved with dry ones, so there is no long-
term directional selection. The mean size and 
shape of the finch beak wobbles to and fro. If 
this fluctuating environment persists over the 
long term, finch species will be in stasis, as 
Gould and Eldredge define it. There will be no 
long-term shift in finch phenotypes. (76) 
 So how does speciation ever occur? There are many 
theories, but occasional Gould co-author Elizabeth Vrba has 
argued that rare catastrophes (in human terms; in geological 
time they are relatively frequent) can cause a "turn-over 
pulse," in which those species that do not become extinct 
are fragmented. In these fully isolated populations, changes 
can accumulate, rather than being dissipated in a large 
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population. And each population, which could survive its 
sister populations by mere chance, is already genetically 
sampled, leading to phenotypic changes that have nothing to 
do with fitness (Sterelny 102). 
 This touches on an issue that Gould frequently raises 
in his emphasis on historical contingency: mass extinctions. 
The sudden death of the dinosaurs (again, sudden in this 
context could mean tens of thousands of years) is perhaps 
the best-known example of this. In a geological instant the 
dinosaurs, which had ruled the earth for tens of millions of 
years, suddenly went extinct. It is now generally (although 
not universally) believed by the scientific community that 
this event was caused by a massive asteroid strike. It is 
universally accepted that such a strike did occur at roughly 
the time of the dinosaur extinction; what the Alvarez 
hypothesis proposes was that this asteroid impact triggered 
the Cretaceous extinction, probably by kicking up debris 
that caused a "nuclear winter" effect, during which most 
cold-blooded animals could not survive. 
 This event is important because without it, the only 
mammals in existence would be the sort of tiny creatures 
that spent their lives hiding and fleeing from the much more 
successful dinosaurs. The entire biological history of the 
world would be different. As Gould has often noted, if we 
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were to "play back the tape of history," there would be no 
reason to expect that creatures anything like us would 
exist. 
 By asserting the importance of contingency, Gould is not 
denying causality; in fact, quite the opposite--he is 
defending it. If we were really to rewind history and start 
again, everything would occur exactly as it has. What he 
means is simply that things would have been different had it 
not been for all the contingent events (like asteroid 
impacts) that have occurred. One could not have predicted the 
emergence of larger mammals, and eventually man, because of 
the greater fitness of mammals; mammals "won" because an 
entire ecosystem was desolated--because of "chance.” 
Mammalian success was not preordained. 
 And the Cretaceous extinction is hardly a singular 
event. There have been several sudden mass extinctions in 
the history of life on earth; at the end of the Permian, 
over 90% of the animal life on earth became extinct. Some of 
these extinctions were possibly because of asteroid impacts 
(many paleontologists now believe that virtually every one 
of the great extinctions was caused by such a cosmic event); 
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 One might ask at this point whether we could not 
consider the ability to survive such catastrophes a kind of 
fitness. We could, but as Gould has pointed out in many 
discussions of the "unit of selection debate" (Dawkins and 
others, on one side, argue that genes and "gene complexes" 
are the primary--perhaps sole--unit of selection, while Gould 
and company, on the other, argue that selection operates 
primarily on individuals [phenotypes] rather than on genes, 
with some selection also operating on the species, and 
perhaps even group [although this is more controversial] 
levels) and in the "evolvability" of different species, 
"species selection" operates on different traits from those 
on which individual-level selection works. Species may be 
particularly viable (or evolvable). Species with a great deal 
of genetic variability may be more resilient in the face of 
catastrophic change than others; so may those with broad 
geographic ranges. But these are characteristics of the 
species as a whole, and may have little or nothing to do with 
the adaptedness of an individual organism to a given 
environment. 
 While these are powerful arguments that evolution does 
not operate (at least not exclusively) by the accumulation 
of tiny changes over time, Gould's most persuasive arguments 
about the role of chance in the evolution of form are seen 
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in his discussions of the "Cambrian Explosion" and the 
"Burgess Shale." 
 It is now generally agreed that most of the major 
animal groups emerged in a relatively short time during the 
Cambrian Age, about 530 million years ago. In the Cambrian, 
"we find segmented worms, velvet worms, starfish and their 
allies, mollusks (snails, squid, and their relatives), 
sponges, bivalves and other shelled animals appearing all at 
once, with their basic organization, organ systems, and 
sensory mechanism already operational" (Sterelny 90). 
 Since then there has been development within phyla, but 
no major deviation from the forms that emerged in a 
geological moment. This in itself is a strong argument for 
the sudden emergence of species generally, but the Cambrian 
holds a more important lesson for us. 
 The Burgess Shale Fauna, found in a quarry in British 
Columbia, were an important discovery because these fossils, 
dating from the Cambrian, preserved not just records of hard 
structures such as shell and bone, but soft structures as 
well. And these records revealed the existence of animal 
forms we never knew existed. 
 Gould points out, in his book Wonderful Life: The 
Burgess Shale and the Nature of History, that with a single 
exception, all of the living phyla (the major subdivisions 
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of animal life) are found in the Cambrian. But the Burgess 
Shale reveals the existence of animal forms as disparate 
from each other and from existing phyla as existing phyla 
are from one another; basically, there were many more phyla 
in existence in the Cambrian than there are now. 
 Why is this important? Gould argues that despite the 
consensus view, and despite the fact that there are many 
more species in existence than there were in the Cambrian, 
the idea that there has been a steady increase in diversity 
(basic forms adapting to specific habitats) is mistaken--or 
at least misleading. There has in fact been a reduction in 
the disparity of forms that animal life takes. 
 This is important, because if a great number of 
possible forms did emerge and then disappear 
catastrophically (the Burgess Shale Fauna, familiar and 
unfamiliar, disappeared very quickly), and if the existing 
forms seem inherently conservative (that is, showing very 
little change over time), then many--perhaps even most--of 
an animal’s traits would be better explained as the product 
of a specific lineage than as an adaptation to a local 
environment. 
 Gould provides a simple example of this in his chapter 
"Male Nipples and Clitoral Ripples" in Bully For 
Brontosaurus. One of the questions that he is most 
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frequently asked, often by puzzled librarians trying to find 
out for a patron, is "why do women have two breasts rather 
than one?" After all, most women only have one baby at a 
time--is not the extra breast unnecessary, and a metabolic 
waste? After considering mathematical models that have been 
proposed to try to make adaptive sense out of this puzzle by 
weighing the drag of an unnecessary breast against the 
possibility of malnourishing the rare twin, Gould points out 
the obvious: women have breasts because of bilateral 
symmetry, a pattern that was set far back in our lineage. 
 The real emphasis in this essay is not on phyletic 
constraints, but on a couple of examples of developmental 
constraints, another important challenge to unbridled 
adaptation. "Male nipples" prove to be another puzzle to 
those who believe in pervasive utility for all parts of all 
creatures. Adaptationist explanations of male nipples invoke 
past utility; the most persuasive of these is the not-very-
convincing theory that men in primitive societies used to 
nurse babies. In fact, to simplify a fairly detailed 
discussion of embryonic development, men have nipples because 
women do, "and the embryonic pathway to their development 
builds precursors in all mammalian fetuses, enlarging the 
breasts later in females but leaving them small (and without 
evident function) in males" (127). The same logic explains 
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the existence of the clitoris, the position of which makes 
orgasm from intercourse difficult for virtually half of all 
women. This argument is somewhat more controversial, because 
male nipples seem transparently without function while the 
clitoris may have been co-opted for adaptive functions such 
as "cementing pair bonds" (a typical sociobiological 
explanation). (This co-optation of a previous existing 
structure for another purpose is "exaptation" in Gould's 
terminology; his most famous example is the panda's thumb, 
which is not a thumb at all, but an extension of a bone in 
the wrist that has come to function as a thumb).             
     Incidentally, this theory would seem to present 
evidence, were any needed, contradicting the assertion made 
by Daniel Dennett and others that Gould's science takes a 
back seat to his progressive politics: his non-adaptive 
explanation of the clitoris has angered some feminist 
biologists, traditionally his allies. (Although it should be 
noted that he believes that the non-adaptive explanation is 
the more progressive one; he provides a fairly convincing 
argument that the presumption of the utility of the clitoris 
[and the female orgasm] has caused women immense suffering.) 
 As Gould and Eldredge point out in the "Spandrels" 
essay, phyletic constraints explain not only why our bodies 
are not optimally designed for upright posture (for example, 
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women have much more difficulty than most other animals in 
giving birth because our hips became narrower when we 
deviated from our quadrapedal ground plan), but also why "no 
mollusks fly in air and no insects are as large as 
elephants" (194). 
 There has recently been even more evidence to support 
non-adaptive explanations in the evolution of form and 
function--from demonstrations of neutral, nonadaptive 
changes in the evolution of nucleotides (Gould, “More 
Things” 106) to studies of the conservation of basic 
pathways of development, which support the view of evolution 
as being as much about constraints as it is about selection 
leading to perfect adaptation: "The major developmental 
pathway for eyes is conserved and mediated by the same gene 
in squids, flies, and vertebrates", while "the same genes 
regulate the formation of top and bottom surfaces in 
insects" but with the order inverted because our backs are 
anatomically equivalent to  insects' bellies (“More Things” 
106).  
 As Gould sums up the limitations of the adaptationist 
program in an article in the New York Review of Books: 
 
Yes, eyes are for seeing and feet are for moving. 
And, yes again, I know of no scientific mechanism 
other than natural selection with the proven power 
to build structures of such eminently workable 
design. . . . But does all the rest of evolution--
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all the phenomena of organic diversity, 
embryological architecture and genetic structure, 
for example--flow by simple extrapolation from 
selection's power to create the good design of 
organisms? Does the force that makes a functional 
eye also explain why the world houses more than 
500,000 species of beetles and fewer than fifty 
species of priapulid worms? Or why most 
nucleotides in multicellular creatures do not code 
for any enzyme or protein involved in the 
construction of an organism? Or why ruling 
dinosaurs died and subordinate mammals survived to 
flourish and, along one oddly contingent pathway, 
to evolve a creature capable of building cities 
and understanding natural selection? (36) 
 
 It appears clear that there is much more to evolution 
than adaptation; but how is this relevant to the debate over 
evolutionary psychology? The problem is that evolutionary 
psychology is adaptationist to its core. As we saw in the 
last section, the field is full of what Gould and Lewontin 
have dubbed "just-so" stories: speculative stories about how 
a particular trait developed to serve a particular purpose. 
If this is a problem in evolutionary biology, where more 
plausible and economical explanations are often rejected in 
favor of adaptive stories, it is a disaster for evolutionary 
psychology. 
 First of all, isolating traits is a problem. Gould and 
Lewontin discuss in their "Spandrels" essay the problems 
generated when we consider, for example, the chin as an 
isolatable "trait" rather than as the interaction between 
two growth fields; in evolutionary psychology we are faced 
not only with the problem of distinguishing selected traits 
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from such artifacts, but with the problem of identifying 
whether they exist at all. The chin, whatever its origin, 
undeniably exists; whether a "mate ejection module" exists 
at all is rather questionable. 
 Moreover, evolutionary psychology's primary 
methodological advantage over sociobiology--the concession 
that some traits might not be adaptive now, but were in the 
ancestral environment1--makes its claims even more 
speculative and less testable than explanations that appeal 
to known environments. No one really knows how humans and 
proto-humans lived hundreds of thousands of years ago; to 
appeal to descriptions of how a particular cognitive 
disposition might have been advantageous if the ancestral 
environment had been so is not methodologically sound. 
 This is especially true if the cognitive dispositions 
that evolutionary psychology purports to explain are only 
presumed to exist because of (in addition to folk knowledge) 
these models themselves. As we have seen, the typical method 
of the evolutionary psychologist is to identify some trait 
assumed to be universal (the propensity to rape, for 
example), and then to explain why it might have been 
advantageous in the ancestral environment (a strategy for 
                         
   1Although, as we have seen, this progress has been oversold. Most of the best-
known architects of sociobiology--including E.O. Wilson--acknowledged this. 
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men facing complete reproductive failure to get their genes 
into the next generation). 
 In fact, the independent empirical research supporting 
even the notion of broad innate cognitive tendencies is 
rather thin. As Anne Fausto-Sterling argues in her 
exhaustively researched Myths of Gender: Biological Theories 
About Women and Men (1992), even such fond assumptions as 
"women have poorer math skills, and better verbal skills, 
than men" are (leaving aside the question of whether such 
differences are the result of very early environmental 
differences) not confirmed by every well-formed study; those 
studies that do confirm such cultural expectations (and, 
admittedly, some do--and none of the studies shows the 
tendency running the other way) because of confirmation bias 
tend to be those that are published in scientific journals 
and reported on in the mass media. 
 Indeed, another of the central assumptions of 
evolutionary psychology--that the mind is made up of 
separately evolved, if interactive, modules--is far from 
uncontroversial. Even if one agrees generally with the 
computational model of the human mind--the working 
assumption of most theorists of the mind--one need not 
accept that it is necessarily modular, and even if modular, 
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 Modular organization is not necessarily an inherited 
result of natural selection; much of the most exciting work 
in robots today involves mechanisms that learn in a bottom-
up sort of way, starting from a few extremely simple rules 
of behavior (Moravec, Mind; Moravec, Robots). And the 
evidence from human development is hardly unequivocal: 
Annette Karmiloff-Smith, in her essay "Why Babies’ Brains 
Are Not Swiss Army Knives," provides a thorough discussion 
of how the empirical research on children supports an 
environmental explanation of the development of skills and 
abilities at least as well as it does an innatist 
explanation. 
     Modularity in fact cuts across political lines: the idea 
that intelligence is a unitary thing rather than a 
reification of a disparate set of skills (an assumption that 
is the target of Gould's critique of IQ testing in The 
Mismeasure of Man) is the central assumption of Charles 
Murray and Richard Hernstein in their much-maligned work The 
Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American 
Life, in which they therefore must argue strongly against 
modularity.            
     Jerry Fodor, one of the architects of the modular theory 
of mind (Modularity), has been very critical of the idea of 
innate and evolved modules, and has directly challenged 
Pinker’s model. More famously, Noam Chomsky, for reasons that 
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are not at all clear, has always denied that the innate and 
hereditary language structures that he claims to have 
identified are evolved.  
 Gould (particularly convincingly and completely in his 
academic work Ontogeny and Phylogeny, but also throughout 
his popular work), in addition to many other scientists and 
popularizers, such as Carl Sagan, has argued that what in 
fact distinguishes the human brain is its lack of the 
specialization that typifies most species. This is because 
the human brain, as well as the human body, is marked in its 
neoteny (meaning "preservation of juvenile 
characteristics"). It is a popularly known fact that 
humankind shares over 98 percent of its genes with the 
chimpanzees. Gould argues that (as in many cases in which a 
small amount of genetic disparity leads to large phenotypic 
differences) many of those genes in which we differ affect 
rates of development. 
 It is not simply a cute, chance anthropomorphism that 
baby chimps look very human. We are baby chimps, as much in 
body as in mind: just as our bodies are essentially frozen 
in a juvenile state, so are our brains, which makes them 
particularly labile (and our youth a particularly vulnerable 
time). Gould in fact argues that given the large size and 
capacity for learning of the human brain, specialization 
would in fact be disadvantageous. Wouldn't a being with a 
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brain particularly prone to absorbing cultural knowledge, 
which can accumulate and change very rapidly compared to the 
stately rate of evolutionary change, be much better adapted 
to any given environment than one with innate modules? 
 Although Gould chooses to keep his critique on firmer 
scientific ground, understandably wary of relying on notions 
of human exceptionalism, other critics of evolutionary 
psychology are not so cautious about seeing human culture as 
the primary challenge to evolutionary-psychological 
explanations. Such explanations might be fine for ants, they 
say, but not for humans. 
 Such a claim is not as idealist as it might first 
appear. They are not arguing for some sort of mind/body 
dualism or for the autonomy of culture from the natural 
world; they are simply arguing that the evolutionary 
psychologists are too quick to jump to evolutionary 
explanations when simpler cultural explanations are 
available. 
 Even as implacable a critic as Gould accepts the 
usefulness of sociobiological logic in some situations: when 
beings, such as ants, have no apparent way to pass on 
knowledge through culture, there must be some kind of 
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 Ultimately, whether one believes that sociobiology and 
evolutionary psychology are "scientific" or not depends on 
one's definition of science and one's notion of what 
science's relation to society is and should be. Wilson, 
Dawkins, and other supporters of evolutionary psychology 
believe that an area of inquiry can be called a science even 
if it is largely speculative and untestable. 
 The principal opponents of evolutionary psychology--
Gould and Lewontin in particular--have a somewhat more 
restrictive view of legitimate science. As Ullica 
Segerstrale sums up Lewontin's position in Defenders of the 
Truth: The Battle for Science in the Sociobiology Debate and 
Beyond, Lewontin believes that scientific arguments should 
be correct, not just plausible; that correctness is most 
likely to be obtained through experimentation; that 
speculation about past evolution can only ever be plausible, 
and so is not scientifically useful; that large 
generalizations about evolution are almost certain to be 
wrong because of the complexities involved; and that we 
should focus on predictions employing the experimental 
method and ask restricted questions (105-106). 
 It is unclear which came first--Gould and Lewontin's 
demanding requirements for legitimate science or their 
distaste for sociobiology--but it is clear that on its own 
terms, their critique is devastating. By standards distilled 
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from other, established sciences, evolutionary psychology 
(at least in its present form) is "unscientific." 
 Gould, in fact, has been quite consistent in holding 
ideological allies to the same high standards to which he 
holds his foes: he has been outspoken, for example, in his 
critiques of "feminist science" (which he has said does not 
exist) and of Jeremy Rifkin's lack of integrity or knowledge 
of evolutionary theory in his environmentalist and anti-
technology screeds (Urchin). 
 Less compelling than scientific critiques such as 
Gould’s and Lewontin’s, however, are those critiques that 
begin from a certain moral or political perspective and 
therefore hold evolutionary psychology to a higher standard 
than other sciences. Kitcher himself does this (although his 
argument does not stand or fall on this assumption). 
 According to him, 'pop' sociobiologists have thrown 
away their caution when they write about human behavior. He 
suggests that standards need to be raised when it comes to 
statements about humans. When there are implications for 
humans, some usual practices of science, such as bold 
generalization, should be curtailed and the standards of 
evidence need to be higher than in other, less sensitive 
areas of science (388). 
 Indeed, some critics are so incensed by the 
implications of sociobiology that they cannot be bothered 
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with challenging the science; the implications invalidate 
the science. Philosopher Mary Midgley, for example, in a 
1979 review of The Selfish Gene, was apparently so blinded 
by her distaste for the implications of the theory that she 
totally misread a fairly clear argument: 
 
[Dawkins'] central point is that the emotional 
nature of man is exclusively self-interested, and 
he argues this by claiming that all emotional 
nature is so. Since the emotional nature of 
animals clearly is not exclusively self-
interested, nor based on any long term calculation 
at all, he resorts to arguing from speculations 
about the emotional nature of genes. . . .Genes 
cannot be selfish or unselfish, any more than 
atoms can be jealous, elephants abstract, or 
biscuits teleological. (451) 
 
 From such statements, one might gather that Midgley had 
not even read the jacket copy, much less the book. Dawkins 
never claims that genes, let alone organisms, are "selfish." 
He is using the metaphor of "selfishness" to make a point 
about gene selectionism as opposed to individual or group 
selection. His discussions of emotion in fact emphasize the 
existence of altruism as a strong emotional motivation. 
 In later years Midgley was to admit that "she did not 
really wish to go after Dawkins as much as she wanted to 
quench any attempt by Moral Philosophers to use selfish 
genery as a backup for their purposes" (Segerstrale 77)--to 
"criticize Dawkins to such an extent that no moral 
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philosopher would ever want to use him as scientific backing 
for philosophical theorizing" (Segerstrale 77). 
 These strategies of working from the political 
implications to criticize the science are for the most part 
ineffective--and not simply because they present a challenge 
to any tedious commitment to truth or objectivity. They are 
rhetorically ineffective because those who do not already 
agree with Kitcher or Midgley are unlikely to see political 
implications that they disagree with as a reason to reject 
science otherwise seen as valid. Kitcher's argument is 
really that science with anti-egalitarian implications 
should be treated more cautiously than other science; true-
believing evolutionary psychologists would argue that 
certain egalitarian policies already in place--laws to 
remedy gender imbalances in hiring, for example--already 
have human costs. 
 And here is where the political implications of 
evolutionary psychology become clear. None but the crudest 
popularizers would draw a direct connection between the 
conclusions of evolutionary psychology and the world of 
politics. The conclusions are not as facile and offensive 
as, say, "Men are prone to rape; therefore rape laws should 
be more lenient," or "Homosexuality is anti-adaptive, and 
should therefore be illegal," or "Man does not have wings; 
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therefore he should not fly." The ideologues of evolutionary 
psychology understand the naturalistic fallacy too. 
 The arguments are subtler and more logical--and 
therefore more dangerous. Wilson, a professed liberal, lays 
out the argument thus: 
 
In hunter-gatherer societies, men hunt and women 
stay at home. This strong bias persists in most 
agricultural and industrial societies and, on that 
ground alone, appears to have a genetic origin. . 
. . My own guess is that the genetic bias is 
intense enough to cause a substantial division of 
labor even in the most free and most egalitarian 
of future societies. . . . Even with identical 
education and equal access to all professions, men 
are likely to continue to play a disproportionate 
role in political life, business, and science. 
(“Human” 40) 
 This is, in Kitcher's schema, the last rung of the 
ladder--"Because there are these genetic differences and 
because the behavior is adaptive, we can show that it will 
be difficult to modify the behavior by altering the 
environment" (Kitcher 127), and if we ignore the quick 
conflation of "genetic" and "difficult to modify,2 this 
argument does have a certain logic. If a certain behavior is 
innate and extremely intractable (for example, a feminine 
predilection for care-giving and a male one for abstract 
math), then attempts to modify this behavior (by, say, 
equalizing the male and female proportions of day-care 
                         
    2As Gould points out, "Many defects of vision are 100 percent heritable and 
easily corrected by a pair of glasses" (Urchin 35). 
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workers and of mathematicians) could have real, even 
devastating, social costs. 
 Here is the real social consequence of evolutionary 
psychology--not that it offends our a priori egalitarian 
ideals, but that social and political implications are read 
off from an immature and speculative science. One might 
reasonably argue, contra Gould and Lewontin, that 
evolutionary psychology is a legitimate science, albeit a 
highly speculative and untestable one; in this view, the 
only harm that it can do is waste research time. But to 
derive political programs, as some evolutionary 
psychologists (and, more often, their popularizers) do is 
quite unreasonable. 
 To argue that some political program should be 
instituted or dismantled because evolutionary psychology 
predicts that we should have certain innate tendencies, in 
the absence of any evidence that such tendencies either 
exist or are intractable, is to encourage the worst sort of 
social experimentation (something the generally conservative 
evolutionary psychologists are usually opposed to). What any 
reasonable person should object to, rather than the 
specifics of these proposals (for example, the anti-feminist 
conclusions derived by some popular interpreters of 
evolutionary psychology), is that any political program 
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should be derived from such shaky science: better that we 
muddle along, attempting to solve our social problems in an 
empirical, experimental way, than to weigh the social costs 
and benefits in advance based on dubious speculation. 
 Philosophers of science may speculate on whether 
evolutionary psychology is, or may ever be, a science. To 
the layman, it seems to deserve at least that much 
consideration. But even if it is a science, it is still in 
its infancy. It may turn out to be a dead end; its 
"predictions" may fail to be realized by, say, cognitive 
scientists (one of many reasonable objections to 
evolutionary psychology is that it warps the research 
program of the otherwise fairly objective field of cognitive 
science by encouraging an overabundance of research down 
certain avenues that would receive no special consideration 
were it not for folk psychology and its support by 
evolutionary "just so" stories). It may, on the other hand, 
bear some fruit. In the meantime, it would be best for us to 
avoid compounding speculation with speculation. 
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  Evolutionary Psychology and Literary Theme 
 
 Assuming that there is something to evolutionary 
psychology, what does all of this have to do with literary 
theory or aesthetics? The most comprehensive application of 
evolutionary psychology to literary theory is Joseph 
Carroll’s Evolution and Literary Theory. In this ambitious 
work, Carroll attempts to counter what he views as the 
excesses of post-structuralism and related approaches (he 
groups feminism and Marxism with post-structuralism) and 
establish a new foundation for literary criticism and 
theory.  
 The first third of Carroll’s work consists of an 
indictment of most of contemporary literary criticism, which 
he sees as dominated by the post-structuralist model. There 
is nothing particularly original in this indictment, which 
is vocally shared by most theorists with evolutionary 
approaches and better stated by several critics outside of 
the evolutionary approach: Terry Eagleton, Alex Callinicos, 
and Christopher Norris to name a few.  
 We will pass over these arguments briefly, as they are 
not at the core of Carroll’s proposal, shared as they are by 
many who would strongly disagree with his assumptions about 
human nature. What is interesting about these arguments is 
that Carroll would choose to include them at all. Setting up 
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a straw-man poststructuralism and demonstrating that it has 
little useful to say about literature is hardly original 
with Carroll. What Carroll adds to the argument is a second 
proposition: if we acknowledge that there is a world outside 
of language (which he claims the poststructuralists deny), 
then we must accept that science has something useful to say 
about literature and its production (reasonable enough), and 
we must therefore accept that there is an essential human 
nature (completely unwarranted). Carroll quickly moves from 
quite reasonable arguments that the insights of science 
might have a useful role in the humanities (an argument that 
anti-foundationalist Richard Rorty would heartily approve) 
to arguments asserting the truth of a rather controversial 
science. To reject evolutionary psychology, in Carroll’s 
view, is to reject science itself, although as we have seen, 
many respected scientists are quite suspicious of the claims 
of evolutionary psychology--and many of the principal 
architects of this new approach would not approve some of 
Carroll's more extreme claims. To believe in the world, 
argues Carroll, one must believe in an innate human nature--
to believe otherwise would be “unscientific”--despite the 
fact that hard-nosed positivists like B.F. Skinner are as 
thoroughgoing in their critiques of an innate human nature 
as the most wild-eyed poststructuralist philosopher. 
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 So the critique of poststructuralism does not 
automatically lead one to an endorsement of evolutionary 
psychology; but if the more extreme claims of popular 
evolutionary psychology are true  (and, despite its critics, 
the EP model has yet to be definitively demolished), do they 
provide us with any useful insight into literature? 
 Carroll, clearly, believes they do. First, Carroll 
claims that the "relationship between the organism and its 
environment . . . . should take a position of hierarchical 
priority over every other concept" (3). What it means for 
this relationship to "take a position" of priority over 
other concepts in literary criticism is never made exactly 
clear, but what Carroll seems to be asserting is that 
because this relationship has causal primacy (see Carroll's 
third point, below), it should be the context within which 
most discussion of literature should take place. 
 Second, and most central to our discussion, Carroll 
asserts that "innate psychological structures--perceptual, 
rational, and affective--have evolved through an adaptive 
process of natural selection and that these structures 
regulate the mental and emotional life of all living 
organisms, including human beings" (3). Carroll points out 
that "this concept sets itself in irreconcilable opposition 
to the idea that human beings are blank slates, that the 
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structure of motivations and cognition is infinitely 
malleable, and that language or culture provides all 
qualitative content and structure for human experience" (3). 
Carroll will elaborate on what he means by "regulate" in 
this context; just how far evolved traits determine the 
structure and content of the mind (very far, Carroll will 
maintain) will be an important question in regard to his 
larger project. None of the arguments of Carroll's enemies 
hinge on the notion of a tabula rasa; some, like Freud (at 
least the non-structuralist, biologistic Freud) even name 
some of the specific structures and contents of the mind. 
Carroll's argument is not that there are some innate 
characteristics rather than none, but that there are many 
rather than a relative few. 
 Third, and not very controversial if one accepts 
Carroll's second claim, "all 'proximate causes' or 
intermediate human motives are regulated by the principles 
of inclusive fitness as 'ultimate cause" (3). This concept, 
claims Carroll, "does not imply that all organisms at all 
times, and especially not all human organisms, are directly 
seeking to maximize their reproductive success" (3). It does 
imply, however, that "all innate psychological structures 
have, in ancestral environments, evolved under the 
regulative power of reproductive success and that these 
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innate structures remain fully active at the present time" 
(3). An important corollary to this concept, for the 
purposes of literary criticism, is that "reproductive 
success, in its twin aspects of sexual union and the 
production of successful offspring, is central to human 
concerns and literary works" (3). 
 Reproductive success, asserts Carroll in a formulation 
that will be central to his argument, as well as quite 
problematic, "provides an organizing principle that can be 
adjusted or modified or repressed (at great cost) but cannot 
simply be ignored" (3).         
 Here Carroll is asserting that innate psychological 
structures have a causal primacy in the production of 
literature, in much the same way that many Marxists assert 
the primacy of the mode of production--the primacy of 
"determination in the last instance." But while Marxists can 
explain the reductionism implied here by either maintaining 
that their focus on the mode of production is actually an 
issue of emphasis ("We're explaining how the mode of 
production relates to literature, others may explore other 
causal factors") or diligently explaining that the mode of 
production, while in a complicated way ultimately 
determinative, is merely part of a structure of semi-
autonomous mechanisms (or that the whole thing is properly 
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deemed the mode of production), Carroll (and this will prove 
to be one of the great failings of his model) fails to 
either mitigate his claims ("I'm just investigating one mode 
of explanation, in a curiously neglected area") or provide a 
convincing model of how these innate psychological 
structures interact with other causal factors. When he says 
primacy, he means primacy, with a single-mindedness that 
would abash the most economistic of Marxists.  
 Fourth, Carroll claims that "representation, including 
literary representation, is a form of 'cognitive mapping" 
(3). Which is to say that "representation is an extension of 
the organism's adaptive orientation to an environment that 
is, in the first place, spatial and physical" (3). This 
notion is central to Carroll's characterization of 
literature, as he develops the argument that the primary 
purpose of literature "is to represent the subjective 
quality of experience" (4). 
 Carroll's central assumption in making these claims is 
that "literary works reflect and articulate the vital 
motives and interests of human beings as living organisms" 
(4). Carroll argues, based on this assumption, that "innate 
biological characteristics provide the basis for all 
individual identity and all social organization, that 
authors exercise originary power in the construction of 
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literary figurations, and that literature represents objects 
that exist independently of language" (4). 
 These claims are relatively abstract, and formulated in 
such a way that a weak reading of them results for the most 
part in truisms (of course literature is produced by 
organisms with motives; who else is going to write it?), 
while a strong reading results in radical--and radically 
unlikely--claims (art is solely the product of organisms, 
whose psychologies are solely the products of genetics). How 
can these claims be used practically in the interpretation 
of literature? Carroll early on provides us with a reading, 
applying these principals, of a canonical work of 
literature. 
 Wuthering Heights provides us with a well-known 
example, argues Carroll, of the problem of incest in 
literature--a problem that has been approached by many 
literary critics employing Freudian assumptions that have 
been “falsified” by evolutionary research. According to 
Carroll, this research “reveals” that the Freudian notion 
that incest is an innate drive that is repressed by social 
convention is mistaken. Research “suggests” (it is not clear 
why Carroll switches to such tentative language) that a 
distaste for incest is genetically programmed (145). 
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 Knowledge of this innate tendency has important 
consequences for literary criticism; such knowledge can help 
us avoid erroneous interpretations of such texts as Oedipus 
Rex, in which incest is clearly a theme, and help us avoid 
“erroneously importing mother/son incest into texts, such as 
Hamlet, in which incest is not a central issue” (145). 
 We see problems developing in the model already. Even 
if there is an innate incest-avoidance instinct, Hamlet is a 
work of fiction; that a desire for incest is rare (or 
contrary to nature, whatever that means) in no way means 
that Shakespeare did not intend for incest to be a theme in 
his play. (Carroll believes that authorial intention is 
particularly determinative of meaning.) And what of 
twentieth-century authors who are aware of Freud's model and 
believe that there is a general desire for incest? Would it 
be illegitimate to see such a desire as important in these 
texts? 
 The problem becomes even clearer in Carroll's 
discussion of Wuthering Heights. Even if there is a 
"genetically programmed" distaste for sexual relations 
between boys and girls who are raised together, a desire for 
it is not unheard of--and even if such desire were 
impossible, Bronte could still have written about it. As 
Alan Richardson puts it in his essay "Rethinking Romantic 
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Incest: Human Universals, Literary Representation, and the 
Biology of Mind," "If Emily Bronte is at liberty to people 
the Yorkshire Moors with ghosts, why not incestuous foster-
siblings as well?" (560) To argue against an interpretation 
of the novel that sees in the central relationship "Byronic 
sexual displays" because evolutionary psychology tells us 
that such sexual desires are unlikely is not unlike arguing 
that Paradise Lost couldn't possibly be about God and Satan 
because such entities probably don't exist. And again, this 
critique assumes Carroll's own position that authorial 
intention is determinative of meaning; we haven't even 
examined whether his arguments on this front are persuasive. 
 This example does provide a model of how criticism 
might be informed by evolutionary psychology, if it fails to 
explain why evolutionary psychology should be central. The 
science of evolutionary psychology can tell us what is 
likely or possible for people to feel, and therefore perhaps 
give some insight into what the author intended, in the same 
way that the science of physics might hint at the correct 
reading (in terms of intent) of a battle scene: the 
physically impossible reading is probably not the correct 
one. 
 But despite the shortcomings of this example, Carroll 
has a grander notion of the place of evolutionary psychology 
in literary criticism. It rests in his idea of the relative 
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importance of evolutionary psychology as an explanatory 
method. 
 Any criticism is informed, Carroll maintains, by 
certain assumptions about the relative importance of 
different causal forces. Critical judgments about literature 
are shaped by assumptions about whether “all texts 
inadvertently reveal repressed subconscious conflicts, 
allegorize the socioeconomic conditions of production, [or] 
enact the triumphal self-affirmation of Being-in-the-
World”(40), or such texts “display the indeterminacy of 
meaning in an endless semiotic dissemination, helplessly 
reproduce an autonomous cultural episteme, or reflect the 
interaction of an organism with its environment” (40). 
 Carroll makes the reasonable point that if a critical 
method is based on flatly wrong assumptions about causality, 
it will probably be wrong (Carroll assumes that criticism 
must be true, rather than simply interesting) in much of its 
interpretation. It is unclear, however, why evolutionary 
psychology, or even the idea of literature as the product of 
biological organism, should take precedence as an 
explanatory model. 
 Perhaps his definition of literature might give us some 
clue as to the significance of evolutionary theory for 
literary criticism. Carroll defines literary works as 
“representations that either take the quality of personal 
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experience as their special subject or register the writer’s 
own sense of the experiential quality of his or her subject” 
(109), that are intended to evoke aesthetic and emotional as 
well as intellectual responses in the reader (109), and that 
are composed of words rather than some other sort of symbol 
(109). 
 Despite some problems with distinguishing “the writer’s 
sense” of something from an “objective” account (what 
Carroll seems to mean by this is something like “objectivity 
effect” or “objectivity intent”--that is, the author or text 
seems to intend to provide an objective picture of the 
world, even if by our lights that picture is distorted by 
ideology or outdated scientific models), this definition of 
“the literary” does demarcate a fairly clear field of study. 
What, then, is the purpose of criticism?  
 Criticism “is concerned to gain objective knowledge 
about literature--‘to see the object as it really is’--and 
also to communicate the personal and cultural value of 
literature” (112). 
 Here Carroll explicitly endorses Matthew Arnold’s ideas 
about the role of literature and criticism, specifically the 
notion that the purpose of literature and criticism is “to 
establish a relation between the new conceptions [of 
science], and our instinct for beauty, our instinct for 
conduct” (Qtd. 113). 
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 Literature provides a subjective view of life, 
delivered in words with certain attention to formal 
qualities. Criticism provides objective knowledge of the 
text, principally by explaining the author as organism in 
environment, and comparing the insights of literature with 
the scientific knowledge of evolutionary psychology. But 
why? What does it mean to “establish a relation between the 
new conceptions and our instinct for beauty, our instinct 
for conduct”? 
 The subjective view that literature provides is “a 
highly developed body of intuitive qualitative judgment 
about human experience” (114). This knowledge can serve as 
“an important point of empirical reference” in evaluating 
new scientific notions about human psychology and culture” 
(114). (Of course, as we saw in the Wuthering Heights 
example, if a text’s “intuitive qualitative judgment about 
human experience” clashes with evolutionary-psychological 
received truth, either the text or its interpreter is 
wrong.) 
 The idea that the primary function of literature might 
be to provide a counterpoint to the scientific worldview, to 
articulate in non-propositional form an intuitive, emotional 
sense of the world, is hardly a new one, as we see in 
Carroll’s wholehearted endorsement of Arnold. There is 
nothing distinctly Darwinian about this. But given his 
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definition of literature and his description of the role of 
criticism, what does the Darwinian model add to this 
discussion? 
 We have seen that knowledge of evolutionary psychology 
might add something to the reconstruction of authorial 
intention--giving evolutionary psychology a useful, if not 
obviously important, role in criticism as defined by 
Carroll. Carroll, however, sees its role as more central. 
 To understand why, we must examine his ideas about the 
conflict between authorial norms and cultural norms. Carroll 
argues that if authorial and cultural norms are the same, 
the protagonist is likely to ultimately adjust completely to 
his or her society--as Tom Jones and Emma Woodhouse do. If 
authorial and cultural norms differ, the story is likely to 
end in “isolated alienation”: Gulliver shuns human beings to 
live with the horses, Stephen Dedalus leaves Ireland.  
 This is an interesting schema for the discussion of the 
two logical possibilities of narrative. Where Carroll gets 
into trouble, however, is precisely where evolutionary 
psychology impinges on this schema. Into the discussion of 
the relationship between authorial norms and cultural norms 
he brings the notion of biological “norms.” 
 Individuals differ in their dispositions, and these 
dispositions are largely “elemental” or innate. Such an 
assertion is hardly controversial if one accepts the 
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evolutionary psychological model. Sometimes authorial norms 
and cultural norms differ--this is also uncontroversial. But 
Carroll makes a crucial error when he introduces the idea 
that some aspects of personality are not only innate and 
virtually universal (both fine if one accepts mainstream 
evolutionary psychology) but somehow normative because their 
origins were adaptive. 
 The fundamental fallacy behind this assertion becomes 
clear in Carroll’s discussion of homosexuality. 
Homosexuality, claims Carroll, violates not only cultural 
norms but biological norms as well: 
If, as in the case of homosexual writers, both 
male and female, the writer’s own sexual 
orientation diverges from the species-typical 
characteristics necessary to the propagation of 
the race, the tension between these two norms, the 
individual and the species-typical, will almost 
certainly play a large role in the organization of 
figurative elements for that author. This tension 
is complicated by the relation between personal 
organization and cultural norms, but my contention 
. . . is that species-typical norms and cultural 
norms are distinct categories; neither category is 
reducible to the other. (163) 
 It is certainly possible that there are certain innate 
and nearly universal traits. What is not clear is why it 
should make a difference if the author’s norms differ from 
dominant cultural norms or from dominant innate norms. 
 Biological norms, asserts Carroll, are not only 
dominant, but also functional--otherwise they would not 
exist (Carroll is here both assuming universal adaptedness 
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and that current utility and adapted origin are the same). 
Homosexuality, however, “presents an instance in which the 
psychological organization of an individual operates in a 
manner different from that of people whose behavior is 
functional for the members of that species as a whole” 
(167). 
 Here Carroll is explicitly rejecting the idea proposed 
by E.O. Wilson that homosexuality evolved through kin 
selection. That is, the presence of a homosexual would be so 
advantageous to that person’s kin that the trait would be 
passed on despite the fact that that person might be less 
likely to have children. 
 Carroll is not alone in rejecting this notion. Most 
theorists of evolutionary psychology find this explanation 
unsatisfying; the numbers just do not add up. But while 
homosexuality is for evolutionary psychologists merely a 
somewhat uncomfortable reminder that not all important and 
central psychological characteristics were adaptive or 
evolved, Carroll comes to a conclusion that few of these 
theorists would endorse: homosexuality is not only not 
adaptive, but it is a dysfunction.3 
                         
 3 Carroll approvingly cites one sociobiologist, George Kocan, who 
does not hesitate to label homosexuality a pathology: “The most 
parsimonious approach is to view homosexuality as it has traditionally 
been viewed in the behavioral sciences, as pathology. The persistence of 
diabetes or prostate cancer in the human population does not make them 
adaptive and in need of any sociobiological analyses. They are simply 
diseases”  (Qtd. 169). 
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 This position is not merely offensive and politically 
dangerous, but it is also fallacious. Even if we accept that 
homosexuality is somehow “dysfunctional” because its origin 
is not adaptive, it is not at all clear why this fact should 
have any normative force. As we saw in our discussion of 
E.O. Wilson, one of the most basic differences between 
evolutionary psychology and sociobiology claimed by 
evolutionary psychologists is that evolutionary 
psychologists are clear about the distinction between 
adaptive origin and present utility--this despite the fact 
that most prominent sociobiologists, E.O. Wilson among them, 
had already made this distinction. 
 Evolutionary psychologists again and again maintain 
that the innate tendencies that they have “discovered” to 
exist and to have adaptive origins--aggression, nepotism, 
rape--may in fact be nonfunctional today, either for the 
individual or for the species. Yet it is central to 
Carroll’s argument that the “species typical” be considered 
normative, as we see in his discussion of “deviations in 
parental behavior.” 
 Carroll argues that without a sense of the species 
typical, without a recognition that “functional” behavior 
has some kind of normative status, we cannot truly 
understand the pathological character of some of the 
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relations described by authors. For example, if we imagine 
that the arrangement in which parents are responsible for 
the raising of their own children is purely a cultural 
construct, then “we trivialize the anguish in the pathology 
exemplified by Mr. Dorrit, as well as the psychological 
heroism of those who cope with this pathology” (169).  
 Carroll is hardly unique in using notions of human 
nature to criticize human institutions; such notions are not 
even the exclusive property of the political right: Herbert 
Marcuse applied a very basic set of propositions about human 
nature to argue that people in modern capitalist society 
were not as happy as they thought they were, or as they 
could be. 
 And yet Carroll carries this argument farther. He is 
arguing that if one’s disposition goes against the species-
typical--even if that disposition is just as “elemental” or 
“innate” as the dominant one--then it is the individual, not 
the culture, who is wrong.  
 This may appear to be a minor point, but in fact it 
touches on the central justification for Carroll’s project. 
Unless, as Carroll argues, “species-typical norms and 
cultural norms are distinct categories” (163), and unless 
this distinction somehow matters, then the Darwinian 
critical approach loses its revolutionary vigor. If the 
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central conflict in much of literature is between individual 
character and cultural norms, what is added to the 
discussion by the knowledge that, say, the cultural norm of 
heterosexuality is both statistically dominant and of 
adaptive origin? 
 In a recent essay, “Human Universals and Literary 
Meaning: A Sociobiological Critique of Pride and Prejudice, 
Villette, O Pioneers!, Anna of the Five Towns, and Tess of 
the d’Urbervilles,” Carroll again asks the question that  
Evolution and Literary Criticism raises but does not really 
answer: “What relevance do human universals have for the 
interpretation of specific literary texts?” 
 The answer, apparently, is not much. Carroll admits 
that “sociobiological critics have only begun to consider 
the question of evaluation” (13) and that such evaluation 
has so far “focused on the presence of universal themes or 
sociobiologically typical behaviors,”4--and he admits that 
such a model for evaluation is lacking.  
 But he gropes toward a method of evaluation by 
suggesting that we can explain the appeal of great works by 
examination of their handling of these universal themes and 
sociobiologically typical behaviors. Pride and Prejudice and 
                         
4 Frederick Turner, whose work we will examine later, has argued that 
one measure of literary worth is the number of such themes dealt with in 
a given work. 
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Tess of the D’Urbervilles, we learn, are popular novels not 
only because of their “extraordinary stylistic felicity in 
the invocation of their subjects” (21) and the “rich and 
magnanimous generosity of fellow human feeling” (20) with 
which they treat their characters, but also because “they 
appeal to common and basic motivational structures” (21). 
 Anna of the Five Towns and O Pioneers!, on the other 
hand, are less popular works because they have “eccentric 
motivational structures” (22) and therefore “present 
interesting puzzles for critical analysis” but “also leave a 
sense of dissatisfaction” (22). 
 That a work’s popularity might be related in some 
interesting way to the universality of its themes or 
“motivational structures” is not such a ridiculous idea, as 
far as it goes. The differences in popularity between some 
works may indeed be partially due to the familiarity of the 
themes dealt with. 
 And yet, again, it is unclear how consideration of a 
work’s popularity necessarily entails any kind of position 
on the innateness or adaptedness of the motivation being 
considered. If a work’s popularity can be explained by the 
typicality of the themes and motivations it considers, what 
difference does it make if those themes and motivations are 
innate or enculturated, so long as they are typical? And 
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even if this analysis of popularity is legitimate, should 
popularity be the measure of greatness? 
 Ultimately, Carroll’s project of arguing for the 
centrality of Darwinian thinking to literary criticism and 
interpretation fails on its own terms. Although, as we saw 
earlier, a knowledge of evolutionary psychology might play 
some modest role in divining authorial intent (that is, 
making some intents more or less probable), it is unlikely 
to provide much more illumination than this. 
 Carroll’s main contribution is the suggestion that the 
concord/conflict between the author’s or protagonist’s 
psychological structure and cultural norms might provide 
some insight into a work’s meaning. But the original part of 
his suggestion, that there is a useful distinction between 
cultural norms and the “species-typical,” remains 
ungrounded. 
 Likewise, any attempt to explain a work’s value, as 
opposed to its popularity, by appealing to its treatment of 
evolutionarily salient themes is also unconvincing without 
some argument as to why popularity and greatness should be 
equated. It is also unclear why, even in the explanation of 
popularity, the adaptedness of the themes, as opposed to 
their typicality, is important. 
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 Carroll’s work represents the most complete and 
convincing argument so far for the importance of Darwinian 
thinking in the understanding of literary content. But 
perhaps the Darwinian model can provide more of a guide in 
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Evolutionary Psychology and Literary Form 
 
While most evolutionary psychologists see the entire 
realm of the aesthetic as a byproduct of other human 
behavioral tendencies--“cheesecake for the mind,” in Steven 
Pinker’s memorable phrase--many with an evolutionary 
approach to the arts believe that art serves a more basic 
evolutionary purpose: it is a primary behavior, selected for 
because of the reproductive advantage that it confers. 
Although Joseph Carroll has suggested, in reviews of 
Wilson’s Consilience and Pinker’s How the Mind Works, that 
the creation and consumption of art and literature might in 
themselves be adaptive, heritable behaviors, his work does 
not really pursue this approach. 
Anthropologist Ellen Dissanayake, in a series of books 
and articles on the subject, has proposed that the arts are 
the product of something she calls “making special,” a term 
that “refers to the fact that humans, unlike other animals, 
intentionally shape, embellish, and otherwise fashion 
aspects of their world to make these more than ordinary” 
(Aestheticus 30). 
 Making special doesn’t occur only in the arts, broadly 
defined--visual art, music, dance, painting, literature--but 
also in forms of ritual and play, behaviors that have long 
been interpreted as conferring adaptive advantage on 
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animals: “Play allows young animals in a protected or ‘not 
for real’ arena to develop practical and social skills that 
can be used later” (Aestheticus 32), while “ritualized 
behaviors formalize, stylize, and emphasize ordinary 
attributes that thereby acquire a secondary communicative 
function and smooth the conduct of social life” (Aestheticus 
33). 
 Making special has a particular significance for humans 
because of several effects: it “provides something to do in 
uncertain or troubling circumstances and gives the 
psychological illusion . . . of coping” (Aestheticus 36), 
causes us to treat certain objects and activities that might 
be essential to survival with special care (Aestheticus 36), 
and provides ceremonies and other “multimedia group events” 
that pass down information from generation to generation in 
memorable form, as well as uniting people. 
 What most of us think of as “art” is what Dissanayake 
calls “aesthetic making special.” Making special is 
“aesthetic” when things are made special by means of what 
Dissanayake calls “protoaesthetic” elements:  
features that inherently give perceptual, 
emotional, and cognitive pleasure and satisfaction 
in their own right. The reason that they are 
inherently pleasing and satisfying is probably 
because they indicate that something is wholesome 
and good--e.g., visual signs of heath, youth, and 
vitality such as smoothness, glossiness, warm or 
true colors, cleanness, fineness, lack of blemish; 
vigor, precision, and comeliness of movement; 
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sounds that are resonant, vivid and powerful. In 
any modality, repetition, pattern, continuity, 
clarity, dexterity, elaboration or variation on a 
theme, contrast, balance, and proportion are 
appealing, presumably because they engage and 
satisfy cognitive faculties, indicating 
comprehension and mastery, hence security. (37)5 
 
Beauty found in nature evokes what may most simply be 
described as an aesthetic response. Art is created by a 
process of “making special,”–-a process seen in the ritual 
behavior of many animals, including humans--but in this case 
applying those “beautiful” or “aesthetic” elements. 
 Such a theory has much to recommend it to the humanist 
fearing that he or she is devoted to something superfluous 
to the lives of virtually everyone. Art, because the desire 
to produce and consume it was selected for, is, in 
Dissanayake’s words, “like eating, sleeping, sex, 
socializing, and parenting . . . a fundamental and essential 
part of human nature.” (150) Art, we are reassured, is 
important.  
 But what does this approach add to the evaluation and 
explanation of literature? Does it provide any norms of 
judgment, any useful tools of analysis? Can it provide us 
                         
5 I will discuss later in this chapter this notion--that there are 
things in nature that we have evolved to experience as beautiful--in 
regard to the work of Frederick Turner, but an interesting discussion of 
an experiment in landscape choice (people prefer to look at pictures of 
savannahs) can be found in Appleton. Also provocative are studies that 
suggest that there are nearly universal preferences for certain shapes 
and forms (Cosmides and Tooby). Of course, none of these studies proves 
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with a better definition of the literary? Other than 
suggesting that producing and consuming literature is 
pleasurable, “aesthetic making special” as a concept does 
not really do much work. The idea of the intrinsically 
beautiful, as we shall see in the work of Frederick Turner, 
might provide a norm of judgment, but this is not the 
distinctive part of Dissanayake’s theory. 
 The idea that there is in innate artistic “sense”--an 
evolved desire to create and consume art with certain formal 
characteristics--might play some role in explaining, as with 
Carroll’s work, the popularity and effectiveness of some 
works. Ultimately though, Dissanayake’s message in arguing 
that art is an evolved behavior is simply that art is 
“important.”  In her recent work Art and Intimacy she argues 
for more artistic education in the schools (10), and since 
What is Art For? has argued for more integration of art into 
modern society. 
 Although Dissanayake is careful enough not to suggest 
that art is necessary or important because it is functional 
now in the same ways in which it was functional (and 
therefore selected for) before, she does suggest that 
satisfying the artistic sense might be an important human 
need: 
What is wrong with calling these tendencies 
biologically endowed needs? Part of human nature? 
All over the world, individuals in social groups, 
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particularly those closer to the environment in 
which we were evolved, display them and satisfy 
them to greater and lesser degrees. In historic 
times, after the rise of civilizations, we can see 
that in many societies these needs are not filled 
so completely or comprehensively, resulting in 
what might be called deformations of a fairly 
stable, universal human nature (an ideal 
construct, perhaps, and never completely realized, 
but an entity like a “species” or “model” with 
identifiable, specifiable, fairly uniform 
characteristics). (What 198) 
 
Geoffrey Miller believes that he has found the adaptive 
purpose of art: it is a form of sexual display. Miller, an 
evolutionary psychologist, began his project as an attempt 
to explain not the arts but humans’ impressive brains. Those 
brains are difficult to explain, argues Miller, for three 
primary reasons. 
 First, “really large brains and complex minds arose 
very late in evolution and in very few species. . . . Far 
from showing any general trend towards big brained hyper-
intelligence, evolution seems to abhor our sort of 
intelligence, and avoids it whenever possible” (17). This 
being the case, “why would evolution endow our species with 
such large brains that cost so much energy to run, given 
that the vast majority of successful animal species survive 
perfectly well with tiny brains?” (17) 
Second, there is a very long period time between the 
first evidence of the expansion of the human brain and any 
evidence of survival benefits. Although “brain size tripled 
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in our ancestors between two and a half million years ago 
and a hundred thousand years ago” (18), there is little 
evidence of its utility until much later: 
Arguably, one could not ask for a worse 
correlation between growth in a biological organ 
and evidence of its supposed survival benefits. 
Our ancestors of a hundred thousand years ago were 
already anatomically modern humans with bodies and 
brains just like ours. Yet they did not invent 
agriculture for another ninety thousand years, or 
urban civilization for another ninety-five 
thousand years. How could evolution favor the 
expansion of a costly organ like the brain, 
without any major survival benefits becoming 
apparent until on after the organ stopped 
expanding? (18) 
  
Finally, Miller points out that there have not been any 
plausible adaptive explanations for the things that humans 
are particularly good at. If our skills of “humor, story-
telling, gossip, art, music, self-consciousness, ornate 
language, imaginative ideologies, religion, and morality” 
(30) are greater than we would expect a general computer as 
powerful as the human brain to have, if these imply innate 
propensities, not one has proposed a convincing--to 
mainstream evolutionary psychologists--explanation of how 
these skills could have developed as adaptations. 
 To explain these uniquely human qualities, Miller makes 
a distinction that Darwin made--between “natural selection” 
and “sexual selection.”  This distinction refers to the fact 
that some traits may be selected for because of the 
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“survival advantage” they confer, while others are selected 
for because of mate choice, regardless of, and sometimes in 
direct opposition to, survival imperatives. The most famous 
example of a trait selected for through sexual selection is 
the peacock’s tail: a metabolically expensive trait that 
nonetheless attracts females. The origin of the female 
peacock’s preference for large, colorful tails is obscure; 
in fact, the most popular explanation for this preference is 
that by being so wasteful, the tail advertises the male 
peacock’s fitness--it has resources to waste. 
 The important fact about sexual selection is not 
necessarily the origin of such seemingly “unfit 
adaptations”--the trait selected for could as easily be one 
that is valuable for individual survival as one that 
advertises metabolic waste—-but the runaway quality of such 
selection. Once a trait begins to be desired, those males 
who have it are at a reproductive advantage--and then so are 
those females who choose to mate with these males. Even if 
the trait is disadvantageous to individual survival, if the 
trait means more reproduction, it pays (from the Darwinian 
standard of fitness, rather than from the popular notion of 
“absolute fitness”) to have the trait or to desire it in a 
mate. 
 Miller points out that evolutionary biologists no 
longer make the distinction between natural selection and 
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sexual selection--when they say “natural selection” they 
mean “selection for survival or reproductive advantage”--but 
he makes the distinction for the same reason that Darwin 
did: to emphasize that selection does not always work 
towards increased survivability. Miller, an avowed 
evolutionary psychologist, points out that “Many 
evolutionary psychologists, who should know better, even ask 
what possible ‘survival value’ could explain some trait 
under discussion” (8). 
 Miller actually ends up bolstering Gould’s project of 
arguing that evolutionary psychological programs that look 
for an adaptive explanation for every trait are too 
speculative to be scientific. While Gould does not emphasize 
the runaway, positive-feedback nature of sexual selection in 
most of his work, the operation of sexual selection can be 
added easily to his list of alternatives to “fitness” 
explanations of evolutionary change. 
 Miller’s discussion of the difficulty of explaining the 
human brain and its unique abilities through appeals to 
fitness conceived narrowly as “survivability”--and his 
explanation of these traits by the notion of sexual 
selection--actually parallels a famous early dispute in 
Darwinian thought. Alfred Lord Wallace, a contemporary of 
Darwin’s and an early champion of the notion of natural 
selection, famously parted ways with Darwin over the 
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evolution of man. Man’s unique cognitive abilities, argued 
Wallace, could not have evolved through natural selection; 
therefore, man and his unique brain are the result of the 
direct action of god. 
Wallace is popularly supposed to have reached these 
conclusions because of a failure of will, or a latent 
idealism or mysticism--he just could not reconcile himself 
to the fact that the human mind was the result of a blind 
natural process. Stephen Jay Gould, however, points out that 
his disagreement with Darwin actually resulted from 
Wallace’s “hyper-selectionist” stance. For the reasons that 
Miller mentions, Wallace could not explain the human brain 
through appeals to “fitness.” Darwin, employing the more 
pluralistic stance advocated by Gould, argued that a lack of 
adaptive benefit was in no way a demonstration that a trait 
was not evolved; adaptation is not the sole source of 
evolutionary change, and many mechanisms, among them sexual 
selection, could be employed to explain a trait that seems 
to have initially conferred no survival benefit (Thumb 48-
50). 
 Because we cannot explain the human brain--and in 
particular apparently innate skills like language--through 
fitness stories, argues Miller, we must look to sexual 
selection. In a provocative thesis, Miller uses the 
“conspicuous metabolic waste” sexual selection origin story: 
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the arts, beginning with ornamentation and song, were taxing 
wastes of cognitive resources, demonstrating a mate’s 
fitness. Once “artiness” became, almost arbitrarily, a 
desired trait, the runaway process of sexual selection 
quickly--by the standards of natural selection--led to an 
unnecessarily large (by survival standards) and “artistic” 
brain. 
 It is a fascinating thesis, attractive not only because 
of its argument that the arts were the primary motor for the 
development of human intelligence (rather than a useless 
side-effect), but also because of its comforting suggestion 
that intelligence and artistic talent might be sexually 
desirable (as contrasted to most evolutionary-psychological 
discussions of human sexual attractiveness, which basically 
argue that symmetry and size in men, and symmetry and youth 
in women, are the only real trans-cultural standards). 
 As with Dissanayake’s theory, Miller’s thesis, even if 
true, does not necessarily provide us with any tools for the 
interpretation of or evaluation of art or literature. It 
might, again like Dissanayake’s theory, suggest that there 
is an innate desire for artistic or cognitive stimulation, 
but the fact that the ability to create and appreciate art 
might be an evolved one in no way makes it innately 
valuable. At most it might console the poor poet that his 
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decision not to go to law school may not necessarily result 
in complete reproductive failure. 
 Robert Storey’s Mimesis and the Human Animal: On the 
Biogenetic Foundations of Literary Representation asks the 
same question that Dissanayake’s and Miller’s works do: what 
is art for? For Storey, the notion that art is a byproduct 
of other tendencies--or even that the urge to produce and 
consume art is evolved and innate--is not enough. Storey 
argues that art (and therefore literature) has always had an 
adaptive function, and still has the same function. 
 Some of what Storey theorizes is fairly plausible--if 
not particularly well proven. For example, in his chapter 
entitled “Comedy and the Relaxed Open-Mouth Display,” Storey 
argues that, contrary to, say, Freudian hydraulic metaphors 
that posit that laughter constitutes a venting of psychic 
energy, cognitive science suggests that “the element common 
to all laughter-inducing situations . . . is the presence of 
a masterable discrepancy or incongruity” (163). The comic 
results from the assimilation of incongruities into our 
conceptual schema, and, says Storey, “The adaptive advantage 
of assimilating incongruities into diverse behavioral and 
cognitive systems--and, in doing so, extending intellectual 
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Comedy (not in the formal, classical sense, but in the 
sense of “the art of the funny”) exists to satisfy the 
adapted pleasure we experience upon mastering cognitive 
discrepancies. More than simply pushing evolved buttons to 
derive pleasure (exactly what Pinker means by “cheesecake”), 
however, comedy serves a valuable function: “laughter . . . 
can strengthen both the stress- and disease-fighting immune 
system; it can alleviate pain and reduce psychological 
tension; it can increase creativity and flexibility of 
thought” (149).  
 Tragedy, however, serves a different function: it 
educates the spectator--through empathetic identification 
with the tragic hero; through “ambivalence over the 
emotional allegiances of the hero,” which results for the 
audience in “a preparedness for instruction about their [the 
allegiances’] social and psychological consequences” (149); 
and through “vicarious endurance of the tragic catastrophe, 
which, through being indexed in memory by the ‘painful’ 
emotions” teaches the audience how to avoid the “inevitable” 
(149). 
 Tragedy teaches us, not by giving us ideas about social 
action, but by showing us instructive scenarios. 
This is a plausible explanation of the social 
functionality of tragedy, but it is difficult to see what is 
particularly Darwinian about any of this; even the claim 
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that the pleasure of laughter derives from solving a 
“masterable discrepancy” is a claim from cognitive science 
that could be confirmed or disconfirmed without the 
manufacture of adaptive explanations. And is there really 
anything novel about the notion that tragedy (and narrative 
in general) educates us in a useful way? Such a claim would 
only be particularly Darwinian if Storey were making the 
claim that tragedy (or narrative) was a “trait” that had 
evolved because it served an adaptive purpose. 
 And again, assuming all of this is true, what tools of 
explanation and evaluation does such a model provide? Like 
Carroll (and unlike Dissanayake and Miller), Storey does 
attempt to apply his model to a few individual works. For 
example, he provides a not uninteresting discussion of 
Antigone’s decision to bury her brother in defiance of 
Creon. 
 It seems that she has been prepared by natural 
selection to value her brother (in the environment of 
evolutionary adaptedness it was a better genetic investment 
to care for a brother, who shares half of your genes, than 
even to care for a child, who is likely to die, or a mate, 
who might leave):  
In standing with her brother, Antigone is thinking 
with a primitive’s heart, but the circumstances 
hardly favor such thinking. Not only is she up 
against powerful civic sentiment, but she 
confronts a king who fears that his dominance is 
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threatened, and threatened by his “natural” 
inferior, a woman. (120) 
  
 This interpretation is plausible--even conventional (as 
critic Tony Jackson says of Storey’s reading, “Who would 
deny that Antigone’s dilemma involves a conflict between 
immediate family obligations and obligations to civil 
authority?” [Questioning 129])--but it is difficult to see 
how its grounding in evolutionary psychology makes it 
particularly radical. This interpretation makes perfect 
sense without the hypothesis of certain innate dispositions. 
Again, as with Carroll’s discussions of Shakespeare and 
Bronte, knowledge of evolutionary psychology might provide 
some insight into authorial intention by indicating that 
some behaviors are more probable than others (assuming that 
the author is attempting to be “realistic” and to some 
extent shares our ideas about human motivational 
structures), but that is all. 
 Poet and critic Frederick Turner--whose ideas about 
progress, complexity, and literature we shall discuss at 
length in later sections--has made perhaps the most detailed 
Darwinian/cognitive analysis of literary form in his 
discussions of poetic meter and the significance of the 
typical length of a line of poetry. 
 The poetic line in almost every culture and epoch takes 
about three seconds to read aloud--and three seconds, points 
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out Turner, is the length of our “mental present”--the 
length of time during which we remember completely 
everything that we experience, before those experiences are 
passed on to long-term memory and edited. Because the poetic 
line coincides with this mental present, “poetic meter is 
the most efficient and memorable way of communicating verbal 
information” (Inner 47); just as we can remember, say, ten 
seven-digit telephone numbers much more easily than we could 
remember seven strings of ten digit numbers, poetry that 
comes packaged in three-second lines is easily remembered. 
     But even more important than the mnemonic advantages 
that the three-second line confers is the “driving” effect 
that such a three-second line has. Natural brain rhythms, 
like the alpha rhythm, which runs at ten cycles every 
second, can be “driven” by an external rhythmic stimulus, 
causing “large changes in brain state and brain chemistry” 
(Inner 48); driving the alpha rhythm can result in seizures, 
but driving the three-second cycle has even more interesting 
effects. 
 Turner claims that research into trances induced by 
chanting indicates that chanting either the same three-
second phrase (or different three second phrases with 
identical rhythmic structures) causes changes in the 
chemistry of the brain that alter how the brain absorbs 
information and how it processes that information: 
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A state resembling the relaxed awareness that is 
the goal of meditative disciplines is attained, 
but at the same time a powerful channel is opened 
up between the linguistic left temporal lobe of 
the brain, normally somewhat isolated, and the 
emotive and evocative limbic system. New 
experiences of insight and empathy with nature and 
with other human beings become possible. (Inner 
48) 
 
 And while the length of the line has this driving 
effect, meter has its own distinctive cognitive effects. 
Metered poetry, long recognized as conveying information in 
its variation (if we are reading many lines of iambic 
pentameter and a line breaks from that pattern, we notice 
it), conveys information in a specific way: “The information 
is processed and understood not with the linguistic left 
brain but with the musical and spatial right brain” (Inner 
49). Therefore, “unlike ordinary language, poetic language 
comes to us in a “stereo” neural mode, so to speak, and is 
capable of conveying feelings and ideas that are usually 
labeled nonverbal” (Inner 49). Ultimately, argues Turner, 
poetry “is a biocultural feedback loop that makes us able to 
use much more of our brain than we normally can” (Inner 55). 
 This is a quite plausible extrapolation from fairly 
uncontroversial findings in cognitive science; along with 
the work of Mark Turner on narrative it is one of the most 
convincing applications of such findings to the study of 
literature. More than convincing, though, it is attractive. 
To the poet or critic of poetry haunted by questions of 
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“relevance,” this theory provides justification in its 
argument that poetry is a pretty amazing tool to achieve 
“higher consciousness.” 
So Turner’s discussion of poetic form is a fine example 
of the application of cognitive science to literary study--
and if it provides few means for making qualitative 
distinctions between poems, this hardly makes it unique 
among such applications--but its connection to the Darwinian 
paradigm is more complicated. One could on one level see 
this work as complementary to the mainstream cognitive 
science position on art, as exemplified by the work of 
Steven Pinker; like Pinker’s “cheesecake for the mind,” the 
form of poetry exploits certain innate cognitive and 
emotional tendencies to give pleasure (and, in this case, to 
inform). 
 Turner’s position, however, is more radical. A fuller 
discussion of Turner’s work must wait, but let it suffice 
here to say that Turner wishes to do more than claim that 
the production and consumption of poetry is a useful 
behavior parasitic on more basic (and presumably evolved and 
adaptive) cognitive tendencies. Not content with 
explanations such as Dissanayake’s and Miller’s, which view 
relatively high-level behaviors such as artistic production 
as traits both adaptive and selected for-–and certainly 
aware that even most evolutionary psychologists find 
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adaptive explanations for art unconvincing--Turner argues 
that poetry is the result of a more general evolved and 
adaptive tendency: the recognition of beauty. Beauty, Turner 
claims in an argument developed in Natural Classicism (where 
he first developed his theory of poetic form) and most fully 
developed in his more recent work The Culture of Hope, 
rather than being a culturally variable concept, is  
an objective property of the fundamental 
generative process of the universe--thus 
possessing a real, not just subjective, existence. 
Like our eyes, our aesthetic sense is designed to 
perceive objects that are actually out there: 
systems which show promise for emergent forms of 
order. (“Evolutionary” 103)  
 
 Such a sense “would have adaptive significance” 
(“Evolutionary” 103). Turner’s arguments in defense of these 
claims are too complex to evaluate here, dependent as they 
are on the science of complexity (the subject of our next 
section), but it is important to note that Turner--unlike 
Darwinian humanists who either see the arts as either 
without primary adaptive significance or, like Miller and 
Dissanayake, provide somewhat plausible explanations of 
adaptive purpose but admit that the connection of such 
purpose to present function is tenuous--sees the perception 
of beauty and the production of artistic beauty as innately 
good, transcending politics or narrow functionality. 
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 Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, whose The Adapted Mind 
was one of the founding documents of evolutionary 
psychology, have recently softened their stance on the 
question of the adaptedness of the arts. In The Adapted Mind 
they took the position, like Steven Pinker and most 
established evolutionary psychologists, that aesthetic 
behavior was a by-product of other adaptations. But in a 
recent essay, “Does Beauty Build Adapted Minds? Toward an 
Evolutionary Theory of Aesthetics, Fiction, and the Arts,” 
Cosmides and Tooby discuss the possible adaptive 
significance of something that they call “off-line 
thinking.” 
 Off-line thinking is a concept that they develop in 
order to explain a few basic facts about fictive narrative: 
first, “involvement in fictional, imagined worlds appears to 
be a cross-culturally universal, species-typical phenomenon” 
(7); second, “involvement in the imaginative arts appears to 
be an intrinsically rewarding activity, without apparent 
utilitarian payoff” (7); third, “fictional worlds engage 
emotion systems while disengaging action systems” (8); and 
finally, “it appears as if humans have evolved specialized 
cognitive machinery that allows us to enter and participate 
in imagined worlds” (8). 
 The challenge for the believer in pervasive selection  
is clear: we seem to have specialized innate abilities 
 
 
                                                            
                                                            
                               96 
                                                          
regarding the arts, yet there is no convincing explanation 
for how these skills could have emerged adaptively. 
Geoffrey Miller’s explanation for artistic “instincts” 
that seem to lack survival value is sexual selection. Sexual 
selection can lead to the development of all kinds of traits 
that might seem, at best, a metabolic drag; in humans, those 
traits are artistic behavior and big brains. Cosmides and 
Tooby, however, believe that there are only three acceptable 
explanations for our artistic propensities: pretend play, 
fictional experience, and other aesthetic experiences are 
direct adaptations; these things are the result of other 
adaptations--“cheesecake,” or, as Cosmides and Tooby put it, 
“something that humans were designed to do, but something 
they are vulnerable to” (9); or these activities are the 
result of genes that spread by chance during evolution. 
 They reject the final hypothesis as extremely unlikely-
-the behaviors under question are too complex and well 
organized to have developed by chance. The second 
hypothesis, which they formerly embraced, and which they 
maintain explains many features of the arts, they now find 
not completely adequate. These behaviors may have adaptive 
value in themselves, and been selected for. Why do they 
think this? Because for some reason–-and despite the fact 
that organisms have a need for, and therefore presumably a 
desire for, reliable information about the world--“when 
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given a choice, most individual prefer to read novels over 
textbooks, and prefer films depicting fictional events over 
documentaries” (11). For this apparently anti-adaptive 
tendency to persist, it must in fact have adaptive value. 
(Note the familiar hyper-selectionist logic: if a trait is 
apparently non- or anti-adaptive, we just haven’t looked  
closely enough for an adaptive explanation.) 
In order to explain this preference for fiction, 
Cosmides and Tooby first present a basic evolutionary-
psychological theory of beauty:         
A human should find something beautiful because it 
exhibits cues which, in the environment in which 
humans evolved, signaled that it would have  
been advantageous to pay sustained sensory 
attention to it, in the absence of instrumental 
reasons for doing so. This includes everything 
from members of the opposite sex and game animals 
to the exhibition by others of intricate skills. 
(14) 
 
 This functional definition of beauty as “a fascination 
with the apparently useless,” they point out, means that 
there can never be a general theory of the properties of the 
things found to be beautiful,6 but it can direct us in the 
investigation of the utility of finding the particular thing 
beautiful. For example, Cosmides and Tooby argue that   
certain phenomena, like landscapes, stars, and fire, “are 
                         
6 This “anti-essentialist” definition is in fact reminiscent of Terry 
Eagleton’s discussion in Literary Theory: an Introduction of the term 
“literature” as being similar to the term “weed”: weeds are any plants 
we don’t want in our yards; literature is a kind of writing that we 
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experienced as beautiful because their invariant properties 
allow them to function as test patterns to tune our 
perceptual machinery” (14). 
 So why, given this definition, do we experience beauty 
upon reading works of literature (or fiction in general)? 
Because they are in the form of narrative. Narrative is a 
special instance of what Cosmides and Tooby call 
“decoupling”--the human ability and tendency to entertain 
many different and sometimes contradictory models of the 
world. The ability to deal not only with the true but with 
“the might-be-true, the true-over-there, the once-was-true, 
the what-others-believe-is-true, the true-only-if-I-did-
that” and so on is a particular strength of the human 
organism. 
 Cosmides and Tooby argue essentially that fictive 
narrative, as suggested by several of the Biopoetics 
contributors, is a form of useful scenario-spinning: it 
allows us to sharpen our wits and prepare for the 
unfamiliar. That it is narrative is important because, they 
argue, we process “more deeply” information that comes to us 
in the form of individual experience: 
We prefer accounts to have one or more persons 
from whose perspective we can vicariously 
experience the unfolding receipt of information, 
expressed in terms of temporally sequenced events 
(as experience actually comes to us), with an 
                                                             
particularly value in a certain way (5). 
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agent’s actions causing and caused by events (as 
we experience ourselves) in pursuit of 
intelligible purposes. (18) 
 
 Because hypothetical scenarios come to us in narrative 
form, they must be “untrue” in their details, but they are 
still instructive in their modeling of all sorts of 
possibilities in the world and their development in the 
experiencer of certain skills: “skills of understanding and 
skills of valuing, skills of feeling and skills of 
perceiving, skills of knowing and skills of moving” (19). 
 Unsurprisingly, Cosmides and Tooby’s account of the 
adaptive nature of literature (very broadly defined as 
fictive narrative) is more detailed and convincing than 
those of the critics collected in the Biopoetics anthology. 
But even if we find the argument that a taste for narrative 
is innate, that innate means adaptive, and that narrative 
was in itself selected for and not the by-product of other 
adaptations convincing, what does this tell us about 
literature? In a general sense, it asserts the cognitive 
value of fictive discourse--a value that would seem to 
persist despite the radical changes in the human environment 
since the environment of evolutionary adaptedness. 
 But do we really need evolutionary psychology to tell 
us this? That a taste for narrative is an adaptive trait--if 
true--is no doubt an important fact. That it is innate, 
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regardless of its origin, is even more important. The latter 
fact is a useful tool for aesthetics and rhetoric, 
explaining the appeal of certain kinds of discourse, and 
providing predictions as to universal appeal and 
intelligibility of certain kinds of works in different 
cultural contexts. 
 But of what importance is it to the critic that this 
taste for narrative is adaptive? It is the findings from 
cognitive science--which are, incidentally, falsifiable in a 
way that the speculations of most evolutionary psychology 
are not--that are of some modest usefulness to the critic. 
The evolutionary origin of a taste for narrative is as 
useful for a theory of reading as the evolutionary origin of 
the eye--that we have eyes is certainly significant in the 
development of literature, but how we got them is not. 
 And this problem is representative of the situation of 
practically all criticism in the evolutionary mode: even if 
the claims drawn from evolutionary psychology are true (and 
as we have seen, critics of an evolutionary bent are not 
nearly so cautious in their speculation as are most 
evolutionary psychologists), this fact does not seem to have 
much significance for the evaluation of and explanation of 
literature--unless one is willing to make the jump from 
adaptive origin to present value. 
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 The work of Joseph Carroll, as we have seen, is 
exemplary in this way. He borrows from evolutionary 
psychology certain claims about human emotional organization 
and behavioral tendencies. But his arguments about the 
interpretation of literature (arguing that Wuthering Heights 
doesn’t deal with incestuous feelings but with infantile 
acting-out) are based in only a modest, and modestly useful 
way, on evolutionary psychology. As we noted earlier, 
applying the “findings” of evolutionary psychology in the 
thematic study of literature can only affect, as with other 
empirical facts about the world, our sense of what the 
author probably intended. It is unclear, however, how this 
is particularly radical or more insightful than, say, 
ideological criticism.  
Robert Storey’s work, too, although he presents it as 
revolutionary riposte to the poststructuralist orthodoxy, 
provides a rather traditional notion of criticism, with only 
an almost superfluous grounding in evolutionary psychology 
to distinguish it. He makes the perfectly reasonable 
arguments that literature allows us to “have the pleasure of 
the emotions that accompany loss or injury while remaining 
certain that [we] will suffer the real effects of neither” 
(115), and that narrative “helps ensure the cohesiveness of 
a culture by bringing the potentially disruptive in line 
with social norms” (114), but these arguments, aside from 
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being as old as Plato and Aristotle, do not depend for their 
cogency at all on the insights of evolutionary psychology. 
 The degree to which literature works upon an innate and 
relatively immutable psychological structure is certainly an 
important question, the answer to which might assist us in 
making probabilistic claims about the reception of 
literature. But again, even though Storey makes some rather 
halfhearted arguments about the historical fitness-enhancing 
qualities of literature, such an adaptive origin story adds 
nothing to a discussion of the creation of, effect of, or 
social functionality of literature.  
 What Carroll and Storey--and most of the critics 
discussed here--seem to find revolutionary about their 
methodology is the assertion that literature is a biological 
phenomenon. But such a claim is either a truism7, or an 
insane claim of monocausality: literature is the result of--
and only the result of--an evolved and immutable 
psychological structure.  
 Nancy Easterlin, a critic generally quite sympathetic 
to the project of applying evolutionary psychology to the 
study of literature and frustrated with the general 
scientific illiteracy of scholars in the humanities, asks,  
                         
7 As critic Tony Jackson points out, “barring supernatural explanations, 
thought cannot ultimately be anything but biological” (Questioning 327). 
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“Do cognitive predispositions predict or determine literary 
quality?” Her answer: so far, no--and maybe never. 
 Easterlin points out that as a result of the hypothesis 
of innate cognitive predispositions there are two basic 
positions taken in regard to the evaluation of art: “that 
artworks whose form and method are based most demonstrably 
on biological patterns are superior to those that are not” 
(“Cognitive” 244) and “that art exists to break up patterns 
of behavioral response (presumably biologically based), and 
therefore is most valuable when it deviates from cognitive 
or behavioral norms” (“Cognitive” 244).8 
 The latter position is obviously similar to the 
position of Bertolt Brecht or that of the Russian 
formalists--art as that which changes our view of the world 
by “estranging” it, by violating the conventions by which it 
is usually represented--adding only the hypothesis that the 
cognitive schema that are being challenged are the result of 
innate cognitive architecture rather than the result of 
ideology or the autonomous development of aesthetic form. 
The arguments for this position would be as strong as those 
for any other theory of art as estrangement. 
                         
8 Contemporary biopoeticists are generally disinclined, as we have seen, 
to make arguments for art that goes against the grain, as it were, of 
human cognitive tendencies. Easterlin, however, brings up the example of 
Morse Peckam, who in works such as Man’s Rage for Chaos (1960) argued 
that “the human drive to order results in the suppression of much 
important information, and that it is the role of art to break up 
behavioral orientations and create new patterns of response” (244). 
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 The former position is explicitly embraced by Frederick 
Turner and implicitly adopted by Joseph Carroll. A full 
consideration of Turner’s position must wait for a 
discussion of his entire theory of “natural classicism,” but 
Carroll’s position, as it stands, needs elaboration. 
Although, as we have seen, Carroll is primarily interested 
in theme rather than form, he does suggest, without much 
argument to support this position, that those works that 
employ more “universal” themes are more likely to be great 
works of art. As Easterlin points out, this position, as 
well as the position that aesthetic forms that “flatter” our 
innate cognitive tendencies are superior to those that do 
not, does not follow logically; the most that can be said of 
such works is that they might be easier to assimilate or 
comprehend than works in other forms or dealing with other 
themes. 
Tony Jackson has argued that the biopoeticists’ claims 
about the revolutionary nature of a criticism informed by 
evolutionary psychology are the result of a mistaken idea 
about the epistemological claims of poststructuralism, which 
they see as the dominant paradigm (“Questioning”). Jackson 
argues that critics like Storey and Carroll conflate 
relativism with nihilism. Easterlin, despite her misgivings 
about evolutionary-psychological criticism, thinks that the 
biopoeticists’ criticisms of the epistemological foundations 
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of poststructuralist criticism are fairly cogent (“Voyages” 
60). 
This is hardly the place to discuss the meaning of 
poststructuralism--whether there is even one 
poststructuralism, what its claims are (if it can be said to 
consistently make claims), and whether those claims make any 
sense (and what the import of asking whether it makes sense 
is). What should be stressed--and Tony Jackson does stress 
this--is that regardless of its epistemological claims, the 
poststructuralists would not necessarily disagree with the 
assumptions of the biopoeticists. For example, of Joseph 
Carroll’s Evolution and Literary Criticism Jackson says 
this: 
Carroll evidently feels he is saying new things 
here. He feels that he is proving the biological 
basis for the traditional (that is, pre-
poststructuralist) notions of literature and 
thereby disproving the claims of poststructuralist 
interpretations. But poststructuralism would agree 
with most of these ideas; the disagreement would 
involve what actually happens with literature in 
specific cultural contexts. Unless biologically 
based analyses are going to explain literary 
affect in toto, then the realm of history, desire 
and politics will inevitably come into play. 
(“Questioning” 326) 
 
 While Jackson may be a bit too sanguine about the 
adequacy of poststructuralist criticism--poststructuralist 
explanations are as often idealist theories about the 
autonomy of, and all-determining nature of, discourse as 
they are theories of the complex material determination of 
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the world--he is certainly correct in pointing out that 
despite their epistemological claims, poststructuralists 
would not necessarily disagree with many of Carroll’s 
assumption: anti-foundationalists as uncompromising as 
Richard Rorty and Stanley Fish would see nothing wrong with 
the claims of evolutionary psychology, provided that those 
claims were well proven as proof is defined by the dominant 
scientific paradigm. That such theorists would point out 
that science is a set of mutually reinforcing propositions 
that can never be ultimately grounded does not mean that 
they do not see the “accuracy” and utility of contemporary 
science (provided, of course, that we understand that 
utility only makes sense in terms of an already-present 
model, and so on).  
 Biopoeticists believe that they are making a radical 
claim in maintaining that humans are physical, biological 
beings; but their ideological bogeymen, the 
poststructuralists (along with feminists, Marxists, and 
others who wish to “politicize” the aesthetic) would not 
disagree--or, rather, they would only disagree by pointing 
out that humans are not only biological beings, or by 
pointing out that this claim, while cogent and reasonable to 
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 The biopoeticists also believe, of course, that humans 
are not just biological beings, but biological beings with 
an innate, evolved, and adaptive (at least in origin) 
psychological architecture. There is in fact throughout the 
work of the biopoeticists a certain “he who is not with us 
is against us” logic that quickly moves from the truism that 
human beings exist as biological beings to the idea that any 
remotely plausible evolutionary-psychological theory is 
true; either one must believe with the poststructuralists 
that there is nothing outside of language, or everything is 
socially constructed, or whatever else it is that these 
radicals believe, or one must believe that humans not only 
do exist outside of language (or whatever) but that they 
also have a certain set of innate cognitive tendencies. 
 Assuming that the evolutionary-psychological claims 
that the biopoeticists make are true--even the ones that are 
controversial among evolutionary psychologists, such as the 
idea that art in general, or certain aesthetic forms, is an 
adaptive trait--what significance do these ideas have for 
the explanation of and evaluation of literature? As we have 
seen in the work of Dissanayake, the hypothesis that the 
artistic impulse is evolved and innate can reinforce the 
idea that art performs both individually and socially 
important functions: that it served specific functions in 
the environment of evolutionary adaptedness can at least 
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suggest that it serves similar functions today. Of course, 
most evolution-minded critics are well aware that adaptive 
origin and present function are not necessarily the same; 
but when Dissanayake argues that because the artistic 
impulse is innate and evolved a diminishment of the 
“artistic” in modern life might be of psychological 
consequence, she is making a reasonable point (assuming, of 
course, that the premise is correct). 
 And yet, does such a theory really add much to literary 
theory that cognitive science does not? One might argue that 
the speculations of evolutionary psychology are valuable in 
the search for innate cognitive structures9--they might 
suggest the specific modular basis of difficult-to-explain 
universal and apparently innate psychological tendencies and 
abilities, for example--but it is still the cognitive 
science that is of direct import, not the speculative 
stories of the origins of cognitive structures. 
 Speculative adaptive stories invented by literary 
critics would seem to have two primary justifications: 
suggesting (like evolutionary psychology itself) research 
programs for cognitive science, or implicitly suggesting 
that the adaptive purpose of art must be its purpose now--or 
                         
9 Although, as I noted in the earlier discussion of sociobiology and 
evolutionary psychology, many critics believe that evolutionary 
psychology actually distorts the research program of cognitive science 
by placing undue emphasis on validating the assumptions of folk 
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if it isn’t, it should be. On this model Dissanayake, for 
example, is doing a little of both: on the one hand she 
seems to be doing evolutionary psychology--suggesting, like 
Cosmides and Tooby, an adaptive explanation for a trait that 
she sees as both universal and innate; and if the adaptive 
story itself is not falsifiable, that the cognitive 
structure is innate is, at least in theory. One could say 
that she and critics with similar programs are simply 
expanding evolutionary psychology into the explanation of 
art as a trait, and that their project is as valid as the 
project of evolutionary psychology in general. 
 On the other hand, stories of evolutionary origin  
proposed by literary critics are often attempts to do what 
evolutionary psychologists are usually careful enough not to 
do: imply that adaptive origin and present function are the 
same. Many of the critics whose work we have considered move 
with quite unreasonable haste from origin stories that they 
know to be controversial even by standards of evolutionary 
psychology to an argument about the necessity of art for 
psychological and social health today. Adaptive origin might 
suggest present utility (and many biologists would caution 
against going that far), but to suggest present utility 
before even proposing a program to verify that the “trait” 
exists is certainly premature. 
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 So in their own evolutionary psychological explanations 
of art and literature the biopoeticists reproduce and 
amplify the epistemological shortcomings of the discipline 
of evolutionary psychology; they are prone to the same 
problems of evidence and fallacious reasoning (explicit and 
implicit). When they extend the field of evolutionary 
psychology by inventing their own origin stories, they are 
on very shaky ground. These stories have the rhetorical 
effect of adding a sheen of plausibility to arguments about 
innate structures that otherwise have weak justifications in 
cognitive science, but they are logically weaker than those 
proposed by most mainstream evolutionary psychologists. 
 But what of the more modest project of importing the 
claims of evolutionary psychology to literary criticism. How 
useful has this project been, or can it be? Is it really 
revolutionary?  Tony Jackson has, I believe, been accurate 
in maintaining that much of the belief among members of this 
movement that they are doing something of consequence is the 
result of their pugnacious misreading of the meaning of (or 
at least the literary-critical implications of) 
poststructuralism; they believe that asserting, for example, 
that authors are biological beings who are (at least in a 
sense) the originators of their works is a radical challenge 
to the poststructuralist establishment--despite the fact 
that there is hardly an interpretive model that does not at 
 
 
                                                            
                                                            
                               111 
                                                          
least implicitly accept the importance of an intention 
effect.10 
 If an appropriation of evolutionary psychology isn’t a 
radical challenge to dominant interpretive paradigms, in 
what way can such an appropriation aid in the interpretation 
and explanation of literature? Models such as Dissanayake’s, 
although they are methodologically suspect, can at least 
suggest a theory of the psychological and social importance 
of art (provided that one always keeps in mind the 
distinction between origin and present function).  
 Models such as Storey’s and Dissanayake’s, which 
suggest that certain works are not only valued but valuable 
because they embrace certain “innate” forms or themes 
overreach; they are in fact examples of the naturalistic 
fallacy: an attempt to derive an ought conclusion from is 
claims alone. Frederick Turner, we shall see, tries to 
provide an argument that explains why such forms are “good”; 
without such an argument, however, literary value judgments 
rooted in theories of innate cognitive tendencies make no 
sense. 
                         
10 As Jonathan Culler points out in On Deconstruction, although 
intention, for a number of reasons, can never be ultimately 
determinative of meaning, an attribution of intention is an essential 
part of the context of any interpretive act (121-126). Stanley Fish has 
also argued that of the many things we might do with texts, interpreting 
them is something we would not say we were doing unless we assumed an 
author with an intent. 
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 Ultimately, the models presented by critics influenced 
by evolutionary psychology are far from revolutionary. When 
they are not making somewhat basic logical mistakes--or 
coming up with evolutionary just-so stories that most 
evolutionary psychologists would find unconvincing--they 
produce interpretations that seem to be connected in only 
the most tenuous way with the findings of evolutionary 
psychology. 
 Although there is no reason to think that evolutionary 
psychology will ever revolutionize literary interpretation, 
or to think that it should ever become central to such 
interpretation, evolutionary psychology might make a more 
modest contribution. As we saw that Carroll’s work suggested 
(before it was carried away by more grandiose claims), 
evolutionary psychology might aid in interpretation simply 
by virtue of being knowledge about how the world works. 
 If true, axioms such as “humans tend to have an innate 
distaste for sexual intercourse with close kin” or “men tend 
to desire more, and more varied, sexual partners” can 
certainly add to literary understanding. Just as an 
understanding of, say, gravity or the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics can assist us in understanding what a text 
probably means (ceteris paribus, the interpretation in which 
the boulder is rolling uphill is probably not the correct 
one), a knowledge of innate cognitive structures can assist 
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in the same sort of understanding. 
 If evolutionary psychology ever becomes a mature 
science, if its claims are ever well proven (or even merely 
accepted as well proven), it will become an essential part 
of the critic’s conceptual toolkit, like other well-known 
scientific precepts. It is unlikely, however, to change the 
way we think about literature. 
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 Part II: Evolutionary Progress and Literary Theory 
 
    Biological Progress 
 
 Charles Darwin cautions to “never say higher or lower” 
in regard to evolution (Gould, Full House 137); his theory 
of natural selection as the mechanism of evolution (which he 
consistently defined as “descent with modifications”) 
provides neither a possible mechanism for “progress” nor any 
criteria for judging progress. Nevertheless, in the broader 
culture (although not, for the most part, in the scientific 
community), “evolution” is equated with “progress”--progress 
that led inexorably “up” from microorganisms to the jewel of 
creation: us. 
 The idea that evolution led inevitably to us--or even 
to “intelligent” life like us--is believed by hardly any 
evolutionary biologists, and the idea of evolution as 
“progress” is generally deplored within the field. 
Nevertheless, there is a sizeable minority of evolutionary 
biologists who believe that there is there is a general 
trend toward increasing complexity among organisms. 
 We saw in our first section that the term “survival of 
the fittest”--borrowed from Herbert Spencer, who certainly 
did believe in progress--is in fact a tautology: since 
“fitness” in orthodox Darwinian theory is a measure of how 
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many descendants of an organism survive into the next 
generation, the phrase actually translates to “survival of 
that which survives.” 
 Remember how natural selection works, according to 
Darwin: members of a species differ in some respects--some 
have traits that are advantageous to reproduction, others 
have disadvantageous traits. Ceteris Paribus, those 
organisms with the advantageous traits will come to 
dominate. If a group is reproductively isolated, enough of 
these traits can accumulate for speciation to occur--the 
group is no longer able to mate with the original species. 
 It is important to note here that “fitness”--in the 
sense of being adapted to one’s environment, of having 
traits advantageous to reproduction--refers to whether a 
particular organism has traits that are advantageous in a 
particular ecological niche. There is no such thing as 
“absolute” fitness--being well adapted to all ecological 
niches; in fact, such a notion is not even coherent. 
 Thus the universal disdain for the idea of progress 
within orthodox Darwinism: there is no notion of a general 
trend toward greater fitness; and as fitness depends greatly 
on the particular environment in which an organism is 
embedded and a given degree of reproductive success can be 
achieved by radically different strategies, there are no 
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traits--of size, complexity, and so on--that can be 
considered universally advantageous. 
 Local adaptation (adaptation within a niche) may as 
easily result in anatomical simplification as in greater 
complexity: Sacculina, a descendant of the barnacle, is a 
“formless bag of reproductive tissue” much simpler than its 
ancestors (Gould, Full House 139); such simplification 
frequently occurs among parasites. 
 And yet the idea of some kind of direction to evolution 
persists, not only in the popular culture, but even among 
some members of the scientific community. Even as esteemed a 
naturalist as E.O. Wilson has sometimes seemed to endorse 
the idea of a trend toward increasing complexity and size of 
organisms. 
 The persistence of this notion of evolution as progress 
could be attributed to ideology, to a persistent 
anthropocentrism. We wish to see evolution as leading “up” 
to us because we wish to see ourselves as the greatest of 
all creations (so far)--the pinnacle of a new Great Chain of 
Being--and as therefore having the right to use the rest of 
nature as we wish. As we shall see, this belief in evolution 
as progress also serves--and has long served--to justify 
certain social relations: apparently irrational, 
exploitative, inefficient, or unjust social relations can be 
justified by pointing to this idea of progress. 
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 But functionalist ideological explanations alone will 
not suffice to explain the belief in evolution as progress--
our imaginary relations to the real conditions of existence 
are not created by dominant groups out of whole cloth: there 
is history, and there are conventions of discourse. One need 
not be a metaphysical realist to assume that, generally 
speaking, ideology cannot simply be made up in order to 
serve a social function. 
 So where does this idea of Darwinian evolution as 
progress come from? Darwin is partially to blame for 
appropriating the term “evolution” at all: before Darwin 
redefined the term to mean “descent with modifications,” the 
term encompassed the idea that such descent was also an 
“ascent” to higher forms. “Higher” tended to be an ill-
defined term (defining higher and lower is still a problem 
for advocates of evolutionary progressivism), but it was 
simply assumed that man was the “highest” form of life yet 
achieved on earth. 
 But the simple history of the term does not explain the 
persistence--not merely among a majority of those of the 
public who believe in evolution at all (49% in the US) or 
who believe in evolution without the intervention of god 
(10%)(Chang), but by a not-insignificant number of 
biologists who work within the utterly dominant Darwinian 
paradigm--of the idea of progress. Darwin won; why aren’t 
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the implications of the theory of natural selection more 
widely accepted? 
 Stephen Jay Gould believes he can explain this curious 
state of affairs. The idea that evolution is not progressive 
is one that Gould spent his entire career illustrating and 
explaining; but in Full House: The Spread of Excellence from 
Plato to Darwin, Gould (whose popularizations usually take 
the form of essays in the journal Nature that are ultimately 
collected in book form) devotes an entire book to the 
subject. In an earlier book, The Mismeasure of Man, Gould 
examined the history of attempts to quantify human 
intelligence, revealing the ways in which, from craniometry 
to IQ testing, well-meaning and distinguished researchers 
find in their data, through experimental and conceptual 
“mistakes,” evidence to justify the dominant ideas of their 
culture--usually about gender or race. 
 Full House applies the same methods of 
ideological/scientific critique employed in the celebrated 
earlier work--neither maligning the scientists who are 
blinkered by ideology for “lying” nor ignoring the fact that 
when they err, they always err in the direction of the 
dominant ideology. In Full House, which Gould considers a 
companion volume to Wonderful Life--his study of the Burgess 
Shale fauna, which presents some of the most persuasive 
empirical confirmation of the Darwinian “prediction” of 
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nonprogressivism--Gould points to a few basic causes of a 
belief in evolutionary progress. Most of these causes take 
the form of misunderstandings of basic concepts in 
statistics--misunderstandings that are understandable, if 
unfortunate, in the general public but highly questionable 
among scientists. 
     E.O. Wilson, for example, who should know better, 
believes that evolution is progressive. He lets slip, 
however, that the reasons for this belief are not 
scientific. In a passage from The Diversity of Life, Wilson 
makes one of his strongest claims for evolutionary progress: 
Many reversals have occurred along the way, but 
the overall average across the history of life has 
moved from the simple and few to the more complex 
and numerous. During the past billion years, 
animals as a whole evolved upward in body size, 
feeding and defensive techniques, brain and 
behavioral complexity, social organization, and 
precision of environmental control. Progress, 
then, is a property of the evolution of life as a 
whole by almost any conceivable intuitive 
standard, including the acquisition of goals and 
intentions in the behavior of animals. It makes 
little sense to judge it irrelevant. Attentive to 
the adjuration of C.S. Pierce, let us not pretend 
to deny in our philosophy what we know in our 
hearts to be true. (187) (emphasis mine) 
  
 Intuition, like common sense, is the homeland of 
ideology; Wilson is aware that there is no evidence for--or, 
within the theory he has devoted his life to expanding and 
defending, a mechanism for--progress. There isn’t even a 
criterion for progress: he is reduced to vaguely gesturing 
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toward increased size and “complexity” (itself, as we shall 
see, a troublesome and disputed term) and asserting that in 
our hearts we know progress when we see it. 
 We will soon examine the idea of complexity and its 
countless definitions; but before we look at such technical 
arguments, let us look again at Wilson’s assertions. Perhaps 
there are no clear criteria for progress, but Wilson is 
right: life began with a few small and simple organisms; now 
the world is teeming with life, and there are large and 
“complex” organisms. To the observer not blinded by the 
absence in orthodox Darwinian theory of a means for 
progress, doesn’t this at least look like progress? 
 It is this idea--that the existence of big and complex 
organisms constitutes a prima facie case for progress--that 
is the foremost obstacle to understanding the non-
progressive nature of evolution; Gould argues that believing 
that the existence of large creatures constitutes proof of 
progress in evolution results from a basic misunderstanding 
of the idea of statistical trends. 
 It is indisputable, of course, that while once there 
were only a few micro-organisms, there are now many 
creatures, many of which are quite big and “complex” in many 
senses of the word. If this were all that is meant by 
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 This is not, however, what is meant by evolutionary 
progressivists; they maintain that there is a general trend 
or tendency to evolution: that there is some sort of 
inexorable surge “upward.” Gould’s explanation of the 
increase in the number of large organisms is much more 
elegant and persuasive: an increase in the statistical 
“sample” (the total amount of life on the planet) leads to a 
greater absolute, although not relative, number of large 
organisms. 
 If we were to look at a group of ten human beings, we 
probably would not find anyone over six feet five inches 
tall. If we were to look at ten million people, we would 
find plenty of people that tall--and some much taller; the 
tail end of the distribution now includes a lot more people. 
 If we took the first sample on Tuesday and the second 
on Friday, we would not maintain that people had grown in 
the intervening time because of the existence in the latter 
sample of very tall individuals; but this is exactly the 
kind of claim that progressivists are making, according to 
Gould. The existence of large and complex organisms is taken 
as evidence of a trend, although there has been no average 
increase in size. 
 In fact, now--as billions of years ago--the dominant 
life forms on the planet are single-celled organisms: 
bacteria. Bacteria are not only what Gould calls the “modal” 
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life form on the planet (there are more of them than of any 
other) as well as the median (if we were to list every 
living thing on the planet in order according to size, the 
middle one would be a bacterium), but they also outweigh all 
other biomass on the planet combined.  
 Given that the modal life form on the planet has not 
changed in billions of years, where is even the appearance 
of an increase in complexity and size? In the increase in 
the average size of organisms. Unlike in our height example, 
there has been over time a real (if surprisingly minute) 
increase in the average size of organisms.  
 Why has there been an increase in the average size of 
organisms? Because unlike in our example, the other end of 
the distribution has been cut off. The number of organisms 
has increased, and therefore chance throws up a few large 
animals on the right-hand tail of the distribution; this 
affects the average because although the distribution 
remains what is called a “random walk,” it is a random walk 
away from a wall of minimum complexity. 
 What we call “life” has a lower bound, and those 
organisms that reproduce started from an absolute minimum in 
complexity. Moreover, small-bodied species near the minimum 
size tend to be the only survivors of mass extinctions--so 
that each extinction starts with only small species. After 
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each extinction event, there has been an increase in total 
number of species, increasing total diversity. 
 Given these facts, 
We note an increase in size of the largest species 
only because founding species start at the left 
wall, and the range of size can therefore expand 
in only one direction. Size of the most common 
species (the modal decade) never changes, and 
descendants show no bias for arising at larger 
sizes than ancestors. But, during each act, the 
range of size expands in the only open direction 
by increase in the total number of species, a few 
of which (and only a few) become larger (while 
none can penetrate the left wall and get smaller. 
. . . [I]n cases with boundary conditions . . . 
extreme achievements in body size will move away 
from initial values near walls. Size increase, in 
other words, is really random evolution away from 
small size, not directed evolution toward large 
size. (Gould, Full House 162) 
 
 The distribution of life on earth as to size actually 
looks like one would expect a random distribution against a 
left-hand boundary to look: like only the right-hand side of 
a Bell curve, with an overwhelming preponderance of microbes 
on the left, and a very small number of large mammals on the 
right. 
 When this left-hand wall is not a factor, there is no 
evidence of a general trend towards larger size, and a small 
but growing amount of data supporting the idea that there is 
no general trend towards larger size. One study by 
researchers at Florida State University comparing 342 
Cenozoic species with their known descendants found no such 
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general trend: a descendant was just as likely to be smaller 
as to be larger (Arnold 206). 
 It remains a logical possibility that even though much 
of the appearance of increasing size and complexity is the 
result of an increase in total variation, we might find 
empirical evidence of a general increase in size of lineages 
not beginning near the wall of minimum complexity. 
It would then be legitimate to speak of a general trend 
towards more complexity. Such evidence, however, has not 
been discovered, and absent a plausible mechanism for 
increased size and complexity, there is little reason to 
suppose that it will. 
If there is any sort of general trend, it is much more 
likely, argues Gould, to be in the other direction: 
One common mode of Darwinian success (local 
adaptation) does entail an apparent preference for 
substantial decreases in complexity--namely, the 
lifestyle of parasites. We are not speaking here 
of an organic rarity, but a mode of life evolved 
by probably hundreds of thousands of species. Not 
all parasites gain adaptive benefit through 
simplification, but one large group of species 
certainly does--those that live deep within the 
bodies of their hosts, permanently attached and 
receiving all their nutrition by commandeering the 
blood supply, or some of the food already digested 
by the host. Such species require neither organs 
of locomotion nor digestion, and natural selection 
favors their loss. One or a few novel organs might 
evolve for special needs--hooks for attaching to 
the host, or suction devices to drain off food, 
for example--but these elaborations are more than 
offset by a far greater number of lost organs. 
(Gould, Full House 200) 
 
 
                                                            
                                                            
                               125 
                                                          
 
 (Interestingly, these parasitic species, consistent 
with the cobbled-together nature of all life, often preserve 
in their development the history of their “more complex” 
ancestors--yet another reminder of the importance of history 
and contingency in the evolution of life.) 
 So: no known mechanism for increasing complexity, no 
evidence of increasing complexity, an explanation for the 
appearance of increasing complexity. Given these facts, how 
can the scientist or educated layperson persist in thinking 
that evolution leads to increasing complexity and size? 
 As we saw with E.O. Wilson, even the most learned of 
evolutionists can be led astray--the appearance of 
complexity confirming what his heart knows is true. And the 
absence of real evidence for increasing complexity is not 
the same as evidence against (although such evidence is 
accumulating). If they can propose a plausible mechanism, 
the orthodox Darwinists might for now retain their belief in 
progress without appearing completely irrational. 
 The appearance of a general increase in size has led 
some biologists working within the Darwinian model to 
propose a general adaptive benefit of increased size. As 
biologist Anthony Hallam puts it: 
Since phyletic size increase is such a widespread 
trend in the animal kingdom, there must be 
manifestly one or more selective advantages of 
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larger size. . . . Among those proposed are an 
improved ability to capture prey or ward off 
predators; greater reproductive success; increased 
regulation of the internal environment; and 
increased heat regulation per unit volume. (Hallam 
264) 
 
 But this adaptive benefit is only proposed because of 
the debatable assumption that size increase is “a widespread 
trend”--there is no direct evidence of general adaptive 
benefits of larger size, and certainly no evidence that, 
overall, those benefits outweigh the reproductive and 
survival costs associated with larger size (as we shall see, 
the biopoeticists carry this logic one step further: 
“obvious” trends in larger size indicate an adaptive benefit 
to larger size; the assumption of presumed adaptive benefits 
somehow strengthens the original assumption of a general 
trend). 
 Similarly, a few biologists believe that there has been 
a general increase in intelligence, or in neurological 
complexity, in nature. The case for this is perhaps even 
weaker than for a general increase in  size: the curve from 
least intelligent to most intelligent life is much steeper, 
meaning that even the appearance of a trend is much less 
apparent in this regard. 
 Nevertheless there is that appearance, and the apparent 
trend is generally explained as a concomitant to the general 
increase in size. But the case for increased intelligence 
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sometimes depends on the example of humankind: evolution led 
to us, the smartest animals ever, so there must be an 
evolutionary impetus toward greater intelligence. 
 This assumption is highly questionable on the 
statistical grounds that we have already examined--one 
outlier does not a trend make. Moreover, as we saw in our 
discussion of Miller, very few evolutionary biologists--or 
even the more extreme evolutionary psychologists--have been 
able to propose an immediate evolutionary advantage to human 
intelligence, or to many of the specific abilities of the 
human brain. 
 The overwhelming majority of evolutionary biologists 
agree with Gould that human intelligence is a historical 
“accident.” Not only humans but even “human-like” animals 
were hardly an inevitability. We are the descendants of tiny 
mammals who came into their own when the dinosaurs died in 
the Cretaceous extinction; but if the dinosaurs had not died 
out (for example) there is no reason to suppose that--like 
the planets on Star Trek populated by human-like 
intelligences--the earth would now be run by a race of 
intelligent dinosaurs. 
 Despite the general skepticism in the scientific 
community in regard to the idea of a trend toward increasing 
intelligence--and the overwhelming rejection of the idea of 
the inevitability of human-like or –level intelligence--the 
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leading biopoeticists persist in claiming that evolution is 
progressive, and that aesthetic, ethical, and political 
values can be inferred from evolutionary progress. 
 They see the appearance of increasing complexity and  
feel that it calls for explanation; they see human 
intelligence and feel that it must be the culmination of 
something--and perhaps the jumping off point for something 
even higher. 
 The biopoeticists could base their case on the idea of 
a general increase in intelligence. They would, however, 
have to produce a better explanation for this increase than 
that it is linked with increased size if they want to come 
to their desired conclusions; and if they wish to stay 
within the pan-selectionist model (and, as we shall see, if 
they want to support their normative conclusions), that 
explanation must involve a specific and direct benefit to 
intelligence. 
 They choose, however, to also base their argument on 
the example of human intelligence. As we saw in our 
discussion of evolutionary psychology, biopoeticists are 
willing to make speculations that even the most ardent 
evolutionary psychologists are not; in proposing adaptive 
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 Ultimately, though, they realize that adaptive 
explanations are not enough: human intelligence defies such 
explanations. But they are unwilling to accept that human 
intelligence is in a sense a historical accident and a by-
product of other adaptations.  
Alfred Lord Wallace was unable to find an adaptive 
explanation for the superfluous majesty of the human mind; 
rather than change his model of natural selection to 
accommodate such a thing, he ultimately rejected a 
scientific explanation altogether. The only explanation that 
remained was supernatural, magical: God. 
Like Wallace, the biopoeticists are so stymied by their 
pan-selectionism that they cannot remain within the 
Darwinian model. But unlike Wallace, they do not turn to 
God. To explain the human mind, and ultimately the mystery 
of progress, they turn to another sort of magic: self-
organization. 
To understand why the biopoeticists believe that all 
matter, not just life, tends toward “higher” levels of 
organization, we must take a brief detour through another 
science: complexity theory. It is a science, we will find, 
that so appeals to them that they will incorporate it into 
their models for more than its explanation of progress. 
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     Complexity 
 
 To understand what is known as “complexity theory,” 
“dynamical systems theory,” “self-organization theory,” in 
addition to a number of other names, we must begin by 
understanding the form of this theory that first entered 
public consciousness in the nineteen-eighties: chaos theory. 
After the publication of James Gleick’s best-selling 
popularization of the field, Chaos: Making a New Science, 
one could hardly avoid references to and analogies to the 
field. In the popular consciousness, chaos was best 
symbolized by one of the field’s most suggestive images: the 
“butterfly effect.” An illustration of “sensitive dependence 
on initial conditions,” the butterfly effect summoned the 
image of the flapping of a butterfly’s wings changing 
weather patterns on the other side of the globe. 
That such a phenomenon could occur was considered 
surprising because most systems studied by classical 
mechanics were presumed to change in linear proportion to 
changes in their inputs: a billiard ball (on a frictionless 
table) sent at the same vector and same force as another 
ball, but from a fraction of an inch away, would end up some 
readily calculable distance from its fellow. The 
relationship between these two elements would take the form 
of a linear (i.e. non-exponential) function: y=2x perhaps, 
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or y=1/2x. Such functions are called “linear” because when 
graphed, they describe a straight line. 
But despite the many great successes of the classical 
model, this model was based on an idealization of real 
systems. In nature there are few--if any--systems like our 
frictionless billiard table. Rarely do we find systems with 
only two elements and no external influences. Even the 
calculations of the orbits of the planets of our solar 
system are based on idealizations: they are only useful and 
“accurate” because of the scale of the system being studied.  
Systems involving more than two elements, or affected 
by factors like friction, must be modeled by nonlinear 
(exponential) functions: X2=y, for example. The important 
difference between linear and nonlinear functions is that, 
generally speaking, linear functions have a general or 
“closed form” solution (Kellert, Wake 3; Coveney, Frontiers 
35), which means that there is a relatively simple solution 
allowing us to discover the final state of the system 
(Kellert, Wake 3; Coveney, Frontiers 36). 
Nonlinear systems (that is, systems that are modeled by 
nonlinear functions) have no such simple solutions. The only 
way to find the end state of a nonlinear system is to 
calculate every state leading up to that end state: the 
model must actually be “played out,” and no system can be 
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accurately predicted by a model simpler than the system 
itself. 
Why is any of this important or surprising? After all, 
few of us really believe that the world is as orderly and 
predictable as the idealizations of classical mechanics 
would suggest. Folk wisdom such as “For want of a nail . . 
.” and science fiction stories in which a minor change in 
the past (a time-traveler stepping on a butterfly in the 
Jurassic, say) results in a completely altered future (an 
idea parodied on a Halloween episode of the popular 
television show The Simpsons) reflect our general sense that 
the future is inherently unpredictable. 
Yet chaos theory was hailed as revolutionary in part 
because of a misunderstanding of these epistemological 
claims as being an ontological claim: specifically, a 
refutation of determinism. Researchers in the field could 
hardly have predicted this; in fact, the field was more 
precisely defined as “deterministic chaos” (a definition 
encompassing the idea that “chaotic” behavior was often the 
result of simple underlying rules). Nevertheless, in the 
popular mind--and, as we shall see, in the minds some who 
hoped to apply chaos theory to the humanities--chaos theory 
implied not only that the future was unpredictable but that 
it was in fact undetermined. 
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Since the notion of determinism plays a role in some of 
the normative conclusions made by the biopoeticists, it 
might be of some use to quickly review  what exactly is 
meant by the concept. Perhaps the most famous formulation 
was made by Pierre Simon, Marquis de Laplace: 
An intelligence which, at a given instant, would 
know all the forces by which nature is animated, 
and the respective situation of all the elements 
of which it is composed, if furthermore it were 
vast enough to submit all these data to analysis, 
would in the same formula encompass the motions of 
the largest bodies of the universe, and those of 
the most minute atom: nothing for it would be 
uncertain, and the future as well as the past 
would be present to its eyes. The human mind, in 
the perfection that it has been able to give to 
astronomy, provides a feeble semblance of this 
intelligence. (Qtd. Ruelle 29) 
 
 Laplace never thought that his “demon,” as it is 
frequently called, was a practical possibility. He was 
simply pointing out that in a universe of matter in motion, 
controlled by physical laws, every future state of the 
universe follows of necessity from the preceding state. 
 One way of looking at this a little less grandly is 
simply to say each state of the universe is the necessary 
result of the previous state; if we could somehow “replay” 
any given moment, the next moment would be exactly the same. 
Yet another way of looking at this would be through a more 
human example. You are driving your car and approach a 
traffic light just as it turns red. You hit the brakes just 
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in time to avoid barreling through the red light. A 
determinist would say that if we could repeat this event--if 
the antecedent states were the same--there is no way you 
could have done otherwise. How could you have?  
 Although determinism is the working model of most 
scientists, this seemingly common-sense notion has generated 
interminable debate on its consequences for “free will.”  
Many philosophers, even up to the present day, find the 
supposed implications of determinism for notions of human 
freedom and responsibility to be distasteful, indeed 
unacceptable. 
 The debates about whether “could have done otherwise” 
in the sense of the above example is an accurate empirical 
description of the world, whether such a notion even makes 
logical sense, and what role this particular definition of 
freedom plays in our ideas of “strong” or “ultimate” 
responsibility can take fairly technical forms; we will 
therefore only consider these debates as they touch directly 
upon claims made by the biopoeticists. 
 We will also consider later the possibility that 
quantum events might be “undetermined,” or that the physics 
of dynamical systems might result in undetermined behavior.  
The important thing to note here is that chaos--at least in 
the form of sensitive dependence--presents no challenge to 
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this model; it in fact depends on the notion of  
determinism. 
 If this misreading of the implications of chaos 
research constitutes the most significant effect of chaos 
theory on popular culture, is this really all there is to 
the spread of the idea that chaos is really a new or 
revolutionary kind of science? Not at all. 
 One profound observation made by the pioneers of chaos 
theory, also illustrated by the idea of the “butterfly 
effect,” is that apparent chaos or complexity can emerge 
from underlying simplicity (some forms of complexity theory, 
as we shall see, spy another phenomenon: surface order 
[simplicity?] arising from underlying disorder). 
 The import of this observation is that although as a 
practical matter me may never be able to accurately predict 
the weather or the development of an ecosystem beyond the 
near future, we might be able to understand how such things 
develop, and to model what might be considered the 
underlying dynamical “rules” of such a system. 
 But what relevance do such concepts as “sensitive 
dependence” and “underlying simplicity” have for the 
humanities in general, and for literary theory in 
particular? Perhaps the best-known early approach to 
appropriating chaos theory for literary studies was in N. 
Katherine Hayles’s work Chaos Bound.  
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In this work Hayles (a literature professor with a 
Master’s degree in chemistry) attempts both to make chaos 
theory accessible to the humanities scholar and to argue 
that there are deep affinities between chaos theory and 
contemporary cultural theories and movements. As she puts it 
in her introduction, 
. . . there are also suggestive similarities 
across disciplinary lines. Suppose an island 
breaks through the surface of the water, then 
another and another, until the sea is dotted with 
islands. Each has its own ecology, terrain, and 
morphology. One can recognize these distinctions 
and at the same time wonder whether they are all 
part of an emerging mountain range, connected both 
through substrata they share and through the 
larger forces that brought them into being . . .. 
In this book, I argue that certain areas within 
the  culture form what might be called an 
archipelago of chaos. (3) 
 As this analogy suggests, much of Hayles's analysis 
will be of the "it is no accident that . . ." variety. It 
will be the burden of Hayles’s argument to prove not only 
that chaos theory and contemporary cultural theory arose 
because of a particular cultural milieu (terms like 
"zeitgeist" or "expressive causality" come to mind, although 
she never uses them) but also that there is indeed some deep 
philosophical affinity between chaos and postmodernism and 
poststructuralism. The latter attempt meets with only 
moderate success. 
 More successful, however, is her exposition of 
fundamental concepts of chaos theory. Her first chapter, 
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"Self-Reflexive Metaphors in Maxwell's Demon and Shannon's 
Choice: Finding the Passages,” makes clear the connection 
between entropy and information and the fundamental 
disagreement in the field about the relationship between 
order and information. The Shannon-Weaver heuristic--
popular, we are told, with electrical engineers--explains 
that "the more uncertain a message [is], the more 
information it [can] convey" (57). The Brillouin heuristic, 
which grew out of an analysis of Maxwell's demon (which 
Hayles explains very clearly) "makes sense only if 
information and entropy are opposites" (58). 
 Hayles reconciles the two viewpoints, noting that 
neither position associates absolute order or randomness 
with information: 
 
Like the optimist and pessimist regarding a glass 
of water, Shannon and Brillouin locate themselves 
at the halfway point of the information-
probability arc and look in opposite directions. . 
. . Shannon, looking forward, sees a downward-
sloping curve and argues that the more certain the 
message is, the less information it conveys. 
Brillouin, looking backward, also sees a downward 
curve and argues that the more surprising a 
message is, the less information it conveys. Both 
recognize that maximum information comes when 
there is a mixture of certainty and surprise. But 
where Brillouin emphasizes certainty, Shannon 
stresses surprise. (59) 
 Hayles sees the difference between the viewpoints this 
way: "Shannon considers the uncertainty in the message at 
 
 
                                                            
                                                            
                               138 
                                                          
its source, whereas Brillouin considers it at the 
destination" (58). This is a valuable observation, but 
perhaps the most important point of this chapter was its 
making clear that "maximum information is conveyed when 
there is a mixture of order and surprise, when the message 
is partly anticipated and partly surprising" (53). This 
chapter also succeeds in making somewhat concrete the 
concept of “the edge of chaos,” a concept from complexity 
theory that the biopoeticists find quite useful. 
 Hayles's chapter on Prigogine and Stengers's Order out 
of Chaos (Prigogine’s work, we will find, is much more 
popular with humanities scholars than with Prigogine’s 
fellow scientists) is somewhat less successful--although 
this is probably more due to the difficulty of the concepts 
being addressed than to any lack on Hayles's part. The 
arguments about self-organization are fairly clear, but the 
metaphysical speculations about the unidirectionality of 
time are not. Here follows part of Hayles's summary of 
Prigogine and Stengers's "refutation" of the notion that 
"the necessity for time to move forward is . . . inherently 
subjective, an artifact of the observer's presence": 
 
They assert that once the [pool] balls are 
dispersed [from an original triangular rack], the 
information the triangular form represents has 
been dissipated. For the pool balls to reassemble, 
they would have to "communicate" with each other 
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about position, momentum, trajectory, and so on, 
so that all the different motions would be 
coordinated in just the right way. Even for a few 
pool balls, the volume of information involved is 
very large. If the entire universe were to run 
backward, it would be essentially infinite. Thus 
Prigogine and Stengers conclude that time can go 
only forward because an infinite information 
barrier divides past from present. (97) 
 Whether it is the idea itself or Hayles's explanation 
that is unclear I am not sure; I am sure that this does not 
make any sense. Hayles had just made the conventional 
argument that 
 
although nothing inherent in physical reality 
causes time to move in one direction, it goes 
forward and not backward because  the probability 
for events to happen in a myriad of different ways 
is infinitely greater than for them to happen in 
one way. And why must things happen in just this 
way? Because our knowledge defines the triangular 
pattern, and only the triangular pattern, as 
"past." (97) 
 That is to say that the triangular pattern is no less 
likely than any one of the multitude of configurations 
possible; the balls don't need to communicate to form the 
triangular configuration--it’s just that we see that one 
unlikely pattern as the "past" while any one of the equally 
unlikely other configurations can be the "future." 
 That this notion is not made clearer is a problem, but 
the notion of self-organization does not depend on it; and 
anyway, as Hayles points out, the Prigogine branch is only 
half of what we call chaos theory. In addition to the self-
organization branch, there is also the Lorenz-Feigenbaum-
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Mandelbrot-Shaw strange-attractor branch--the branch 
emphasized by James Gleick in his influential book 
(Prigogine’s work is now more frequently associated with 
complexity theory than with chaos theory proper). Hayles's 
chapter on this branch, which concludes with a discussion of 
Gleick's book, is very useful (read: clear and concise). 
 Fairly interesting chapters on The Education of Henry 
Adams, The Golden Notebook, and the works of Stanislaw Lem 
are interspersed with the technical chapters--the Education, 
we are told, "transforms its voids and ruptures into gaps 
from which radiates an energy that radically reorganizes 
whatever comes in contact with it" (77), while Lessing's 
book "has many of the characteristics associated with the 
new paradigms--a problematic relation between local sites 
and global theories, an interest in recursive symmetries as 
a principle of organization, an awareness of how small 
fluctuations can effect large-scale changes" (241); the 
connection between Lem and chaos theory, although "he seems 
not to know" about it (115), is less forced because of Lem's 
explicit interest in cybernetics and information theory--but 
the book really heats up when Hayles starts trying to draw 
connections between chaos and poststructuralism. 
 In a chapter called "Chaos and Poststructuralism" 
Hayles does a fine job of summarizing some major points of 
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thinkers such as Derrida, Barthes, and Michel Serres. She 
also gets down to what she's been leading up to all along--
drawing affinities between contemporary cultural theory and 
the chaos paradigm. 
 For example, Hayles draws a very convincing parallel 
between Derrida's notion of iteration and Feigenbaum's. 
Hayles's gloss of Derrida's notion: 
 
Any word, he argues, acquires a slightly different 
meaning each time it appears in a new context. 
Moreover, the boundary between text and context is 
not fixed. Infinite contexts invade and permeate 
the text, regardless of chronology or authorial 
intention. Hamlet, for example, influences our 
reading of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead; 
but Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead also 
influences our reading of Hamlet. The permeation 
of any text by an indefinite and potentially 
infinite number of other texts implies that 
meaning is always already indeterminate. Because 
all texts are necessarily constructed through 
iteration (that is, through the incremental 
repetition of words in slightly displaced 
contexts), indeterminacy inheres in writing’s very 
essence. (181) 
 On Feigenbaum:  
 
Recall that Feigenbaum attributed the universal 
element in chaotic systems to the fact that they 
were generated from iterative functions. He showed 
that for certain functions, individual differences 
in the equations are overwhelmed as iteration 
proceeds, so that even though the systems become 
chaotic, they do so in predictable or regulated 
ways. Derrida claims that his iterative 
methodology is similarly regulated, in the sense 
that its production of undecidables is not a 
capricious exercise but a rigorous exposition of 
the text's inherent indeterminacies. (183) 
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 Even more successful is Hayles's comparison of 
Barthes’s S/Z with the Shannon-Weaver heuristic. Shannon, 
remember, views maximum information as the result of the 
right balance of surprise and certainty. But while Shannon 
is concerned with separating "noise" from desired meaning, 
in the Weaver interpretation "the 'desired meaning' goes 
from being what the sender intended to whatever comes out at 
the end after semantic noise has been included" (193). 
 This, we find, is similar to the viewpoint espoused by 
the Barthes of S/Z, a work that seems to valorize the 
proliferation of interpretations for their own sake. Barthes 
argues that literature is in fact the "art of noise" (188), 
and in turning a 13,000-word story into a 75,000-word 
analysis, "he claims that the reader will find this extra 
information more delectable than the original message" 
(188). 
 In her final chapter, "Chaos and Culture," Hayles 
extends her argument to cultural postmodernism, which she 
defines as "the realization that what has always been 
thought of as the essential, unvarying components of human 
experience are not natural facts of life but social 
constructions. We can think of this as a denaturing process" 
(265). Hayles argues that "with language, context, and time 
 
 
                                                            
                                                            
                               143 
                                                          
all denatured" by theory, "the next wave . . . is the 
denaturing of the human" (266). 
 It would not be useful here to review Hayles's clear 
and uncontroversial discussion of, say, the denaturing of 
language via Saussure. What is most important about this 
final chapter is her discussion of the denaturing of the 
human. Here she quite reasonably invokes Donna Haraway's 
"Manifesto for Cyborgs." Although there is little truly 
original in this essay (and Haraway freely admits how much 
of her argument is stolen from science fiction writers from 
Olaf Stapledon through John Varley), it does make available 
to the academy arguments about how technology literalizes 
what we poststructuralists intuitively recognize--the 
constructed nature of the autonomous subject. As Hayles puts 
it,  
Haraway argues that information technology has 
made it possible for us to think of entities 
(including human beings) as conglomerations that 
can be taken apart, combined with new elements, 
and put together again in ways that violate 
traditional boundaries. (283) 
 The problem with this interesting final chapter, 
though, is that Hayles fails to make apparent the affinities 
between chaos theory and cultural postmodernism. While she 
made productive comparisons between, say, Derrida and 
Feigenbaum, Hayles never quite succeeds in arguing that the 
denaturing of the human has much of anything to do with the 
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new chaos paradigm, or even that the denaturing of the human 
is a uniquely postmodern phenomenon. 
 One doesn't have to be a poststructuralist to agree 
with Donna Haraway's critique of the autonomous subject  
(one can imagine as hard-nosed a positivist as B.F. Skinner 
agreeing with her entirely); but even if one embraces (for 
the sake of Hayles's periodization) the notion that  
Foucault and his contemporaries invented the idea that "man" 
is an ephemeral construct, Hayles still fails to really 
explain what this denaturing has to do with the complex of 
scientific approaches she has defined as "chaos theory." 
 But this "failure" may in fact rest on Hayles's 
(defensible) refusal to ever really define what she means by 
chaos. She hints at what she means ("order in disorder") but 
never really gives a useful definition--if by “useful” we 
mean something like "can be explained to someone in fifty 
words or less."  
 Early on, Hayles explains her use of the terms "chaos 
theory" and "science of chaos" despite their signaling that 
"one is a dilettante rather than an expert": 
 
Part of my project is to explore what happens when 
a word such as "chaos," invested with a rich 
tradition of mythic and literary significance,is 
appropriated by the sciences and given a more 
specialized meaning. The older resonances do not 
disappear. They linger on, creating an aura of 
mystery and excitement that even the more 
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conservative investigators into dynamical systems 
methods find hard to resist. . . . The name is 
important, for in its multiple meanings it serves 
as a crossroads at which diverse paths within the 
culture meet. (9) 
 That this is more than just a defense of a failure to 
adequately define an important term (or to choose a more 
specific one) becomes clear when we consider again Hayles's 
chapter on entropy. Here we find that the very slipperiness 
of the term in different contexts proves immensely 
productive of new ideas. In her fast-and-loose use of the 
term "chaos" Hayles is trying to create the same sort of 
productive situation.  
 Although her work accomplishes this, by most measures 
it is a failure. Carl Matheson and Evan Kirchhoff, in a 
generally critical essay on the use of chaos theory in 
literary studies, argue that Hayles’s work, like that of 
many others applying chaos theory to the study of 
literature, fails to make a compelling case that creating an 
analogy between chaos theory and literature or literary 
theory contributes anything to our understanding of any of 
these subjects (“Chaos”). 
 Matheson and Kirchhoff do not object primarily to the 
many mistakes or misstatements that Hayles makes, both in 
regard to literary theory and to chaos theory, although 
these could be considered a major problem: right-wing 
watchdogs of the use of science in the humanities Paul Gross 
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and Norman Levitt provide a withering indictment of Hayles 
based primarily on an enumeration (hardly exhaustive) of 
such mistakes in their book Higher Superstition: The 
Academic Left and its Quarrels with Science (98-106). 
 Matheson and Kirchhoff concede rather generously that 
confusion over a few fundamental terms does not necessarily 
make a discussion like Hayles’s inherently unproductive. 
They argue, however, that her analogy is nevertheless 
unproductive. 
 Matheson and Kirchhoff propose that there are several 
ways in which an analogy can be useful, some more powerful 
than others: an analogy might allow us learn about a given 
subject in ways that might not otherwise be possible; an 
analogy might be the best way for someone who is familiar 
with one subject but unfamiliar with another to learn about 
the unfamiliar subject; someone who is somewhat acquainted 
with a given subject might learn more about that subject by 
learning about the analogous one; or there is a structural 
similarity between two subjects, “and this is inherently 
interesting” (41). 
 Matheson and Kirchhoff argue convincingly that Hayles’s 
work fails to accomplish either of the first two goals: the 
conclusions drawn from applying chaos theory to literary 
studies could be drawn without this analogy, and because her 
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“intended audience is not composed of scientists in need of 
elementary instruction in literature” (42). 
 Hayles has also not shown that those somewhat 
acquainted with the study of literature can learn more about 
it by learning about chaos theory, primarily because 
   
If the terms contained in the scientific 
illustration must be laboriously explained before 
they become at all comprehensible, the analogy 
itself is often effectively deflated, and can be 
discarded altogether in favor of the ordinary-
language explanation which necessarily accompanies 
it. (42) 
 
 Matheson and Kirchhoff argue that Hayles’s argument 
does not even meet their minimum criterion for a useful 
analogy: as Hayles is unable to demonstrate significant 
structural similarities between chaos and literature or 
chaos and literary theory, such an analogy is not even 
interesting. 
 Here Kirchhoff and Matheson are being too harsh. They 
may be correct about there being no significant structural 
similarities between the two terms of Hayles’s analogy 
(although this is debatable), but this does not mean that 
such an analogy is not interesting. It is the very slippage 
of the term “chaos” that is conceptually productive, not the 
almost accidental similarities between chaos and literature. 
 Hayles’s work does not succeed if we view the goal of 
literary theory and criticism as discovering the “truth.” 
 
 
                                                            
                                                            
                               148 
                                                          
Its scientific misstatements and logical gaps make for an 
unconvincing argument. But if we judge her by the standard 
that she attributes to Barthes--the proliferation of 
interpretations is in itself good, and the “noise” of 
criticism surrounding a text can be more interesting than 
the text itself--it is certainly an “interesting” one. 
 This is where Hayles’s application of chaos theory is 
superior to that of the biopoeticists: hers succeeds on its 
own terms; theirs does not. One could appreciate their work 
as a contribution to the proliferation of discourse about 
literature, as interesting writing about writing; Hayles’s 
work operates in just this way.  
 But the entire justification for the biopoeticists’ 
project is that contemporary literary theory is not 
“scientific” enough, that it does not obey scientific rules 
regarding logic and evidence. If their arguments are just as 
lacking in empirical evidence--and are much weaker 
logically--than those of their rivals, their project can 
hardly be considered a success. 
 Hayles’s work provides one model for the importation of 
chaos theory into literary studies: observe some 
similarities with literature, note that these similarities 
(“real” or not) are interesting. But how do the 
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Self-Organization 
 
The biopoeticists are not primarily interested in 
“chaos theory” as we have defined it (this term, never 
popular among researchers in the field, is now practically 
dead anyway). They are more concerned with the field that 
could be said to embrace chaos theory. The object of study 
of this field is variously known as “complexity,” “dynamical 
systems,” “self-organization,” “emergence”--among many other 
names. That these concepts are not exactly synonymous is a 
reflection of the ill-defined nature of the field. 
According to a list compiled by the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, at least thirty-one different 
definitions of complexity have been proposed by researchers 
(Horgan 197). One of the most frequently referred to 
definitions is one proposed by Gregory Chaitan, a researcher 
at the Santa Fe Institute: the complexity of something can 
be measured by the amount of processing power it takes to 
completely model it (Coveney and Highfield, Frontiers 37). 
The problem here is that such a definition would accord a 
rotting carcass at least as much complexity as a living 
animal, and would describe, in the words of John Horgan, “a 
text created by a team of typing monkeys as more complex--
because it is more random and therefore less compressible--
than Finnegans Wake” (Horgan 197). 
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Researchers have often considered rejecting the term 
“complexity” altogether as being so ill-defined as to be 
meaningless (Horgan 197), and many of the scientists at the 
Santa Fe Institute simply employ “interesting” as a loose 
synonym (Horgan 197). But as Horgan points out, “what 
government agency would supply funds for research on a 
‘unified theory of interesting things’?” (Horgan 198) 
According to Chris Langdon, another researcher at the 
Santa Fe Institute, chaos is related to complexity in that 
both deal with nonlinear dynamics (Lewin 12). But while 
chaos deals with apparently random, “chaotic” phenomena that 
are the result of the interaction of many parts, 
“complexity” deals with the emergence of a different kind of 
interesting behavior from such interaction:  
From the interaction of the individual components 
down here emerges some sort of global property up 
here, something you couldn’t have predicted from 
what you know of the component parts. (Qtd. in 
Lewin 12) 
 
 That “couldn’t have predicted,” we will find, makes 
this statement controversial, but the statement does give us 
a rough definition: if chaos can be described as “disorder 
out of order,” complexity could be described as “order from 
disorder.”   
 On one reading, the one stressed by the biopoeticists, 
this is a radical statement: it implies a violation of the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics (“entropy increases”). Indeed, 
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one researcher, Stuart Kauffman, believes that we may need a 
fourth law to accommodate self-organizing phenomena 
(Investigations).  
 On another, less controversial reading, self-
organization or emergence simply refers to the phenomenon of 
globally interesting behavior resulting from many parts 
interacting locally. Two popular works--Out of Control: The 
New Biology of Machines, Social Systems, and the Economic 
World, by Kevin Kelly, and Emergence: The Connected Lives of 
Ants, Brains, Cities, and Software, by Stephen Johnson--
provide fascinating studies of these phenomena. 
 For example, the human mind. The current model of the 
human mind embraced by most cognitive scientists, as we saw 
earlier, is the modular one. What this means is that the 
human mind (and consciousness) is not simply a unitary, 
global phenomenon. There is no “self” that runs everything. 
What we think of as “mind” is an epiphenomenon of the 
interaction of countless cognitive “modules,” each of which 
is not transparent to the others but, rather, interacts in a 
relatively limited way. 
 An ant pile, too, seems to have a consciousness, and to 
plan things: the location of a new pile, where to put the 
dead, where to put the garbage, where to find food. But this 
“smart” global behavior results from “dumb” ants following 
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simple rules and communicating with each other in a limited 
way. 
 Human cities grow in a way that can also seem directed, 
but is really just the result of individuals making 
decisions. This explains the appeal of such “bottom-up” 
simulation games as SimCity--a game in which the player 
controls such things as property taxes and general 
infrastructure while an algorithm simulates the kinds of 
decisions people living in such a city would make about 
where to live, what businesses to start, and so on. The 
resulting “city” grows in ways that appear to simulate the 
dynamics of a real city.  
 This notion of self-organization is not altogether new. 
In fact, the classic example of this sort of self-
organization is what Adam Smith called the “Invisible Hand” 
of the market. By purely local interaction, the “market” 
results in efficient use of resources: if demand for a 
product increases, supply will respond; if it decreases, 
some suppliers will choose to sell a different product. 
 It is important to keep in mind the distinction between 
this idea of self-organization, which is well documented and 
implies no mechanism outside the known laws of 
thermodynamics, and the ideas embraced by the biopoeticists, 
which are supported by few undisputed studies and propose no 
mechanism other than a new law of nature. It is this version 
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of self-organization on which their belief in the 
progressive nature of evolution relies--and it on this 
version that we will continue to focus as we consider the 
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Frederick Turner: Beauty and Evolution 
 
Frederick Turner, a professor of English Literature at 
the University of Texas at Dallas and a celebrated poet, 
believes that we have forgotten about beauty. 
 As we saw in our chapter on evolutionary psychology and 
literary criticism, Turner has provided an explanation of 
the operation of metered poetry in light of findings from 
cognitive science: he believes that metered poetry comes to 
us in “stereo” mode--integrating left- and right-brain 
function and thereby allowing us to make fuller use of our 
brains: in particular, to reach new heights of empathy with 
humans and nature.11  
 Although he suggests an immediate adaptive function as 
the origin for this mechanism, he is rather halfhearted 
about justifying this suggestion; he seems aware that a 
specific adaptive explanation for such a late-appearing (in 
the history of the species) trait is unlikely to be very 
persuasive. 
                         
11 This thesis, which relies on somewhat overhyped and oversimplified 
notions of the left-brain/right-brain split, raises a couple of 
interesting questions: why would integrating the two halves of the brain 
increase cognition? Presumably, (given the sort of Darwinian logic that 
Turner endorses), the human brain is split for a reason, and cognitive 
science does suggest that the specific nature of human cognition  
results from the parallel operation of  the two halves, which are 
(relatively) limited in their communication with each other. Moreover, 
research suggests that women’s brains are somewhat less divided in their 
function (each half is less specialized: verbal processing, for example, 
more often occurs in both hemispheres, while in men it tends to be 
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 He does not need such a specific adaptive story, 
however, because his explanation of the function of poetry 
is that it is part of a general human capacity for 
recognizing and creating beauty. We have already seen, in 
several forms, the argument that the human capacity for 
creating and appreciating art has an adaptive origin: 
“making special” for Ellen Dissanayake, or sexual selection 
for Geoffrey Miller, for example. 
 Turner’s argument, however, hinges on his definition of 
beauty. Beauty, contrary to the beliefs of both the 
political left and right, is neither merely ideological nor 
merely pretty. It is not subjective; it is in fact “real” 
(Culture 10). 
 “All human societies,” Turner informs us, “possess the 
concept of beauty” (“Evolutionary” 106). What is beautiful, 
of course, we all agree on: peacock feathers, tropical fish, 
and, of course, the blue satin bowerbird, which as part of 
its courtship ritual builds a complicated and apparently 
useless bower, which is decorated with colored objects and 
painted with berry juice (“Evolutionary” 106).  
Having provided examples of (but yet no definition of) 
“the beautiful,” Turner asserts that we have an innate 
tendency to respond to beauty. His argument proceeds 
                                                             
localized in the right-brain); does this mean that women’s brains work 
better than men’s? 
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curiously: first, he asserts, our capacity to create and 
experience beauty is a characteristic of an evolved animal, 
and that beauty is thus in some way a biological adaptation. 
 Beauty is “a physiological reality” because the 
experience of beauty can be linked to the activity of 
certain brain chemicals, such as endorphins and enkephalins. 
Turner points out that drugs such as heroin and cocaine are 
addictive because they chemically resemble the “chemistries 
of joy” with which the brain rewards itself (“Evolutionary” 
107). 
 We experience pleasure, which is ultimately chemical, 
when we perceive beauty--a pleasure so great that “artists 
will starve in garrets” and “for whose mimicked substitutes 
rats and addicts will happily neglect food and sex” 
(“Evolutionary” 107).   
 What then is the adaptive function that this sense of 
beauty serves, asks Turner, this sense that is so strong 
that it can lead us to forgo nourishment or the opportunity 
to reproduce? 
Before we proceed to Turner’s answer, we should note 
that there are problems with this argument already. First of 
all, it conflates the chemistry of “joy” with the specific 
experience of beauty. While there is plenty of evidence that 
viewing “pretty” things stimulates the release of certain 
chemicals in the brain, lots of things stimulate the release 
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of these chemicals, and the suggestion that heroin addicts 
and rats with electrodes in the pleasure centers of their 
brains are experiencing “mimicked substitutes” for beauty is 
unwarranted and misleading. 
 Moreover, Turner provides little argument to support 
his assertion that the experience of beauty is an adapted 
trait at all. As we have seen, Steven Pinker, along with 
most cognitive scientists and evolutionary psychologists, 
believes that the pleasure that we experience when we 
encounter beauty is a form of “cheesecake for the mind.” 
(Just as we have a taste for sweets not because they are 
good for us but because we have an adaptive desire for 
certain tastes or foods that were scarce in the environment 
of evolutionary adaptedness but all too plentiful in the 
industrialized world, we enjoy the “pretty” because it 
flatters certain innate tendencies of the human mind.) The 
controversial assertion that it is a primary trait and not a 
by-product or mediated trait therefore requires some 
argument. And even if we assume that it is an identifiable 
trait, this is leaving aside the questions raised by Stephen 
Jay Gould and others about the assumption that every trait 
has an adaptive explanation. 
 Let us assume for the moment, however, that Turner is 
correct in his assertion that the experience of beauty is an 
innate and adaptive trait (the claim is at least not 
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demonstrably false; as we’ve seen, adaptive stories are 
unfalsifiable, which is why many consider them fundamentally 
unscientific); what adaptive function does beauty serve? 
 Turner’s origin story begins somewhat like Geoffrey 
Miller’s: with sexual selection. He asks us to imagine a 
mating ritual that affects an individual’s likelihood of 
reproducing. Those who have the cognitive ability to perform 
the ritual have a better chance of attracting a mate and 
leaving progeny. Cultural changes in the ritual will give an 
even greater reproductive advantage to those individuals who 
can easily master those changes (“Evolutionary” 108). 
This notion of sexual selection as the spur towards the 
development of the human brain, expanded upon in other 
essays,12 is thus far very similar to Miller’s: demanding 
mating rituals gave a reproductive advantage to those who 
had the best cognitive skills (at least in regard to these 
rituals) and eventually led to the modern human brain. 
 But whereas Miller emphasizes the somewhat arbitrary, 
out-of-control nature of sexual selection (since sexual 
selection has little to do with survival, any particular 
trait could become hypertrophied through what is basically a 
historical accident), Turner wants to emphasize that 
evolution led to a particular human propensity to create and 
                         
12 “Beauty: The Foundation of Cognition” and “An Evolutionary/Chaotic 
Theory of Beauty and Meaning.” 
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recognize beauty, a propensity that he argues has survival 
value in itself. 
 He reaches this conclusion by a rather circuitous 
route, introducing first the notion of the evolutionary 
origin of standards of human beauty. 
 In this hypothetical situation, according to Turner, 
the idea of beauty is obviously important. The ritual led 
not only to a general improvement in cognition, but to “a 
capacity for recognizing and creating beauty,” a competence 
that was selected for because of the ritual (Culture 108). 
As the ability to recognize beauty was selected for, “to be, 
and to be able to recognize, a beautiful human being, and to 
desire to mix one’s genes with him or her” might have also 
driven human evolution (Culture 108). In this scenario, 
“personal physical beauty takes on new importance”; 
ultimately, argues Turner, “we look the way we do as a 
species, largely because that was the way our ancestors 
thought intelligent, strong, loving, and imaginative-ritual-
ready animals ought to look. We are the monument to our 
progenitors’ taste” (Culture 108). 
This idea of the evolutionary development of 
transcultural standards of beauty is a common one in 
evolutionary psychology, but it is unclear how it relates to 
the hypothetical with which Turner has presented us. 
Traditional evolutionary-psychological explanations of the 
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development of standards of human beauty revolve around 
relatively straightforward arguments: youth (in women) and 
symmetry of features, for example, are attractive in a 
potential mate because they are indicators that healthy 
progeny might result from a union with this person. How 
Turner gets from an evolved ability to perform a mating 
ritual to an evolved propensity to perceive beauty--and to 
desire to embody it and mate with it--is completely obscure. 
However, this leap does allow him to introduce the idea of 
beauty into the argument: 
If the theory of the biocultural evolution of the 
sense of beauty through traditional ritual is 
correct, we might expect to see a specific set of 
capabilities, natural-classical genres or systems 
by which we generate, recognize, and appreciate 
beauty, based on new or revised neural structures 
in the hominid brain, that would be culturally 
universal and fundamental to the human arts. What 
should we call these special human abilities? They 
would be much more powerful and more sharply 
focused than the general processing of the basic 
mammalian brain. Perhaps we could call them 
hereditary knowledges, or lores, or skills, or 
powers. . . . Or perhaps we should call them 
genres, because they have distinct forms and even 
rules. . . Let us settle for the word “charms,” in 
the combination “neurocharms.” (Culture 208) 
 
 Note the introduction of the idea of beauty into the  
discussion of the development of skills due to the mating 
ritual: the argument as originally formulated required no 
specific content for the ritual, but now the skills are 
somehow about beauty. 
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 There is no logical problem, within the framework of 
sexual selection, in simply arguing that what we find 
beautiful now is what our ancestors found beautiful, and 
that what our ancestors thought beautiful was somewhat 
arbitrary (Miller makes this argument in part), but this is 
not the argument that Turner is making. He ultimately argues 
that beauty is not arbitrary in this way. 
 Leaving aside for a moment this questionable origin 
story, let us consider his fascinating proposal about 
special human skills related to beauty.13 The idea of 
“natural classicism” is one that he first developed in his 
1991 book of that title, which first introduced his theories 
about poetic meter.  
People see (hear, touch, taste, smell) the 
beautiful, and recognize it by a natural intuition 
and a natural pleasure. This “natural intuition” 
is for us human beings activated, sensitized, and 
deepened by culture, is a natural capacity of the 
nervous system [that] now incorporates a feedback 
loop, and also uses the physical world, through 
art and science, as part of its own hardware. The 
theory of such a training or sensitization, the 
incorporation of this cultural feedback loop, the 
plugging of it in to the prepared places in our 
brains, is what I have called “natural 
classicism.” (Culture 106) 
  
                         
13  It may seem peculiar at this point to still be withholding a 
definition of beauty, but it is important in examining the logic of 
Turner’s argument that he provides both an inductive definition of 
beauty (beauty is what is found in those things that the right people 
find beautiful) and a content-neutral origin story for the sense of 
beauty before he provides his ultimate definition.  
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 The neurocharms (a term first introduced and most 
thoroughly developed in Beauty: The Value of Values), one of 
which is poetic meter, are at the heart of his theory of 
natural classicism. “Natural classical” art is that art 
which makes use of these innate abilities, which include 
(and the heterogeneous grouping of things and actions is 
Turner’s) syntactical organization; trope, symbol, metaphor, 
and various forms of reference; collecting, selecting, 
classification and hierarchical taxonomy; dramatic mimesis 
(basically reflection and modeling); debate, dialectic, and 
eristics; the scientific imagination; narrative, story, and 
myth; musical meter, tempo, and rhythm; musical tone, 
melody, and harmony; musical performance; pattern 
recognition; color sense; eye-hand mimetic capacity; dance, 
gymnastic, and the martial arts; mapping; poetic meter; 
cuisine; and the art of massage (Culture 109-110). 
 These are divided, in Turner’s schema, between left-
brain and right-brain “charms,” with dance, mapping, and (as 
we have seen) poetic meter mediating between the two 
hemispheres (Culture 109-110). 
 There is much evidence from cognitive science that many 
of these are innate and specialized human capacities. They 
are obviously capacities of the human mind; the question is 
whether these capacities are simply the abilities of a very 
complex general computing machine, or specialized modules 
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that allow humans to perform particularly well in these 
domains. There is a general agreement among cognitive 
scientists that the human mind is modular in this way; there 
is less agreement as to whether these modules are inherited 
or acquired, and the question of the evolution of such 
modules takes us out of the realm of cognitive science into 
the speculative realm of evolutionary psychology. 
 Turner argues, not completely unpersuasively, that 
these abilities are innate because we are so awfully good at 
them, asking us to imagine that we had developed other 
skills instead: 
If our species had evolved in a highly mechanized 
biocultural milieu, it could easily have developed 
an innate skill for instant, easy and unconscious 
calculation of mathematical problems. Just by an 
act of intention as simple as raising one’s arm, 
one could bring to one’s mind the value of pi or 
the square root of two to any desired decimal 
place, or rattle off the first three hundred prime 
numbers. We regularly, as in the grammar of the 
language we speak, or in the evaluation of speeds 
or vectors in a busy intersection, perform 
calculations at least as complex and requiring at 
least as much neural processing. We very nearly 
did develop this capacity: some idiot savants seem 
to have the power of instant calculation, though 
it looks as if other brain capacities may have had 
to be sacrificed in order for them to do so. Or 
imagine that we could as naturally recognize or 
create an eight-second poetic line as we do the 
normal and universal three-second one. Or that we 
could as instinctually catch the “tune” of a piece 
of serial music when we have not heard it before, 
as we can pick up a melody based upon the 
universal human music scale. Or that there is the 
same kind of unambiguous natural mimetic and 
representational referent for musical keys and 
phrases, preexisting musical conventions, that we 
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find in visual outline pictures, so that 
programmatic or narrative music would be as easily 
interpreted across cultures as pictorial 
representations are. Or that the meaning of such 
works as Spenser’s The Fairy Queene or Joyce’s 
Finnegans Wake, aspects of which appeal to 
hypothetical but not actual human linguistic 
abilities, should be as transpicuous to the 
general understanding as those of Homer, 
Shakespeare, and Tolstoy, which are at least as 
complex but which are tuned to real human brain 
capacities. (“Beauty” 367-368) 
 
 Of course, it is not easy to compare the “difficulty” 
of different tasks; computers are good at certain things not 
only because of their architecture but because of how they 
are programmed; it is quite possible that an artificial 
intelligence developed in a “bottom-up” manner, through 
learning, would be as inept at doing on-the-fly calculations 
as most humans (Moravec, Mind). That certain things that 
humans do, such as seeing and balancing and understanding 
speech, are incredibly difficult for computers to do is 
suggestive, but hardly definitive proof of modularity.14 
 Assuming that these neurocharms exist--and that they 
are innate and adaptive in origin--what difference does this 
make for literary theory and criticism? We need not rehearse 
here the logical problems involved in taking these 
statements about human nature and turning them into 
                         
14 This question of comparing the difficulty of different tasks is 
responsible for a few of the holdouts from the modular model of the 
human mind. For a lucid (though biased towards modularity) discussion of 
this debate, see Pinker (1997). 
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evaluative standards. As with the other theorists we have 
considered, knowledge about the innate structure and content 
of the human mind might help in developing a theory of 
literary effect, and also might assist in reconstructing 
authorial intention, but such knowledge automatically 
entails no particular value claims. 
 If Turner were claiming that these “neurocharms” were a 
response only to the fundamentally contingent dance of 
sexual selection--as Miller essentially does--then his 
theory would face these limitations. But Turner claims that 
this sexual-selection story about the development of the 
sense of beauty (and he has here jumped from claims about 
cognitive structures that his own story describes as having 
contingent origins to claims that these structures are 
collectively related to beauty) is only part of the story: 
So much for the special evolutionary truth about 
beauty. Without the general evolutionary truth, it 
would be meaningful only in a practical sense, it 
would leave out that tremble of philosophical 
insight that we associate with beauty, and would 
ignore the beauty that we find in nature and in 
the laws of science. It is not enough, from the 
evolutionary point of view, that individuals 
within a species should be endowed with a species-
specific sense of beauty related to co-operation 
and sexual selection, even if the selection favors 
big brains, sensitivity, and artistic grace. The 
whole species must benefit from possessing a sense 
of beauty. This could only be the case if beauty 
is a real characteristic of the universe, one that 
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 There are two serious flaws in this argument: first, 
both the theory of the gene as the unit of selection (the 
theory that Turner believes is true) and the theory of 
sexual selection both imply that there might be traits that 
are beneficial to the organism but detrimental to the 
species. Second, Turner himself has argued elsewhere that it 
might be possible--even beneficial--for a species to evolve 
to hold certain beliefs, even if those beliefs are false. 
 But let us assume, however, that Turner is correct in 
stating that there is a sense of beauty--a sense of 
something out there in the world; what, ultimately is 
beauty, or the experience of beauty? The experience of 
beauty, proposes Turner, is “a recognition of the deepest 
tendency or theme of the universe as a whole” (Culture 114). 
Our experience of beauty “enables us to go with, rather than 
against,” this deepest tendency, “to be able to model what 
will happen and adapt to or change it” (Culture 115). What 
is this tendency? The universe’s “self-organizing process” 
(Beauty 59). 
 Before examining exactly what Turner means by this, we 
should perhaps examine how Turner comes to the conclusion 
that our sense of beauty is a recognition of self-
organization. Turner derives this idea from a discussion of 
one of the neurocharms--visual pattern: it seems that people 
prefer to look at visual images that are neither too simple 
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nor too complex. When subjects are shown images of 
horizontal, vertical, or radial lines, they prefer to look 
at images that have neither too few nor too many lines: they 
prefer those that are just right (Culture 111). 
 From this seemingly mundane fact about the function of 
the eye, Turner comes to a general conclusion: “Patterns are 
beautiful that exist at the margin between order and 
disorder, that exhibit a hierarchical organization which is 
troubled and opened up by contradictory elements” (Culture 
112). And there is “only one kind of phenomenon [that] can 
satisfy all these criteria, and that is the form of a 
growing organism or evolving system” (Culture 113). 
That we find evolving systems beautiful he deduces from 
the function of the eye. But what is it about evolving 
systems that is so special? 
Without any argument as to why it should be seen as the 
“central tendency” of the universe, Turner provides a list 
of “descriptions or characteristics of that theme”: “unity 
in multiplicity,” “complexity within simplicity,” 
“generativeness and creativity,” “rhythmicity,” 
“hierarchical organization,” and “self-similarity” 
(“Transcending” 7). 
Turner argues that these descriptions belong “to 
feedback processes and the structures that are generated by 
them” (Culture 116). One example of a feedback process, 
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Turner claims, is evolution. Evolution, however, “is only 
one of a class of processes that are characterized by 
various researchers in various ways: nonlinear, chaotic, 
dissipative, self-organizing”--equating “feedback processes” 
with that over-used and ill defined term, “complexity” 
(Culture 117). 
 It might be helpful at this point to summarize Turner’s 
argument so far, which has remained fairly consistent 
throughout his work since 1979 but which is most integrated 
in The Culture of Hope: beauty is an objective 
characteristic of the universe. Humans, as biological 
beings, develop certain traits through evolution. Sexual 
selection could hypothetically provide the spur for the 
development of bigger brains and specific skills--
“neurocharms”--related to the mating ritual. These skills 
are also related (incidentally?) to beauty.  
Humans find interesting things that are neither too 
complex nor too simple; therefore the beautiful exists “at 
the margin between order and disorder.” This is because our 
sense of the beautiful is a recognition of the deepest theme 
or tendency of the universe: feedback, a term that 
encompasses systems that are chaotic, self-organizing, 
dissipative, or nonlinear. That beauty is real and objective 
we know because humans would not have a sense of beauty if 
such a sense were not functional for the entire species--and 
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it couldn’t be functional if it weren’t true (this despite 
his mating ritual fable of the origin of the aesthetic 
sense, and despite his own discussion of how false beliefs 
can be adaptive). 
As we have seen, this argument is fallacious, or at 
least incomplete, at every step. But let us turn from his 
unconvincing story of how the sense of beauty developed--his 
explanation of why we find beautiful the things we do--to 
his discussion of why feedback, chaos, nonlinearity, or 
self-organization should be what we find beautiful. 
Perhaps his normative claim is rooted in his assertion 
that feedback is the fundamental theme or tendency of the 
universe. Turner provides little argument as to why this 
should be the case--and as it stands, the assertion makes 
little sense: one might concede that almost every thing and 
process in the universe is characterized by feedback, but 
everything in the universe is characterized by many things. 
To say that the central tendency of the universe is feedback 
is akin to saying that the central tendency of humans is to 
breathe, because everybody does it. 
But perhaps Turner simply means that the universe shows 
a statistical tendency toward increasing complexity, self-
organization, and so on. We will examine in more detail in 
the next section why such a claim is almost certainly false. 
Let us suppose, however, that he is correct: complex systems 
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are emerging everywhere, more and more all the time (the 
other possible interpretation of his claim--that the 
universe as a whole is becoming more complex rather than 
less--is one even Ilya Prigogine would not endorse; even he 
admits that the universe [assuming that it is a closed 
system] will eventually wind down); so what? 
It should not be necessary here to reiterate the 
distinction between adaptive origin and present function, or 
between “adaptive” and “good.” We may charitably assume that 
Turner is not making the simple and fallacious argument that 
our taste for beauty has an adaptive origin and is therefore 
good. 
What he seems to be arguing is that our sense of beauty 
is not only adaptive in origin but also adaptive now. What 
can this mean? Adaptive for what? To make sense of this 
claim, we should perhaps examine his discussion of 
hypothetical “false but functional” beliefs. Although Turner 
believes that nature is teleological (and we will examine in 
a moment Turner’s connection of the sense of beauty to a 
belief in natural teleology), this part of his argument does 
not seem to hinge on the truth of this proposition: 
Concede even that beauty, value, meaning, freedom, 
planning for the future, teleology, soul, etc, 
were indeed complete nonsense; nevertheless for a 
species to operate as if they were real--by 
nurturing its young, self-sacrifice, ritual 
celebration and the like--such a species would be 
at a competitive advantage with others. But that 
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concession is now a purely metaphysical one, with 
no practical or scientific relevance. Those 
“abstractions” will have become laws of nature. 
Good hard empirical science would tell us that of 
course the universe is full of value and purpose. 
If values are for animals as functional as teeth, 
that does not make the values any the less values 
than it makes teeth any the less teeth. Only if we 
let the likes of Kant dictate our definition of 
value--as essentially unlike teeth--is there a 
problem: but it may be that Kant’s values never 
existed anyway, and the word value would be more 
useful applied to something that does exist. If 
values necessarily evolve in the struggle for 
survival, belief in the meaninglessness and 
valuelessness and directionlessness of the 
universe is an act of purely religious faith, 
maintained in the face of the cold hard facts of 
meaning, design, love, progress and beauty. The 
austere and faithful dialectical materialist, in 
his sackcloth and ashes, could then say with the 
mystic “Credo quia absurdus est”--I believe 
because it is absurd. (“Transcending” 231) 
 
This argument is a central one in his aesthetic theory-
-demonstrating as it does the link between Turner’s factual 
and normative claims--and therefore calls for some 
untangling. 
Although it is a question still debated by 
epistemologists and philosophers of science, the assumption 
that there is no such thing as a value-free fact is one we 
may grant Turner (despite his vociferous objections 
elsewhere to the “politicization” of science). This 
assumption, however, does not free Turner from the 
responsibility for explaining, in a work presumably intended 
to persuade others to embrace his aesthetic values, the 
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connection between values and observations almost 
universally accepted to be factual assertions. He does not 
disarm us by admitting up front that he is collapsing the 
fact/value distinction, nor does he free himself from the 
responsibility for logical argument by appealing to the 
authority of “serious philosophy” that he believes collapses 
this distinction.15 
But, again, Turner is not only arguing that his view of 
the universe as teleological is true but that such a belief 
is useful. This is a questionable assumption; one could 
easily image a species with no sense of cosmic destiny whose 
members still cared for their young, engaged in ritual, were 
sometimes self-sacrificing--in fact displayed at least as 
many qualities contributing to the continuity of the species 
as a species that did believe in cosmic purpose. 
Although Turner’s notion that the “central trend” of 
the universe is self-organization is factually false, and 
his derivation of an ethics from this trend (even if it were 
true) fallacious, his aesthetic might still stand simply on 
what seems to be Turner’s central value, as illustrated by 
                         
15 Although it is almost certainly true that all normative philosophies 
(except those whose authors admit that their founding assumptions are 
ultimately ungroundable) do collapse the fact/value distinction, 
arguably almost all of these do so not by providing a compelling 
argument about the nature of this distinction but by making unwitting 
(or rhetorically justified) leaps in logic. That great philosophers have 
violated Hume’s law is no refutation of it. 
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his discussion of the functionality of belief: the survival 
and “evolution” of the human species. 
If we jettison Turner’s speculation about the anti-
entropic nature of the universe and his derivation of an 
ethics from this nature, we are left with a politics and 
aesthetics of (evolutionary) progress--one that we will see 
is not without its virtues. But before we purge his 
aesthetics of its metaphysics, let us take him at his word: 
the universe is evolving, and as the most complex, 
intelligent, and self-aware (as far as we know) species in 
the universe, it is our responsibility to assist the 
universe in its surge to increasing complexity. What does 
this mean for literature and aesthetics? 
In The Culture of Hope, Turner presents five basic 
ideas for an “ecopoetics” (an early name for what Turner and 
Brett Cooke will later dub biopoetics), a poetics that is 
informed by ideas about natural classicism, self-
organization, progress, and the idea that “beauty is a real 
property of things” (221). 
Such a poetics will concern itself with  
healing: the rejoining of broken wholes, the 
reuniting of false dichotomies, the bringing 
together of cultural energies vitiated by their 
division. Our theory must rejoin artist with 
public, beauty with morality, high art with low, 
art with craft, passion with intelligence, art 
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 It is unclear how these imperatives follow from the 
rest of Turner’s argument; he does suggest, however, that 
the split between the cultural left and the cultural right 
is that the left values disorder while the right values 
order. The solution, he says is in the middle--the “radical 
center.” 
 So we need a poetics of healing. What will this entail? 
First, it must understand “ratio, space and quantity” (222) 
and “reconnect with mathematics, geometry, logic, number 
theory, and geometry” (222). This will allow us to notice 
interesting things such as that Dante’s description of the 
cosmos in the Paradiso is similar to recent mathematical 
theories of the universe that describe it as “a double 
super-sphere, that is a sphere with two centers, each of 
which is the periphery of the other” (222). 
 Second, the new poetics must understand the physical 
world, a world that “is full of subtle phase-changes, 
turbulences, emergent orders, and self-reflective processes” 
(222). Such processes can “act as amazing models and 
analogues for artistic creation” (222). 
 Third, the new poetics must embrace the living world. 
We must assimilate the findings of sociobiology and natural 
classicism, and also understand the way that DNA “edits, 
expresses, and repairs itself” because “literature, music, 
and art . . . do exactly the same things” (223). 
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 Fourth, the new poetics must understand the human 
world--that is, understand that the history of tradition and 
ritual and artistic form is not the history of societally 
imposed ideologies, but the history of the different 
expressions of innate predispositions (223). 
 Fifth, the new poetics calls for art that is popular, 
but that does not “truckle to the infantile and uncultivated 
appetites of the masses” (224). How should it do this? Look 
to Shakespeare (224). 
 Sixth, the new poetics should avoid imposing modern 
moral values on the past (224). This could result in 
“important” historical literature. 
 Finally, the new poetics should assimilate our 
knowledge about the spiritual universe. The world can be 
seen as “both the fetal body of a divine being, and as a 
sort of theater in which its story will play itself out” 
(225), and “the very nature of the good, the beautiful and 
the true is still being worked out, created, and unfolded” 
(225). 
 These suggestions are mostly fairly reasonable--even if 
they do not necessarily follow logically from Turner’s 
broader argument. Literature and theory should understand 
science and history--and if science and history were as 
Turner sees them, then it would be reasonable for literature 
and theory to see them this way. 
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 But they do not follow from the broader argument; 
moreover, they are so vague or commonsensical as to provide 
very little guidance: understand science and history, obey 
natural classical conventions, be popular and good--like 
Shakespeare. What does this have to do with evolution or 
self-organization? 
 Turner actually provides very little in the way of 
guidance as to how his ideas that the universe is self-
organizing and evolving, and that humans should share the 
universe’s “goals,” should affect literary or critical 
practice--particularly in terms of form. 
 In terms of theme, however, we can extrapolate that it 
means that great literature should celebrate the evolution 
of mankind and the universe, and that works that are 
thematically anti-evolution are questionable. This 
extrapolation seems accurate in that Turner, a fairly 
acclaimed poet, does celebrate evolution in his work, and 
nowhere more so than in his book-length epic poem Genesis--a 
work about the struggle to terraform (make Earth-like, 
presumably for human habitation) the planet Mars. 
This work, which follows natural classical guidelines 
in its hewing to a traditional narrative and in its use of 
iambic pentameter, addresses a theme that Turner has dealt 
with elsewhere--most prominently in an essay originally 
written for Harper’s magazine about the spiritual reasons 
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for terraforming Mars, but also in the Culture of Hope and 
in several other essays. 
We have already seen Turner’s leap from a belief in the 
evolution of the universe to a belief that evolutionary 
progress is “good.” It is our responsibility to contribute 
to the complexification of the universe, and terraforming 
Mars is a grand project to do this--the making of a lifeless 
rock into a world full of life. 
In Genesis the hero, Chance Van Riebeck, battles 
assorted enemies--particularly members of the Ecotheist 
movement, which “divides human beings off from the rest of 
nature and regards all human interference with nature as an 
evil” (Genesis 15). Chance and his followers succeed against 
the assorted enemies of life and evolution, and the planet 
is eventually terraformed. 
 The poem is an often moving dramatization of many of 
the political and aesthetic positions espoused in Turner’s 
critical work--self-organizing systems are beautiful, the 
universe is evolving, we have a responsibility to help it 
evolve--but aside from these themes, it is difficult to see 
how the poem is particularly influenced by an aesthetic of 
complexity or evolutionary progress.  
Turner’s vision is a grand one, but the grand theory in 
which he embeds his ideas of natural classicism results in 
an impoverished poetics. What Turner ends up recommending is 
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nothing more than that art thematically celebrate complexity 
and evolution. We will examine later the worth of such a 
project; for now, let us now simply note the irony of a 
critical theory conceived as a corrective to the 
politicization of contemporary theory calling for the utter 






















                                                            
                                                            
                               179 
                                                          
   Alexander Argyros: Self-Organization, 
      Complexity, and Literary Theory 
 
 Alexander Argyros also attempts to derive normative 
political and aesthetic conclusions from chaos theory. In A 
Blessed Rage for Order: Deconstruction, Evolution, and 
Chaos, Argyros argues that biological and cosmological 
evolution are progressive, that chaotic systems are “the 
beautiful,” and that the goal of art is to imitate the chaos 
of the universe and help it reach higher levels of 
complexity. 
 Argyros bases his argument on some by-now-familiar 
assumptions. First, Argyros proposes, without any argument 
as to how this could take place, that “literature is an 
emergent evolutionary development of Homo Sapiens” (Argyros 
196). We have already examined in some detail the claims by 
assorted theorists that art in general or literature in 
particular is an adaptive behavior--and the rejection of 
such theories by most mainstream evolutionary psychologists; 
let it suffice to say here that Argyros does not present 
even the sorts of feeble arguments that Turner does for how 
literature could develop adaptively. 
 Although he fails to present a plausible evolutionary 
story for the origin of literature, he does, like several 
theorists working in the evolutionary paradigm, propose a 
socially important purpose for literature. According to 
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Argyros, “literature is most fruitfully understood as an 
activity through which human beings create models of the 
possible effects of concrete choices” (197). 
 Of course, why art would be “most fruitfully 
understood” as serving this purpose is unclear if he has not 
made an argument for this purpose being literature’s 
adaptive origin--and even if he had made such an argument, 
he provides no reasons why we should primarily consider 
literature as serving this purpose instead of the many other 
purposes literature obviously serves. 
 Although Argyros makes no explicit argument, the tacit 
logic here is clear: since literature’s adaptive purpose was 
this kind of modeling/prediction, literature should be 
judged by how well it achieves this purpose.  
 Criticism, meanwhile, reduces the various scenarios 
generated by literature to “the higher cortical level of 
concepts, hypotheses and theories” (207). While literature  
“engages the entire brain, from the reptilian stem to the 
huge human neocortex,” criticism works only in the 
neocortex, translating the experience of literature into 
ideas that can be discussed and evaluated. 
 Criticism completes the work of literature by providing 
“hypothesis synthesis” (205), and by making judgments about 
the values of specific readings (206). Presumably, the more 
“valuable” reading is the one in which the text is seen as 
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generating the most useful scenario--“most useful” meaning 
“most accurately modeling the world.” 
This is obviously a blatant example of the naturalistic 
fallacy, but as a stand-alone proposition, the idea that 
literature provides counterfactual models of the world--and 
that works can be judged by the usefulness or accuracy of 
the models they provide--is not the most ridiculous claim 
one could make. 
 In any case, Argyros proceeds with this definition, 
embracing along the way Frederick Turner’s notion of 
“natural classical” cultural universals. Argyros agrees with 
Turner that humans have certain propensities for 
creating/appreciating certain themes, forms, and genres. 
 Argyros believes that great art must employ “natural 
classicism” to anchor the otherwise wild and unfruitful 
experimentation of art, because “human future projection 
cannot be purely free . . . but must, if it is to be as free 
as possible, use the entirety of the past as its 
springboard” (224). 
Art must be “as free as possible” in order to provide a 
model of “the trends and patterns that nature has manifested 
in the evolution and self-organization of matter and energy” 
(224). 
This is the crux of Argyros’s argument. Argyros argues 
that the best works of literature will be those that are 
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“chaotic” and “self-organizing” in form (or which deal with 
themes of chaos and self-organization) because the universe 
itself is chaotic and self-organizing! Such works will be 
better because they will be more accurate models and because 
(as we will see), to Argyros, “beautiful” means chaotic, 
self-organizing, complex. 
To evaluate these claims, we must examine the 
underlying assumption behind them: that the universe--along 
with life--is evolving toward greater complexity. What can 
this mean? We have already seen how there is no clear 
evidence of an increase in complexity in nature, or any 
mechanism for such progress in the Darwinian model. 
And the idea that the universe as a whole is moving 
toward greater complexity (less entropy) is an extremely 
marginal one: all of the mainstream cosmological theories 
describe a universe that began in a low-entropy state and 
which is moving toward maximum disorder. Islands of order 
may exist in this winding-down universe, but they take place 
against a background of increasing disorder. 
But there has yet been no evidence to definitively  
claim that evolution is not progressive; given a mechanism, 
it just might be. And although the universe as a whole may 
be increasing in entropy, those islands of order do exist--
and persist. How do we explain this? 
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Unlike Frederick Turner, who tends to simply claim that 
matter becomes more organized, Argyros relies for his 
argument on the speculations of Ilya Prigogine, who argues 
that in certain systems “far from equilibrium,” order can 
spontaneously emerge. 
Why is this important? Because it is an apparent 
violation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which states 
that in a closed system, entropy always increases (or 
remains the same in a reversible system). Entropy is a 
rather difficult concept, but it can be roughly defined as 
“manifest disorder.” Another way of thinking about entropy 
is simply to see increasing entropy as the tendency for 
systems to reach more and more likely configurations. 
The classic example of this involves air molecules in 
an air-tight chamber. Left to themselves, these molecules 
will spread out throughout the chamber. Such a distribution 
is the most likely distribution of these molecules. 
 If the air were compressed by a piston, so that it 
only occupied the bottom third of the chamber, this would be 
an unlikely arrangement of these molecules; if the pressure 
were removed, the molecules would spontaneously return to 
their most likely configuration. The reverse would never 
happen: the molecules would never spontaneously get together 
in a third of chamber (actually, this is theoretically 
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possible, but the likelihood is vanishingly small). Eggs do 
not unscramble themselves, glasses do not unbreak. 
The Second Law is perhaps the best established--and 
most justified, both theoretically and empirically--of the 
physical laws. As Arthur Eddington put it: 
The Law that entropy increases--the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics--holds, I think, the supreme 
position among the laws of Nature. If someone 
points out to you that your pet theory of the 
universe is in disagreement with Maxwell’s 
equations--then so much the worse for Maxwell’s 
equations. If it is found to be contradicted by 
observation--well these experimentalists do bungle 
things sometimes. But if your theory is found to 
be against the Second Law of Thermodynamics, I can 
give you no hope: there is nothing for it but to 
collapse in deepest humiliation. (Qtd. in Penrose 
154-155) 
 
 Nevertheless, there are a few scientists who, disliking 
the philosophical consequences of the Second Law, are 
devoted to disproving it--or as Stuart Kauffman puts it in 
his book Investigations, finding a Fourth Law regarding the 
self-organization of certain systems (primarily living 
systems). 
 Kauffman is following in the tradition of Ilya 
Prigogine, a Nobel Prize-winning scientist16 who developed a 
                         
16 James Horgan, without naming names, indicates that many of 
Prigogine’s fellow scientists working in thermodynamics or complexity 
studies think that he has “won the Nobel Prize for less cause than any 
other recipient” (End 217). Horgan also notes that even those scientists 
who admire Prigogine for the work in irreversible thermodynamics that 
won him the Nobel Prize think that the philosophical conclusions that 
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theory of dissipative structures, “according to which 
patterns are supposed to form when the uniform, 
uninteresting ‘thermodynamic branch’ of the system becomes 
unstable” (Shalizi). 
 Very few of Prigogine’s fellow scientists believe that 
Prigogine has shown anything like a tendency for open 
dissipative systems to order themselves--although pop 
sociologists such as Alvin Toffler have been much taken with 
the idea. Many of the systems that Prigogine has studied do 
in fact appear to become more ordered; the standard 
explanation for this is that such systems are importing 
order from the larger systems in which they are embedded. 
 Physicist Roger Penrose provides a lucid explanation in 
his popular work The Emperor’s New Mind of the standard 
model of importation of order at work: he explains how the 
Earth’s biosphere, and the individual life-forms it 
comprises, are entropic systems that would fall victim to 
entropy if they did not constantly import low-entropy. 
 Contrary to popular conceptions, we do not really 
obtain energy from food and oxygen; except when we are 
growing, or putting on weight, the energy in our bodies 
remains approximately the same throughout our lives. We take 
in energy, but that energy leaves our bodies again, in the 
form of heat. What we import is low entropy: 
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We take in energy in a low-entropy form (heat, 
carbon dioxide, excreta). We do not need to gain 
energy from our environment, since energy is 
conserved. But we are continually fighting against 
the Second Law of thermodynamics. Entropy is not 
conserved; it is increasing all the time. To keep 
ourselves alive, we need to keep lowering the 
entropy that is within ourselves. We do this by 
feeding on the low-entropy combination of food and 
atmospheric oxygen, combining them within our 
bodies, and discarding the energy, that we would 
otherwise have gained, in a high-entropy form. In 
this way, we can keep the entropy in our bodies 
from rising, and we can maintain (and even 
increase) our internal organization. (319) 
 
 Meanwhile, the Earth as a whole is receiving low-
entropy visible light photons and re-radiating high-entropy 
infra-red ones. Visible light photons, having a higher 
frequency than infra-red photons, individually have higher 
energy; the infra-red photons, having less energy, are more 
numerous, meaning that this energy has more degrees of 
freedom than the incoming energy; it is therefore spread out 
over a greater phase space, and the entropy is much 
greater.17 (320) 
There is little technical work challenging Prigogine’s 
conclusions in his popular, non-technical work about 
spontaneous order--most scientists do not believe that the 
                         
17 Put simply, “phase space” is a conceptual space in which each element 
or variable in the system has its own dimension (each element or 
dimension is referred to as a “degree of freedom”; that a system has 
more degrees of freedom is frequently misunderstood to mean that the 
system is somehow more free). Therefore, if we think of graphical 
representation of a system in phase space, each state of the system can 
be represented by a single point. The trajectory of that point 
represents the evolution of the system over time. 
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Second Law needs defending, and accept the adequacy of the 
standard model--but there are a few very lucid explanations 
of the confusion that Prigogine’s and Kauffman’s work can 
lead to among non-scientists. 
Particularly enlightening is an article by Dorion 
Sagan, a paleontologist, and Jessica Whiteside, a magician, 
for SWIFT, the journal of the James Randi foundation. Randi, 
who is closely allied with the Skeptical Enquirer, is a 
magician and perhaps the world’s most famous debunker of 
“paranormal” or “supernatural” phenomena: his promise of one 
million dollars to the first person to demonstrate any sort 
of psychic phenomenon--ESP, telekinesis, precognition--under 
laboratory conditions has remained unclaimed for decades. As 
a professional skeptic, he also supports research debunking 
all sorts of unlikely things, from alien abductions to 
perpetual motion machines. 
Sagan and Whiteside point out that if Kauffman’s claims 
are taken seriously--if he is really arguing that order can 
spontaneously emerge in a system considered as a whole--he 
is simply mistaken; if this were true, it would be a 
refutation of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Kauffman has 
noted an interesting phenomenon, however, that calls for 
explanation: 
What Kauffman really means (it seems; he has a 
talent for grandiose obfuscation) is that order 
(i.e. nonrandom arrangements of matter) can arise 
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without natural selection. This is a decent idea 
(one attractive to Stephen Jay Gould, long opposed 
to the narrow adaptationist view of evolution 
which would invent a natural selection survival 
story for every attribute of every organism--e.g., 
socially objectionable ones like rape), but 
completely mistaken if we accept it at face value. 
Order (or better, organization, which suggests a 
process more than a state) in physics is never 
“for free” but always the result of previous order 
or organization, always paid for in the coin of 
energy. (4) 
 
 Although Gould has spoken favorably of some of 
Kauffman’s theories, he has, unsurprisingly, “specifically 
repudiated” the suggestion that, as Kauffman believes, life 
inexorably becomes more complex because of mathematical laws 
(Horgan 136). Unlike Gould, who emphasizes contingency in 
evolution, Kauffman is driven by a dissatisfaction with the 
“cold and mechanical” notion that life is constructed out of 
random variation and selection (Horgan 136). 
 This unlikely agreement, however, does point out a 
fundamental contradiction in biopoeticist thought: if 
biological complexity can be built by mechanisms other than 
natural selection, as the biopoeticist interpretation of 
complexity theory implies, this undermines the assumption 
behind their radical evolutionary psychology--that the 
existence of every part of an organism can be explained by 
an adaptive story. 
 Physicist Jean Bricmont discusses a confusion similar 
to that surrounding Kauffman’s work (the failure to consider 
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the larger system in which a “self-organizing” system is 
embedded) in the work of Ilya Prigogine. Prigogine argues 
that in open systems far from equilibrium, order can 
increase, and there is movement away from equilibrium. 
Bricmont points out that 
This is correct, provided that part of the 
environment is more ordered than the system, where 
“order” is taken in a technical sense: the system 
plus its environment (considered as approximately 
isolated) is in a state of low entropy, or is in a 
small subset of its total phase space and moves 
towards a larger subset of that space. But it is 
misleading to suggest that order is created out of 
nothing, by rejecting “entropy” in an unspecified 
environment. It is not enough to be an “open 
system”; the environment must be in a state of low 
entropy. While it is correct to say that the 
Second Law “applies only to isolated systems”; it 
should not be forgotten that most systems can, at 
least approximately, be considered as subsystems 
of isolated ones, and that, therefore, the Second 
Law does imply some constraints even for open 
systems. (“Chaos in Science” 32) 
 
 Bricmont patiently considers many examples of “self-
organization,” explaining how such organization is always 
the result of order in the environment. For example, the 
Benard instability,18 in which structure seems to emerge 
from the introduction of heat to a system (heat is usually a 
source of disorder): 
 
                         
18 “A fluid is maintained between two horizontal plates, the lower one 
being hotter than the higher one. If the temperature difference is large 
enough, rolls will appear” (Bricmont 33). 
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But what is needed, of course, is a temperature 
difference between two plates. So, if one heats up 
from below, one must have some cooling from above. 
The cooling acts like a refrigerator, so it 
requires some “ordered” source of energy. The more 
one heats, the more efficient must be the cooling. 
(Bricmont 33) 
 
So what difference does it make if certain systems are 
creating order rather than importing it? First of all, the 
idea of “order for free” is necessary if one wishes to argue 
that there is some sort of trend toward increasing 
complexity in the universe--otherwise, the universe as an 
isolated system must be seen as “winding down.” Argyros 
would have to embrace something like Kauffman’s Fourth Law 
to maintain this; and this assumption is necessary for 
Argyros to maintain that there is evolutionary progress from 
which we can draw normative conclusions. 
 Second, Argyros believes that this notion of anti-
entropy--with its implication that order is achieved 
autonomously--provides some kind of refutation of Laplacian 
determinism. This notion is frequently seen in 
popularizations of chaos theory and of complexity theory 
(Laplace is given quite a drubbing in Gleick’s Chaos and in 
Coveney and Highfield’s Arrow of Time and Frontiers of 
Complexity) despite the fact that chaotic systems are 
assumed to work the way that they do because of determinism. 
 
 
                                                            
                                                            
                               191 
                                                          
 This is not to say that determinism in the Laplacian 
sense is true; it is possible that “undetermined” events 
occur on the quantum level--and that these events could have 
an effect on the macro level. Complexity theory, however, is 
simply irrelevant to this argument. As physicist Jean 
Bricmont puts it, “If we did not know about quantum 
mechanics, the recent discoveries about chaos would not 
force us to change a single word of what Laplace wrote” 
(Science). 
 But why should Argyros so badly want chaos to provide a 
refutation of determinism? Because he believes that free 
will and determinism are incompatible--that for there to be 
freedom and responsibility in a meaningful sense, some 
things, like our choices, must be “undetermined.”19 
 The philosophical debates over free will and 
determinism are ancient, and have become extremely 
complicated, so let us focus here on the idea of free will 
that Argyros embraces. He appears to believe that we are 
determined up to a point, but that “chaos” creates a break 
in the causal sequence. 
                         
19 Ilya Prigogine’s philosophical speculations about the nature of far-
from-equilibrium systems seem motivated by a similar distaste for the 
consequences of determinism.  In an interview with John Horgan, 
Prigogine maintains that “You cannot on one side believe that you are 
part of an automaton and on the other hand believe in humanism” (Qtd. in 
Horgan 218).  
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 To put this in terms of our earlier example: if you 
slam on your brakes at the red light, you could have done 
otherwise even if all the antecedent conditions were the 
same. If it were somehow possible to play this moment back, 
we might do something different--because our brain function 
is chaotic, and therefore undetermined. 
 This is very similar to philosophical arguments that 
were made in the wake of findings in quantum mechanics that 
seemed to imply that some events were undetermined. It was 
argued, for example, that although we are determined in our 
behavior up to a point, quantum indeterminacy could explain 
our free will. Again, we approach the red light. Antecedent 
conditions would seem to determine our decision. But no-- 
quantum events might cause some neurons to fire “randomly.” 
If we were able to replay the event, quantum effects could 
bring about a different decision. 
 According to this argument, our freedom lies in the 
acausal, random events that interrupt an otherwise causal 
and deterministic sequence of events. 
 The flaw in such an argument--proposed by, among 
others, philosopher G.E.M. Anscombe in her essay “Causality 
and Determination”--is its assumption that “undetermined” 
equals “freely willed.” As physicist David Deutch puts it, 
Replacing deterministic laws of motion by 
indeterministic (random) ones would do nothing to 
solve the problem of free will. . . .Freedom has 
 
 
                                                            
                                                            
                               193 
                                                          
nothing to do with randomness. We value our free 
will as the ability to express, in our actions, 
who we as individuals are. Who would value being 
random? What we think of as our free actions are 
not those that are random or undetermined but 
those that are largely determined by who we are, 
and what we think, and what is at issue. (Fabric 
338) 
 
 Erwin Schrodinger--one of the founding architects of 
quantum mechanics and devisor of the “Schrodinger’s Cat” 
paradox--also saw no logical connection between quantum 
indeterminacy and free will (Ruelle 31-32). 
 There are many conceptions of free will, some 
compatible with determinism and some not, but what is clear 
is that randomness or lack of determinism has nothing to do 
with free will. Even David Hume, who famously proposed that 
we could never prove causality but merely note the “constant 
conjunction” of some events, argued that our notions of 
freedom and responsibility in fact assume determinism (Ayer 
126). 
 To make this a little clearer: when you approach the 
red light, your decision is determined by, among other 
things, the antecedent state of your brain. You are 
responsible for that decision not despite the fact that it 
was determined, but because of it. That decision was the 
inevitable conclusion of a causal sequence. 
 If you were forced to alter your decision because of 
the flip of a coin, say (and we can think of random firings 
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in the brain as “flips of a coin”), you would hardly think 
of that decision as being “more free,” or of yourself as 
being “more responsible” because of this imposed randomness. 
Rather, you would think of yourself as less free. 
 It may be difficult to understand why the paradoxical 
notion of “ultimate” freedom and responsibility--the idea 
that our decisions are neither determined nor undetermined, 
but arise freely and autonomously--should be of such concern 
to anyone other than God (and perhaps Kant); and indeed, to 
most scientists, the question of determinism (at least on 
the macro level) is a settled one, with no particular 
consequences for our everyday notions of freedom and 
responsibility. 
 Nevertheless, Argyros wishes for chaos theory to square 
the circle of ultimate freedom and responsibility. Unlike 
Frederick Turner, who is savvy enough to admit that complex 
systems are only “free” in the sense that their future 
states cannot be calculated by any systems simpler than 
themselves, Argyros simply assumes that the practical 
impossibility of predicting the behavior of complex systems 
is itself a refutation of Laplacian determinism, despite the 
fact that Laplace himself acknowledged this impossibility. 
 Argyros insists on conflating “chaotic” with “non-
deterministic”; throughout A Blessed Rage for Order he 
confuses the epistemological claim that certain systems are 
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unpredictable with the ontological claim that such systems 
are undetermined. According to Argyros, chaotic systems, 
like good art, steer a course between stultifying order and 
determinism and complete disorder. 20  
 The notion that certain kinds of complex systems are 
“more free” than others in an ultimate sense (Argyros 
insists on reading “having more degrees of freedom” as 
“being more free” rather than “having more elements”) is 
important for Argyros’s aesthetics and politics: liberal 
capitalism is the most free political system, and 
experimentation rooted in natural classicism leads to the 
most free art, because these forms are “chaotic” and 
therefore “free.” 
 Argyros is refreshingly direct about his political 
commitments: 
Whether of the teleological or the demystifying 
type, academic Marxists tend to agree that 
capitalist/technological institutions are 
oppressive constraints on the freedom of human 
beings. I will conclude this chapter by suggesting 
the opposite, that it is precisely a form of 
multinational, free-market capitalism whose energy 
is channeled productively by a certain amount of 
socialist top-down control that is most likely to 
foster freedom, justice, community, and individual 
happiness in a world that is metastable between 
matter dominance and spirit dominance. (329) 
 
                         
20 Stephen Kellert points out that Argyros makes a basic mistake when he 
claims that chaotic systems are neither deterministic or random, “when 
they are both” (Science 232). 
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 (This last part about “matter dominance” and “spirit 
dominance” is a typical bit of ecopoeticist bad faith: 
Argyros, like Turner, has a habit not only of viewing the 
injustices of today in the light of an unimaginable post-
matter eschaton but also of imagining that matter and 
scarcity have already lost their pre-eminence in human 
life.) 
But what, exactly, has all this to do with aesthetics 
or literary theory? Argyros has made some highly 
questionable--even wrong--assumptions about human nature, 
progress, and complexity: he has embraced a radical version 
of evolutionary psychology, proposed that biological and 
cosmological progress are self-evident, and proposed 
complexity theory as the motor of that progress. He has also 
proposed that chaotic systems are the most free (without 
giving a coherent definition of freedom). 
 On one level, Argyros is simply arguing that because 
the purpose of literature is to generate plausible scenarios 
(and we know this is what literature should be because it 
evolved to serve this purpose), and because the world is 
unpredictable, the speculations of literature should be made 
using natural classical rhetorical terms--both to make those 
speculations more comprehensible to humans and to ground the 




                                                            
                                                            
                               197 
                                                          
 If we ignore the fallacy of equating evolutionary 
origin with present function, accept the plausibility of an 
unlikely evolutionary psychological model, and accept that 
art is most effective when it “goes with the grain” of human 
behavioral propensities, this argument is not completely 
incoherent. 
 As a broad general claim, stripped of the unnecessary 
and obfuscatory chaos metaphor, the idea that literature 
should constitute an arena in which we can play out 
scenarios of our future, and that such scenarios are more 
useful--more accurate--when they are neither too 
conservative and ordered or too radical and disordered makes 
some sense. This aesthetic is revealed as somewhat lukewarm 
when stripped of the suggestive language of chaos theory, 
but the purposes and methods that it suggests for literature 
are not unreasonable. 
 But Argyros is more ambitious than this. His full 
aesthetic theory seeks to integrate his ideas about these 
purposes and methods with his belief in progress. 
 One way in which Argyros attempts to construct an 
aesthetic from this belief is by defining beauty in terms of 
the motors of progress, arguing that “evolution, feedback, 
chaos, and ritual . . . combine to form a system which is 
the beautiful” (286). 
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 Why should we think of such systems as beautiful? 
Because they are self-organizing, and therefore creative:  
when a far-from-equilibrium system makes a “global leap” in 
organization, “such events are truly creative--they bring 
into existence something that did not previously exist” 
(286). 
 So: beauty is defined as the result of “creative” 
processes--“creative” being defined as “producing something 
that did not previously exist.” On its face, this seems a 
useless formulation: since everything in the universe at any 
given moment did not previously exist, doesn’t this 
definition simply identify everything as beautiful? 
 His definition becomes clearer when he explains his 
notion of how complex systems operate, proposing that the 
beautiful is “the unpredictable and discontinuous emergence 
of higher levels of systemic complexity” (287). 
 The “unpredictable” we can grant him (no real-world 
system is utterly predictable), but it is that 
“discontinuous” that is essential to this argument--and this 
word is totally wrong in this context. To reiterate a point 
we discussed earlier: complex or chaotic systems operate the 
way they do because they are deterministic, not because they 
are not. 
 Here the misreading of Laplace becomes important. Not 
content to simply say that there are points at which the 
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behaviors of certain systems are in a sense harder to 
predict (when considered on a specific scale), Argyros wants 
to claim that there is an actual break in the causal 
sequence. 
 Like the philosophers who sought freedom in quantum 
indeterminacy, Argyros wants to equate “nondeterministic” 
with “free.” Argyros goes further, though, equating “free” 
with “creative.” 
 We have already seen the problems involved in trying to 
salvage a meaningful sense of absolute freedom from 
indeterminacy; but perhaps he means to simply define 
“creative” as nondeterministic, without any complicating 
talk of “freedom.” This would only make sense, of course, if 
there were some reason to think that the systems he 
describes as beautiful are nondeterministic (or even somehow 
less deterministic than other systems). There isn’t. 
 Proceeding with this incoherent definition of beauty, 
Argyros goes on to make a completely nonsensical claim: 
When we read a work of literature that we are 
tempted to describe as beautiful, I suspect that, 
at the very least, the work is a self-similar 
system, displaying similar patterns at different 
levels of description, and that it functions as a 
nonlinear, dynamical system able to occasion 
global leaps of organization in the reader’s mind. 
(287) 
  
 Even if we grant him the metaphor of literature as 
bringing about “global leaps of organization” (reminiscent 
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of a silly speculation by Turner about works of literature 
being strange attractors), this assertion makes no sense. If 
Argyros is claiming that works of literature are literally 
self-similar, as fractals are--displaying the same pattern 
on several scales--it is simply wrong. If he means fractal-
like--displaying patterns that seem somewhat similar on 
several levels--it is difficult to imagine what would not 
fit this description.21 
 These tenets--there are “natural classical” forms that 
must be used if art is to be understood most widely; art 
must be “chaotic” both because creativity inheres in chaotic 
processes and because the world, about which art 
hypothesizes, is chaotic--are ultimately subordinate to 
Argyros’s primary idea, however: that there is progress. 
 What does Argyros mean by this? Much like Frederick 
Turner, Argyros believes that there is a trend throughout 
the universe toward greater complexity. He bases this belief 
on the “obvious” increases in complexity in the Earth’s 
biosphere (we have already examined the flaws in such 
reasoning) and on the speculations of Paul Davies, the 
author of such popular science books as God and the New 
                         
21  This argument is quite similar to one cited by Eugene Eoyang as one 
of the more egregious misuses of chaos theory in literary studies: 
“’Humpty-Dumpty’ displays fractal self-similarity because it 
rhymes”(Qtd. in Kellert, “Science” 218) 
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Physics, that the cosmos is becoming more ordered rather 
than less. Argyros puts it this way: 
 If by history we mean something like the 
history of Homo sapiens, the evolutionary history 
of biological organisms, or the history of the 
entire cosmos, then certain long-standing trends 
are inescapable. One of these is the self-
organization of the universe into increasingly 
complex entities. (214) 
  
 If Davies--along with Argyros--means that the universe 
is increasing in average or total complexity, this is an 
extremely controversial claim, one that is in direct 
contradiction to the Second Law. The universe, considered as 
a closed system, cannot spontaneously become more ordered. 
 On the other hand, if he simply means that there will 
continue to be pockets--even, in a sense, “eruptions”--of 
order in a universe that is as a whole winding down, it is 
difficult to see how this could constitute a trend (or, in 
Frederick Turner’s words, “the central tendency of the 
universe.”) 
 Let us grant Argyros these two extremely controversial 
claims: that life is increasing in complexity and that order 
sometimes arises spontaneously in the universe, not from 
order being imported into a system but through a real 
increase in order, raising the total order of the universe. 
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 What does this imply for aesthetics and for literature? 
To understand Argyros’s aesthetics, we must first understand 
his politics.  
 First, as we have seen, Argyros believes that chaos 
provides a direct justification for certain kinds of social 
systems: 
Ultimately, I believe that chaos offers a bracing 
vision of political normativity. If the universe 
is, indeed, a society of chaotic, self similar 
layers, then it appears that everything in nature, 
from prebiotic dissipative systems, to the 
ecosystem of a river, to the organization of a 
primitive nervous system, to the dynamical flow of 
a human brain, to the shape of a kinship group, a 
city, a nation, or a world works best when it 
resembles a chaotic attractor. (331) 
 
 Now, there are a number of problems with this argument, 
not least of which is that, as Stephen Kellert points out, 
“this antecedent condition is in fact false: the universe is 
not made up entirely of ‘chaotic, self-similar layers’” 
(“Science” 225). 
 Moreover, as Kellert also points out, even if the 
universe were the way Argyros thinks it is, this would not 
necessarily mean that chaotic systems “work well” unless we 
assume that the universe selects for systems that by 
definition work well (“Science” 225). (Actually, if the 
universe were made up entirely of “chaotic, self-similar 
layers,” to draw normative conclusions from this would be 
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nonsensical--like saying “objects work best when they are 
made of matter.”) 
 Argyros might mean, proposes Kellert, something like 
“in the long run, only robust systems will persist,” but he 
points out that this “assumes that new systems are not 
continually generated” (“Science” 225). We will examine in a 
moment a fairly successful attempt to generate a normative 
political model from complexity theory that emphasizes the 
robustness of complex systems, but Argyros neither provides 
any proof that chaotic systems are more robust than other 
systems nor explains why such robustness would be valuable. 
More important than the argument from chaos, however, 
is the argument from progress. That the universe is evolving 
toward greater complexity implies, for Argyros, that “our 
chief responsibility to the universe” is “to be an 
instrument of its introspection and evolution” (115). For 
Argyros, evolution is the primary value, and the primary 
goal should be to assist this (inevitable?) process. 
 Literature, in this view, “can be thought of as an 
adaptation of Homo Sapiens to facilitate the handing of the 
main baton of evolution from the biological or genetic realm 
to the cultural realm” (206). This is of course rather 
silly, if we are expected to read this as a claim that 
literature arose in order to speed up evolution. 
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 Literature can, nevertheless, contribute to cultural 
change, even “evolution.” Argyros argues that it should fill 
this role not only because we should do what the universe 
wants, but also because our evolutionary future is just 
lovely: 
Our world is evolving toward a global society. . . 
. This world would witness the gradual merging of 
knowledge and reality with a concomitant 
sharpening of the distinctions among the kinds of 
knowledge available to human beings, the 
increasing individuation, sexualization, and 
information-processing capacity of its inhabitants 
through a radically lengthened life-span due to 
nanotechnology and some form of computer-neural 
interface, the emergence of an immensely complex 
global state in which the old nation-state 
allegiances are felt to be underpinned less by 
metaphysical necessity than by aesthetic choice 
(this is like the difference between killing 
someone biologically and doing it on stage), the 
increasing reverence for art that is at once 
classical and experimental, the rehabilitation of 
our old bio/noo/sociotemporal roles, such as sex 
roles and kinship roles, in a flexible and 
ultimately aesthetic manner, and the discovery of 
new forms of devotion to the sacred. An 
information-centered world could be, to resurrect 
an old Puritan idea, the setting for a new Eden. 
(328) 
 
 Like Turner, Argyros seems to realize that his chaos- 
and-complexity-based arguments for free-market capitalism 
are feeble, and feels the need to justify his political 
preferences by reference to a future telos--a technological 




                                                            
                                                            
                               205 
                                                          
 As with Frederick Turner’s politics, when stripped of 
the metaphysics of inevitable progress, of inexorable 
complexification, Argyros’s notion is difficult to challenge 
on its own terms. That the inefficiency, injustice, and 
ecological destructiveness of capitalism are justified 
because of the wealth that the system ultimately provides, 
far from being a marginal notion, is a central assumption of 
mainstream neoclassical economics. 
 Although one could challenge this assumption in various 
ways, an aesthetics subservient to a politics of “chaotic” 
capitalism and “evolutionary” technological progress would 
not be the most ridiculous or inhumane aesthetics ever 
proposed. 
 But what, finally, does such an aesthetics amount to? 
Argyros explicitly states that he is not arguing “that 
painters should devote themselves to painting seahorse tails 
and writers to writing great evolutionary epics” (342). In 
fact, as natural classicism implies, there are only a few 
great aesthetic themes, which are “legitimate cultural 
attractors, drawing artists to their basins across cultures 
and through time” (342).22 
                         
22 This metaphor not only is befuddling, but also provides an example of 
a scientific mistake (one of many) that Argyros makes throughout the 
book--confusing “attractor” and “basin of attraction.” The basin of 
attraction is constituted by all the points that are drawn to an 
attractor. To speak of something being drawn to a basin of attraction 
makes no sense. 
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 If this chaotic/progressive aesthetic does not call for 
literature to address certain themes, as Frederick Turner’s 
does, what concrete proposals does Argyros make? 
 Very few. Argyros does suggest that “chaotic” art (as 
we have seen, very loosely defined as art that has both 
structure and “randomness”) will produce more novelty than 
other art, and “a society that is able to manufacture more 
innovation will be more likely to survive in the long run” 
(330). 
 So literature that is, well, imaginative but anchored 
by natural classicism is the best sort of literature because 
it will create “controlled novelty” (what writing does 
not?), and such “chaotic” art, in addition to being 
beautiful because it is the result of a creative process 
(again, what isn’t?), is necessary for a chaotic, 
evolutionary, self-organizing society--and chaotic, evolving 
societies are not only the quickest route to techno-utopia, 
but also our “responsibility” as members of an evolving 
universe. 
 Even if we grant Argyros all of his dubious 
stipulations and conclusions, his aesthetics is practically 
useless--his notion of chaos so broadly defined as to 
include almost anything, his one example of “chaotic” form 
in literature (the use of natural classicism) seeming to 
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reveal nothing more than an idiosyncratic preference for a 
certain ratio of “order” to “randomness.”  
 But we need not grant Argyros all of his assumptions, 
and perhaps the most dubious of these are two that he shares 
with Frederick Turner--that complexity theory posits 
evolutionary progress as a central “trend” or “theme” in the 
universe and especially in the development of life, and that 
we can draw some normative conclusions about this.  
 And yet, even if Argyros and Turner cannot logically 
connect the findings of complexity theory to their 
valorization of complex or self-organizing systems, there is 
certainly nothing intrinsically wrong with their defining 
“beautiful” as “complex” and finding things that either are 
or seem to be self-organizing--embryos, whirlpools, 
whatever--beautiful. Such an aesthetic is no more loosely 
defined than past theories that aestheticized “life.”  
 Nor is there anything particularly monstrous about 
their politics of human progress to an ultimate Omega Point, 
an ultimate ascent of spirit into the noosphere; even if 
they are mistaken about the route to such transcendence--
liberal capitalism--they would not be the first to 
subordinate aesthetics to a teleological politics. If they 
desire art that values “evolution” over “justice,” as 
Turner’s poem Genesis does, one cannot challenge this 
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commitment by questioning their science or their reasoning--
one must challenge that politics directly. 
 The problem here is not that the aesthetics of Argyros 
and Turner is based in an a priori reprehensible politics--
the problem is that these theorists claim that their 
aesthetics are apolitical. Turner constantly bemoans the 
fact that feminists and Marxists have politicized art; 
Argyros believes that the nature of the universe is 
incompatible with poststructuralism (Argyros is a little 
confusing, or confused, here; he argues that no particular 
political or ethical beliefs flow from poststructuralism, 
but also argues that the politics of poststructuralism is 
wrong). 
But they do not escape politics by redefining beauty; 
the literature that their theory values (at least as far as 
Turner explains it; Argyros’s aesthetic is, as Raymond 
Williams said of Christopher Caudwell, not even specific 
enough to be wrong) is as crudely subservient to politics as 
Socialist Realism. If these authors would simply admit their 
political commitments--that they like capitalism and dislike 
the whining of losers, that they think a grand technological 
future justifies almost any apparent injustice or waste now-
-their aesthetic would be far more convincing. 
Genesis, along with Turner’s other poetry, expresses 
this evolutionary ideology far more effectively than does 
 
 
                                                            
                                                            
                               209 
                                                          
the non-fictional work of Turner and Argyros because it does 
not rely exclusively on reasoned argument. Reduced to 
propositional form the idea that “we should contribute to 
the evolution of the universe because the universe evolves” 
is ridiculous; in an epic poem, it is an inspiring religious 
tenet. The pro-capitalist ideas put forth in Ayn Rand’s 
novels are even more bizarre when put into propositional 
form, yet generations of otherwise bright adolescents enjoy 
her novels and think that they believe in her politics and 
ethics (until confronted with the consequences of and self-
contradictory nature of these beliefs). 
There are many possible justifications for the 
unbridled capitalism advocated by classical liberalism--the 
rights-based justifications of Robert Nozick, the 
utilitarian justifications of Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig Von 
Mises--but while utilitarian justifications are subject to 
debate (does unbridled capitalism really lead to greater 
happiness than socialism?) and rights-based theories lead to 
theoretical edifices as incommensurable as the basic rights 
they assume (Nozick’s libertarianism vs. John Rawls’s 
welfare liberalism), the notion of progress as a universal 
imperative is used by the biopoeticists, as it was by 
Herbert Spencer (who believed the evolutionary imperative 
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That is to say, one can at least attempt a utilitarian 
calculation weighing the wealth and technological prowess 
generated by capitalism against the suffering of its victims 
(is a more equal, but less wealthy overall, society a 
maximally happy one? Is it even true that great income 
inequality is necessary for a productive society?), but if 
one assumes a priori that progress is a universal 
imperative, and what is most desirable is what leads to such 
progress, the most rapacious and brutal forms of capitalism 
are justified if they can be shown to hasten mankind's 
ascent into the noosphere--or, as Neal Stephenson calls it, 
"the great global furball." 
Alternatives to this mythical valorization of 
complexity can be seen other recent works of science fiction 
dealing with the terraforming of Mars. If Turner's goal in 
the valorization of complexity is to take the politics out 
of politics (as he also wants to take it out of aesthetics), 
Kim Stanley Robinson, a celebrated science fiction writer 
with a PhD in literature (Fredric Jameson was his 
dissertation director), in his own three-volume Mars epic, 
leaves it in, in all its human complexity. The central 
question for Robinson, in the words of one of his 
characters, is "Why do we value life more than rock?" But 
even this riposte to Turner is not really Robinson's 
ultimate message. Robinson doesn't really take a position on 
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whether bringing life to Mars or preserving it in its 
pristine glory is preferable. These are absolute ethical 
principles with which one really cannot argue. What is 
important to Robinson is how the question of whether to 
terraform Mars is ultimately political--the result of real 
struggle over who gets to dispose of resources. 
Bruce Sterling, too, provides a fascinating take on the 
terraforming issue in his “Shaper/Mechanist” stories 
(stories that take place in a milieu of humans radically 
altered by technology)--those posthumans involved in the 
terraforming of Mars do so because of precepts distilled 
from Ilya Prigogine's complexity: they are helping Mars move 
up the "Prigoginic levels." Although this commitment to the 
terraforming of Mars is the most moving ethical/political 
commitment in these works (and virtually identical to 
Turner's position), the most thoughtful characters in these 
stories think that this ideology is utter nonsense--as does 
Sterling, who admits in his preface to a recent edition of 
Schismatrix that Prigogine himself thinks shaper/mechanist 
ideology a complete misreading of his work. 
Robinson's Mars novels reveal the dual errors in 
Turner's position: first, in thinking that there is a 
tendency in nature toward higher forms, and second, in 
believing that if this tendency is the case, man should 
therefore emulate it or encourage it. 
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But this logical leap is not really an “error” in the 
context of Turner’s project, as revealed in his nonfiction 
as well as his fiction; he is engaged in myth-making--a 
different project from those of Robinson and Sterling, who, 
although their focus is more on the conflict of political 
visions, are guided by their own political ideologies (among 
them a liberal receptiveness to debate). 
 So these biopoeticists subscribe to marginal science, 
and their reasoning from facts to values is wrong--or at 
least rather transparently fallacious. They are probably 
mistaken about liberal capitalism being more “chaotic” than 
other systems, and it is unclear that liberal capitalist 
societies will “evolve” faster than others. 
Their arguments in favor of their values are either 
deceptive or sloppy; and yet, given that all values are 
ultimately ungroundable, let us accept the validity of an 
aesthetics based on the evolution of humanity and the 
cosmos--and a belief that capitalism is the way for 
humankind, or at least its social systems, to evolve most 
rapidly. If they want pro-evolutionary myths and wish to 
judge the quality of a work of literature based on their 
perception of how that work contributes to/inhibits 
evolution, how do we judge that project?   
 Even if we accept the premise that evolutionary 
progress is the ultimate value, the aesthetics that Argyros 
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and Turner construct from this premise is sadly wanting. The 
only real guideline they provide is to ask whether the work 
is pro-evolution or not. 
 Contrast this with the sophistication of and lively 
debate in Marxist criticism, which also in a sense 
subordinates the aesthetic to an ultimate political goal. 
From Trotsky’s discussion of whether Shakespeare should be 
read to Fredric Jameson’s attempts (following Ernst Bloch) 
to find utopian hope in the most right-wing cultural 
products, from Lukacs’s endorsement of realism to Brecht’s 
championing of modernism, Marxist literary criticism has 
realized the difficulty of judging a work by its political 
intent or predicted political effect. 
Perhaps it is unreasonable to judge these theories by 
such standards. Marxist literary theory has existed for over 
a century, biopoetics for less than twenty years (if we can 
describe E.O. Wilson’s sociobiological speculations about 
art in On Human Nature as biopoetics, as Brett Cooke and 
Frederick Turner have). Attempts to derive an aesthetic from 
evolutionary progress, however, date back at least as far as 
Herbert Spencer, and the biopoeticists have not progressed 
beyond Spencer’s ideas that art serves to keep our 
facilities in shape (much like the “off-line” thinking 
described by Cosmides and Tooby), and that progress in art--
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like progress in all things--lies in “heterogeneity”: the 
progressive differentiation of forms (“Progress”). 
At this time, even the paths of development that have 
been sketched out by the “pro-evolution” biopoeticists--more 
precise definitions of “pro-evolution” themes and “complex” 
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   Conclusion 
 
 The biopoetics project--an attempt to depoliticize 
literary theory and criticism, to make criticism more 
“objective” and “scientific” through an explicit connection 
with evolutionary theory (specifically, through an 
application of evolutionary psychology and of the idea of 
evolution as progressive)--must ultimately be considered a 
failure, even on its own terms. 
 Where it conceives most contemporary literary theory as 
impoverished for not considering all of the causes 
(especially material causes) of the production of 
literature, the biopoeticists present an essentially 
monocausal explanation of literary production: literature is 
the product of authors, whose identities are completely 
determined by biology. 
 Such an explanation of literary production pales in 
comparison to, for example, the application of the 
Althusserian concept of overdetermination in the work of 
Pierre Macherey and others (a concept that can ultimately 
encompass any new ideas from the sciences). Moreover, while 
the biopoeticists condemn most literary theorists for 
ignorance of or indifference to science, the science that 
they place at the center of their theory, evolutionary 
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psychology, is, to say the least, immature--and they extend 
the hypotheses of this science far beyond the wildest claims 
of its practitioners. 
 While they accuse contemporary theory of “politicizing” 
literature, they make “apolitical” claims such as Joseph 
Carroll’s that we must understand homosexuality as a 
dysfunction if we are to understand works involving 
homosexual characters. In fact, there seems to be no method 
in the biopoeticists’ novel evolutionary-psychological 
hypotheses; all that these hypotheses seem to share is their 
happy support for the biopoeticists’ cultural claims. 
 If their arguments for the greater explanatory power of 
their model are weak, the biopoeticists’ normative claims 
derived from evolutionary psychology are even more feeble: 
those works that employ themes involving “innate” concerns 
(reproduction, child care, male aggressiveness and female 
coyness) are greater than those that do not; those that 
flatter our adaptive and innate cognitive structures (our 
desire for a sense of pattern, or our three-second memory 
“pulse”) are greater than those that do not. 
 Even if their evolutionary-psychological claims are all 
true, the biopoeticists still fail to provide an explanation 
of why such works should be considered better than others. 
That works going, as it were, with the grain of human 
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cognition rather than against it are the greater ones 
requires arguments that they do not provide. The most that 
can be asserted from the mere existence of the cognitive 
propensities that the biopoeticists identify is that works 
that play to these propensities might be more widely 
comprehensible than those that do not--and even this 
assertion questionably assumes that cultural influence on 
the human mind is slight. 
 When they recognize the inadequacy of mere assertion of 
innate tendencies--as Frederick Turner and Alexander Argyros 
do--and attempt to root their preference for traditional 
forms in a larger argument, the biopoeticists get into even 
more trouble. As all the biopoeticists do with evolutionary 
psychology, Turner and Argyros root their argument in a 
highly questionable scientific claim: evolutionary progress. 
They then pronounce such progress good, and construct very 
tenuous arguments that certain literary forms and themes are 
the product of, and contribute to, that progress. 
 Elements of biopoetics may one day prove useful as part 
of a broadly conceived materialist poetics. Evolutionary 
psychology will always be a speculative science; one cannot 
test its assertions of adaptive origin. As cognitive science 
progresses, however, we will better understand the skills 
and weaknesses of the human mind; it may even prove to be 
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the case that certain themes have a particular appeal to 
humans because of the construction of their brains. Such 
findings, combined with an understanding that humans are 
embedded in cultures, could perhaps contribute in a modest 
way to the discussion of how literature is created and 
received. 
 These areas are properly the domain of cognitive 
science alone, however. Although some fine work has been 
done by literary theorists applying the still-modest 
findings of this science (Mark Turner, for example), this 
work is convincing due to the very extent that it does not 
rely on evolutionary just-so stories.  
  The theory of evolution, and especially the theory of 
its primary motor, natural selection, deserves consideration 
by literary theorists, who should applaud attempts to expand 
their critical toolkit. A critical theory that would come to 
grips with evolution, however, would do well to ignore the 
foundation constructed by the biopoeticists, and seek to 
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